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The health insurance reform debate, which resulted in the passage of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act and the Health Care and Education Reconcilia-
tion Act, both signed into law in late March, 2010, had two general goals. One was
extending coverage to millions of uninsured Americans. The other was controlling
the growth of health care costs, with an aim to making health care more affordable
and making health insurance more protective against catastrophic financial losses as-
sociated with illness or injury. With these dual goals, policymakers focused on both
the extensive margin of health insurance coverage — moving the uninsured into any
form of coverage — and the intensive margin — how much coverage one has, and
how insurance influences the medical spending of the insured.
This dissertation consists of three distinct essays related to both aspects of the
health insurance policy debate; two focus on the intensive margin of health insurance
coverage, and one examines the extensive margin. The three essays cover some of the
most relevant issues in health insurance coverage, including whether more generous
coverage leads to more spending due to moral hazard, how different are the enrollees
in more and less generous plans (i.e., adverse selection) and how that might influence
insurance premiums, how interracial disparities in health insurance coverage have
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changed over time and why, and how responsive consumers are to particular plan
characteristics, including the level and variability of the consumer’s projected burden
of out-of-pocket medical spending under each plan.
In the first essay, I devise a new test for whether adverse selection and/or moral
hazard influence the national market for employer-sponsored health insurance. Be-
fore enrollment, employees likely know much more about their health needs in the
coming year than the insurer, which in most cases must charge the same premium
to every employee for any particular health plan, regardless of their past, present,
or future utilization. In addition, the employee and her care provider likely know
more than the insurer about the necessity of each unit of medical care received dur-
ing the coverage year. The employees’ information advantage before and during
enrollment threatens to induce inefficiency due to adverse selection and moral haz-
ard, respectively. While these effects are well understood theoretically, in practice
they are difficult to distinguish, as each results in enrollees in the more generous
plan spending more on medical care. I propose a model that produces two empirical
predictions to separately identify these effects. First, a more financially generous
health plan, irrespective of the rejected alternatives, induces increased spending due
to moral hazard. Second, controlling for the selected plan’s generosity, a positive
correlation between expenditures and the level of spending that leads employees to
prefer the more generous plan suggests adverse selection. Then, using data from
the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey from 1996 to 2001 on health plan offerings
from a national sample of employers, I confirm that more generous coverage leads
to increased spending on medical care due to moral hazard, although the effect is
weaker in managed care plans than in traditional, non-managed plans. While there
is some evidence that individuals with a medical condition enroll in more generous
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plans, spending in those plans is not significantly higher, suggesting that adverse
selection does not lead to diverging premiums.
In the second essay, written with Catherine G. McLaughlin of Mathematica Policy
Research and the University of Michigan School of Public Health, we decompose how
differences in citizenship, education, and labor market outcomes have contributed to
the growing disparity in the uninsured rate between Hispanics and non-Hispanic
Whites. Over the last 25 years, the uninsured rate has risen dramatically for His-
panics, while the proportion of most other racial and ethnic groups without health
insurance coverage has been fairly stable. Hispanics, on average, are less likely to be
citizens and have lower educational attainment and worse labor market outcomes,
and there is evidence that these differences between Hispanics and non-Hispanics
have grown over time. Using pooled panels of the Survey of Income and Program
Participation from 1983 to 2007, we find that differences in citizenship and education
can explain about half of the growth in the uninsured rate gap between Hispanics and
non-Hispanic Whites, but even after controlling for other observable characteristics,
more than half of the growing disparity, or more than one million extra uninsured
Hispanics, remains unexplained.
In the final essay, I examine the relative influence of the elements of a health
plan’s “price” on the probability that it is selected from the set of plans offered
by one’s employer. In health insurance, price includes not just the upfront cost to
the consumer, the premium, but also both the level and the variance out-of-pocket
spending associated with the care the plan insures. In addition, I consider how plan
characteristics beyond financial coverage for basic care, including access to providers,
non-standard coverage like mental health and long term care, and plan’s market share
among one’s coworkers, affect plan choice. Using the same data as the first essay and
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accounting for the differences between managed care and less restrictive plans, I find
that employees demand a plan with lower expected out-of-pocket costs, but that the
variance of a plan’s out-of-pocket spending has no effect on plan choice. Employees
are only weakly responsive to their share of the premium, but do tend to choose the
most popular plan at a firm, suggesting the importance of unobserved plan quality
differences and/or the employees opting for the default plan.
CHAPTER II
Asymmetric Information and the Generosity of
Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance
DISCLAIMER: The research in this paper was conducted while the author was a
Special Sworn Status researcher of the U.S. Census Bureau at the Michigan Census
Research Data Center. Any opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of
the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Census Bureau. All
results have been reviewed to ensure that no confidential information is disclosed.
2.1 Introduction
Seventy-five percent of Americans under the age of 65 obtain their health insurance
through their (or a family member’s) employer (DeNavas-Walt et al., 2009). The
main advantage of the employer insurance system is the ability to pool risk over a
group that gathers for reasons that likely have little to do with health. However, there
may be no insurance market where information is more asymmetric between buyer
and seller. Because of nondiscrimination laws, privacy concerns, and administrative
difficulty, health insurers must set plan premiums without knowing any individual
employee’s family health history, recent medical care utilization, or often even basic
demographic information like gender, age, or family size. Usually, the most the
insurer knows about any one individual in a firm is whether it is covering her alone
5
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or her and some unspecified number of family members.
A consequence of asymmetric information is that moral hazard and adverse se-
lection can unravel the efficiency gains from selling insurance to an employee group
rather than individual by individual. Because the insurer cannot properly monitor
which units of care are medically necessary, more generous coverage may lead to en-
rollees purchasing care that the consumer values below their full cost, reducing social
welfare. The inflated health care spending due to moral hazard drives up insurers’
costs and makes health insurance more expensive for all.
In addition, employees with private information about their high expected health
needs have an incentive to choose more generous plans, driving up the premium for
these plans and forcing healthier employees into plans that provide less protection
against financial risk. Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) show that this self-selection may
lead to the adverse selection “death spiral,” where a plan that enrolls only the highest
risk employees becomes too expensive for the employer to offer. This results in a
welfare loss to both high- and low-risk enrollees: there are fewer insurance options
available, and those plans that do exist have less generous coverage than enrollees
would prefer.
In this paper, I take advantage of variation across employers in the generosity of
plans in the employees’ choice set, and information about both accepted and rejected
plans, to separately identify the influence of moral hazard and adverse selection. The
separate estimation of these two phenomena stands in contrast to previous studies
of other insurance markets that are restricted to a joint test of adverse selection and
moral hazard (Chiappori and Salanie, 2000).
I model the employee’s decision to enroll in the more generous plan offered to her
by her employer, and two empirical predictions emerge. First, a more generous plan
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leads to more spending on medical care due to moral hazard; the employee’s spend-
ing decision is independent of her plan’s premium and the premium and generosity
of other plans the employee had been offered. Second, an employee’s incentive to
choose higher- or lower-generosity plans depends on the difference in out-of-pocket
spending between her offers. Low spending employees prefer the less generous plan
with the lower premium, but above some (firm-specific) spending threshold, the more
generous plan is preferable. If adverse selection occurs, as the threshold spending
level increases, enrollees in both the more and less generous plans should be less
healthy and higher-spending on average.
This model leads to clear testable implications for employer-sponsored health in-
surance, the broadest insurance market in the U.S. I produce the first nationwide
estimates of the impact of moral hazard and adverse selection between plans of the
same type, either health maintenance organizations (HMOs) or more traditional,
less-managed care, on this market. Like existing studies on a small number of firms
(including Feldman et al., 1989, and Cutler and Reber, 1998), I consider how differ-
ences in direct health measures suggest adverse selection between plans of the same
type. Unlike these studies, I also estimate how differences in generosity and premi-
ums correlate with the difference in expenditures between plan enrollees, which is
more likely to lead to the adverse selection “death spiral.”
My estimates, using Medical Expenditure Panel Survey data from 1996 to 2001,
suggest that moral hazard leads to substantially more spending on medical care in
non-HMO plans, though spending does not increase with generosity in an HMO plan.
There is no evidence for adverse selection between plans of the same type; an increase
in the threshold spending level does not lead to an increase in observed spending
nor more adverse health outcomes among enrollees. There is weak evidence, that
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HMO plans are less likely than non-HMOs to enroll employees with family members
suffering from a chronic condition or over the age of 50, consistent with adverse
selection between plan types.
These results are relevant to at least two aspects of the current health insurance
debate. One important goal of reform is to reduce the growth of health care costs; the
lower level of moral hazard-induced spending among HMO enrollees suggests that
tighter management of care among all plans may reduce the ever-growing spending
on health care in the U.S. economy. Officials also aim to reduce the often exorbi-
tant premiums in the small business and individual insurance markets, restricting
premiums based on personal characteristics, including age, eliminating coverage ex-
emptions for pre-existing conditions, and generally making these markets more like
the existing employer insurance system. While adverse selection resulting from this
increase in private information could lead to rapidly increasing premiums or the
elimination of the most generous plans, my estimates suggest that this outcome is
unlikely.
2.2 Related Literature
Economists have long theorized that insurance contracts that are improperly
priced due to private information can lead to spiraling prices, unequal access, and
market failure (Arrow, 1963). Because efforts to prevent illness or injury, or limit the
amount spent on the patient beyond what is medically necessary, are difficult if not
impossible to monitor, insurers include deductibles and coinsurance to reduce moral
hazard, rather than fully cover medical care (Pauly, 1968). Furthermore, Rothschild
and Stiglitz (1976) show that when insurers are unable to differentiate between high-
and low-risk enrollees, insurance markets are prone to adverse selection: in equilib-
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rium, either low-risk individuals are unable to fulfill their desire to fully insure, or
no insurance contract is offered to either group. The market is thus forced to decide
on the proper tradeoff between protecting against the financial risk of medical care
episodes and moderating inefficiency.
The health insurance literature has generally found that moral hazard has a mod-
erate but statistically significant impact on medical spending (Cutler and Zeckhauser,
2000). This consensus emerged after the RAND experiment (Manning et al., 1987),
which featured an experimental design that avoided corrupting the moral hazard
estimates with selection effects. The RAND experiment’s conclusion was that con-
sumers are responsive to out-of-pocket price, with a small but statistically significant
elasticity (approximately -0.2).
While there has never been an analogous large-scale experiment for determining
the impact of adverse selection, researchers have frequently used employer data on the
composition of enrollees in their health plans to determine whether employees select a
health plan based on private information about their health. Cutler and Zeckhauser
(2000) survey this literature, and find that in most studies of a small number of
firms, more comprehensive plans tend to enroll older workers and those more likely
to have chronic conditions. Most of these studies focus on selection between managed
care and more traditional plans (including Cutler and Reber, 1998), with managed
care plans attracting the lower risk employees. A few others (including Ellis, 1989)
examine selection within plans of the same type (i.e., managed care or traditional fee-
for-service plans). Feldman et al. (1989) consider selection both across and within
plan types, but they lack data on covered dependents, and only observe personal
characteristics, not the eventual medical care expenditures by enrollees.1
1Other studies (Buchmueller and Feldstein, 1997, Strombom et al., 2002, and Cutler, Lincoln, and Zeckhauser,
2009) find evidence that unhealthy employees are also less likely to switch plans between years. I lack data on
employees over time, so I am restricted to a static model of adverse selection.
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These studies of individual firms nearly universally find evidence of adverse selec-
tion by individual characteristics, which are often correlated with, but not equivalent
to, eventual financial risk. The problem with adverse selection is the “death spiral,”
where a plan that attracts only high-risk enrollees will have to charge ever-higher
premiums that result in a high cost enrollee base. If costs are sufficiently managed
by the insurer so that the difference in financial risk between plans remains within
reason, then the death spiral is not inevitable (Feldman and Dowd, 1991). Fur-
thermore, the initial high-generosity plan enrollees that are forced to switch to a
lower-generosity plan are likely to bring up the average financial risk for their new
plan, stabilizing the difference in costs between the plans.
A better measure of adverse selection is whether enrollees in the more generous
plan spend more on medical care than enrollees in the less generous plan. The prob-
lem, as Pauly (1986) points out, is that higher generosity plans also encourage more
spending due to moral hazard, so a positive correlation between coverage amount
and medical care expenditure (controlling for variables that are common knowledge
and can thus be used to price the contract) could suggest the presence of adverse
selection, moral hazard, or both. The positive correlation test literature (Chiappori
and Salanie, 2000) acknowledges this limitation, but provides a starting point for
determining whether cost differences between plans in a national insurance market
could lead to escalating premiums.2
Other researchers have suggested estimation techniques to separately identify ad-
verse selection and moral hazard, but these methods carry downsides both in general
and for employer-sponsored health insurance in particular. Structural estimation re-
quires assumptions about the underlying utility maximization problem and the na-
2Chiappori and Salanie (2000) and Cawley and Philipson (1999) find no evidence for a positive correlation in the
auto and life insurance markets, respectively. Finkelstein and Poterba (2004) find a positive correlation in the U.K.
annuities market.
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ture of private information about one’s expenditure risk. Cardon and Hendel (2001)
rule out adverse selection, though they do find evidence of moral hazard in line with
the RAND experiment. Reduced form models may also allow for separating adverse
selection from moral hazard, but these models require either exogenous variation
in prices (Einav, Finkelstein and Cullen, 2008) or experience rating (Abbring et al.
2003); however, there are few, if any, natural experiments in the national employer
insurance market in the U.S. during the late 1990’s, while group health insurance
premiums are almost never based on any individual enrollee’s past utilization.
My paper employs a method for distinguishing the effects of adverse selection from
the effects of moral hazard that does not rely on assumptions about consumers’ pref-
erences or the nature of the private information signal, nor does it require exogenous
variation in the price of insurance. Instead, I use variation in the choice set of plans
across a national sample of employers to determine what portion of an enrollee’s
spending can be attributed to the generosity of the plan she selects (moral hazard),
and what can be attributed to her selecting that plan over alternatives based on
her expectations about her future spending. Like the existing single-employer stud-
ies, I compare plans based on the composition of their enrollees, but I also consider
the difference between plans in enrollees’ ultimate financial risk, which would more
directly lead to the adverse selection “death spiral.”
2.3 Data
The Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) is conducted by the Agency of
Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), a division of the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services. MEPS interviews households about health care expen-
diture and utilization, health status and conditions, and health insurance, including
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which family members were covered and when, and other demographic variables.
Household respondents are surveyed every three to five months, a total of five times
over their two years in the panel. A new panel has started each January since 1996.
If an individual or family receives medical care during their time in the survey,
MEPS gathers more information on care events directly from the provider, including
total expenditures on the patient’s behalf and how the provider was reimbursed for
that care, either by the patient out-of-pocket or by private insurance. The primary
dependent variable in this analysis, total expenditure, is the sum of the private and
self-paid expenditures from these events during the months when individuals in the
family were covered by the selected employer-sponsored plan.
In addition, MEPS surveys business establishments and government units on the
health insurance plans (up to four) that they offer their employees. MEPS collects
characteristics of the business, eligibility rules for benefits, and details about the
offered plans. From 1996 through 2001, except 2000, this sample includes employers
of individuals in the household survey.3 This allows for a link between a survey of the
full set of insurance offerings of employers of varying size and industry from across
the country to comprehensive data on medical care utilization and expenditures for
6,600 employees, including demographic data and measures of health status.4
2.4 Theoretical Framework
The analysis in this paper considers decisions made by the health insurance unit,
which may consist of a single individual or multiple individuals in a family, subject
3MEPS documentation (AHRQ 1999) cautions that there was significant survey non-response from the employers,
and thus there has been no effort to create weights that allow for nationally representative estimates from the Linked
File, unlike the full MEPS sample.
4Only one spouse was surveyed in about 92 percent of two-earner households in this sample, but this is usually
the spouse whose employer provided coverage to the other household members. The set of offers may also be less
than complete if the firm offers more than four plans; government entities were asked about up to 36 plans, but I
restrict the choice set to the four most popular plans of the type ultimately selected by the employee.
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to eligibility rules. Single workers maximize their own individual utility. When the
health insurance unit is a family, the worker receiving the offer of insurance maximizes
expected family utility. In the analysis that follows, the “employee” refers to the
individual in a single coverage plan, or the family in a family coverage plan. I take
the decision to choose single coverage or family coverage as given.
A representative employee obtains utility from her consumption of health care,
h, and goods other than health care. While she does not know exactly how much
she (and her family) will spend on medical care during the coming year, she likely
has a better estimate than her employer or the insurer, as she knows her personal
health history, family history, the severity of any existing health conditions, and her
preference for obtaining care. While the insurer may have data on her past usage of
care if she has been enrolled previously, this information cannot be used to vary the
premium by risk type; the premium for each policyholder in a given plan is equal to
the expected average cost of all enrollees in that plan.5
At the beginning of the fiscal year, she will choose a health insurance plan from
among the plans offered by her employer.6 Her selected plan j is characterized by the
amount she must contribute toward the premium, pj, and the financial generosity of
the plan, as summarized by the coinsurance rate, 0 ≤ δj ≤ 1, i.e., the share of h she
must pay out-of-pocket.7 The plan may also differ from other plans offered by her
employer in non-financial elements: access to doctors, the breadth of in-network and
out-of-network options for care, whether a referral is necessary to see a specialist, the
5Insurers do, however, charge different premiums for the same plans across employers. The plan’s total premium
depends on the region, industry, general demographic composition of the employer’s workforce, and the collective
utilization history of that employer’s enrollees in the plan. However, the total premium paid on behalf of any
worker, i.e., the sum of the employer- and employee-paid portions, does not vary by any individual characteristic.
Conceivably, the employer could require higher-risk employees to contribute a larger amount toward the premium,
but in practice this is rare; I exclude such plans from the analysis.
6I leave the modeling of the employer’s decision to offer one or more plans of varying generosity for future research;
see Moran, Chernew, and Hirth (2001) and Bundorf (2002).
7For simplicity, plan j is assumed to have a linear coinsurance schedule; a kinked schedule, as would be the case
with a deductible, would not change the analysis.
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inclusion of dental, vision, home health care, or mental health coverage, and coverage
for particular procedures, such as mammograms or vaccinations. I restrict my focus
to the financial generosity of the plans in the portfolio with respect to physician,
hospital, and prescription drugg expenditures alone, as any two plans of the same
type (e.g., all managed care plans) in a firm’s portfolio tend to offer the same non-
financial benefits.8 A more financially generous plan will reimburse the care provider
with a higher portion of every dollar spent on health care on the employee’s behalf,
leaving the employee with a smaller share; that is, plan j is defined to be more
generous than plan k if δj < δk.
During the fiscal year, the employee’s demand for medical care should depend
only on the out-of-pocket price per unit she faces under selected plan j, δj; the more
that the insurance plan reduces the out-of-pocket price below the true price, the
more the employee will buy, due to moral hazard. This assumption follows directly
from the concept of the sunk costs, which, according to traditional economic theory,
are irrelevant in deciding how much of a product, in this case medical care, to buy.
In this model, there are two sunk costs. The premium is a fixed cost (even if paid
monthly or in each pay period, as the amount is a contractual obligation), and is
therefore a sunk cost for the length of the contract. In addition, the opportunity cost
of choosing one plan rather than another is also sunk during the contract period, and
therefore irrelevant; that is, within the fiscal year, only the selected plan matters.
Thus, moral hazard is influenced only by the absolute generosity of the selected plan
— the more generous the employee’s plan, the more she and her family will spend,
irrespective of the rejected alternatives.9
8Table 4.4 shows how the selected plans differ from the rejected plans along non-financial elements. Any two
HMO plans tend to be very similar; slightly more people prefer not to need referrals for specialist care, and prefer
to have access to a chiropractor. Non-HMO plans are more different from each other; coverage for home health care
and physicals is especially preferred. Non-HMO plan enrollees often choose a plan that requires referrals and has a
deductible over plans, consistent with choosing PPO plans over FFS plans.
9Endogenous job selection could bias this correlation upward. A job applicant with high expected medical costs
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Adverse selection, however, requires information on both the selected plan and
the rejected alternatives, as those are the options between which the employee is
self-selecting. In an insurance market with standardized options, or within one firm
that is restricted to offering the same set of health insurance plans to all employees,
the rejected alternatives are standard across enrollees, so their characteristics are
of relatively little importance. In the national employer-sponsored health insurance
market, however, the parameters of the rejected plans vary. The potential for adverse
selection will be different at a firm that offers only two very generous plans compared
to a firm that offers one very generous plan and one much more bare-bones plan,
and very obviously different at a firm that offers just the one very generous plan and
nothing else.
In this model, the distribution of risks is continuous and one-dimensional, based
only on expected health care expenditure (as in Cutler and Reber, 1998), and risk
type maps monotonically to the ex-post realization of medical spending.10 Employees
are offered two plans of the same type (e.g., managed care), with associated premiums
that do not vary by individual but may differ between the plans, and no one chooses
to remain uninsured.11 For any fixed dollar amount of total spending on behalf of
may be attracted to a firm by its generous health plans (or one specific generous plan). Thus, a positive correlation
between generosity and spending would result purely from adverse selection between jobs. However, there are several
reasons to think that endogenous job selection does not invalidate this paper’s results. For one, among all the
uncertainty surrounding a job search, it is difficult to place a value on hypothetical plan offers, especially when all
potential employers are likely touting their “generous health benefits.” I also include firm characteristics, including
industry and firm size, in the regression analysis, which may control for differences across firms. My sample is also
limited to employees who take up an employer’s insurance offer. Endogenous job selection is more of a concern when
there is sorting between jobs that offer no health insurance versus jobs that offer at least one plan; even then, Hirth
et al. (2006) and Monheit and Vistnes (1999) indicate that a substantial number of individuals who prefer not to
have insurance are mismatched with firms that offer insurance, resulting in lower wages than would be ideal.
10Medical spending could be modeled as a function h(Ψ), where Ψ represents the difference in monetary value
between the more generous and less generous plans (Feldman and Dowd, 1982). Employees with low values of Ψ
opt for C, and those with high values select G, and the analysis is no different than above. Medical spending may
also be modeled as a function h(Ψ, ε), where ε is a stochastic variable accounting for uncertainty about one’s health
during the coming year. Employees with low Ψ will opt for plan C, but some will draw a large ε (bad health)
and realize a large value for h; these employees will have low-generosity plans but high spending levels, biasing the
expected positive correlation between absolute generosity and spending toward zero. A similar result holds for high
Ψ employees in plan G who draw a low value of ε and thus spend very little.
11This restriction simplifies the exposition of the model but is not essential. If there are uninsured employees, the
model assumes that they come from the left-most points on the risk distribution. The implications for the subsets
choosing the less generous and more generous plans remain unchanged.
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the employee, h, plan G requires less out-of-pocket spending than the less generous
plan, C (δGh < δCh). Premiums for the two plans will depend on their respective
average costs; unless G enrollees spend far less than C enrollees, enough to make up
for the plan-paid advantage, plan G will have the higher premium, so pG > pC .
Adverse selection arises in this model because each employee chooses the plan that
requires a lower total out-of-pocket spending at their expected expenditure level, h.
If spending is likely to be low, then the lower coinsurance paid under plan G will not
make up for the extra premium every month. However, if h will be high, then plan
G’s advantage in cost sharing will more than compensate for the higher premium.
Below some threshold value of spending, h′, plan C will be preferred, while above h′,
plan G results in a lower out-of-pocket spending amount, including premium. At h′,
the total out-of-pocket spending under the two plans are equal, so
pG + δGh




δC − δG =
pG − pC
(1− δG)− (1− δC) , (2.2)
which indicates that the threshold level of spending above which consumers would
prefer the more generous plan is simply the ratio of the relative premium, or the
difference in premium between the two plans, to the relative generosity, the difference
in the plan-paid portion out of every dollar of medical spending.12
The MEPS dataset essentially draws a small number (often just one) of employees
randomly from the risk distribution in a firm. The expected value of that draw will
depend on the threshold spending level, h′. As h′ increases, the expected value of h
12This framework implicitly assumes a risk neutral consumer. A risk averse employee would likely prefer plan G
even at some h slightly below h′. In this case h′, and its (theoretically) positive correlation with spending, would
be overstated, so the correlation measured in the regression model is an upper bound on the true correlation. In the
results section, I show that the measured correlation is not significantly greater than zero, so we can be confident
that there is no correlation with h′ and thus no adverse selection along the demand for financial generosity.
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both above and below h′ also increases.13 The intuition is presented in Figure 2.1.
Firm X and Firm Y have identical risk distributions, f(h), in their employee pools,
and both firms offer the same less-generous plan C requiring the same employee
contribution.14 The firms offer different more-generous plans: Firm X’s plan GX is
more generous, and requires a larger employee contribution, than Firm Y’s plan GY ,
and thus is further to the right on the generosity continuum. Because the generosity
gap between the two plans is wider in Firm X, the threshold level of spending h′ will
also be further to the right in Firm X than in Firm Y, which means the randomly-
selected X employee who chose plan C will have a larger expected value of h than
the sampled Firm Y employee with the same plan.15
The exercise in Figure 2.1 summarizes the strategy for separately identifying moral
hazard and adverse selection among employees who opt for their respective firm’s
lower generosity plan. A positive correlation between plan C’s absolute generosity
and the C enrollee’s total medical care expenditure, all else (including the relative
generosity and relative premium) equal, reflects the presence of the moral hazard
incentive, because only the generosity of the selected plan matters. If unhealthy
employees adversely select into more generous plans, the threshold level of risk,
h′, i.e., the ratio of plan C’s relative premium to its relative generosity, should be
positively correlated with spending, holding C’s absolute generosity constant.16
The exercise is similar for plan G enrollees. In Figure 2.2, I compare the same
13See Appendix for the proof to this statement.
14Note that h is endogenous to plan choice, due to moral hazard, but in Figure 2.1, the relevant employees at each
firm face the same moral hazard incentive, as both choose plan C. The same is true for the employees choosing plan
G in Figure 2.2.
15In this intuitive model, plan GX requires a larger employee contribution than plan GY , for two reasons. First,
because the insurer reimburses the care provider with a higher proportion of any dollar of spending under plan GX ,
the expected cost for any fixed dollar amount in any fixed population is higher for GX than for GY . Second, as
shown in the graph, the enrollees in plan GX are higher risk on average, so the premium will need to be higher to
reflect the higher average cost. The higher premium only reinforces the adverse selection — only the riskiest Firm
X employees will choose to pay the much higher premium for GX .
16Plan C should have a lower premium than plan G, and by definition is lower generosity, so both relative premium
and relative generosity are negative, and thus the ratio is positive. The threshold value h′ is always positive if plan
G is more expensive than plan C.
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Firm X to a different firm, Z, which also has the same risk distribution among its
employees. Firms X and Z offer the same more-generous health plan G, but Firm
Z’s less-generous offering, CZ , is more generous than at Firm X, requiring a greater
premium. Because Firm X’s plan C is further to the left, so too is the threshold
spending level h′, and therefore the sampled employee at Firm X should have a lower
expected value of spending. Thus, holding constant the absolute generosity of the
selected plan (in this case, G), a positive correlation between h′ and the ultimate
level of medical spending h suggests adverse selection.
In summary, in the national employer-sponsored health insurance market, the vari-
ation in both absolute and relative generosity and relative premium allows for the
separate identification of moral hazard and adverse selection, respectively. The more
generous the selected plan is, the more that moral hazard will induce the enrollee
to spend on covered medical care; thus, a positive correlation between absolute gen-
erosity and medical expenditures suggests the influence of moral hazard. A positive
correlation between expenditures and the threshold level of spending that separates
those who prefer the more generous, more expensive plan and those who prefer the
cheaper option, controlling for the moral hazard incentive, suggests adverse selection.
2.5 Health Insurance Generosity
A key contribution of this paper is the creation of a single measure that summa-
rizes the financial generosity of a health insurance plan. This generosity measure
simplifies a plan’s often complex, non-linear coinsurance schedule, and allows for
comparing plans over the range of one’s possible out-of-pocket costs.
The simplest possible generosity measure is the total amount that the plan actu-
ally reimburses on behalf of the enrollee (and her family, where applicable) during
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the given year. This is not the measure I use, as there are a number of serious
problems with this measure. First, the family’s spending level is likely endogenous
to the plan’s characteristics; in fact, one of the hypotheses tested in this paper is
exactly that: a plan with lower cost-sharing will likely lead to more spending, due to
moral hazard. Second, this variable is only ascertained for the selected plan, not the
rejected alternatives. Finally, for those plans with no deductible, there is a mechan-
ical relationship between the chosen plan’s actual insurer-paid amount and the total
expenditure level, in effect tracing out the average plan-paid rate for that enrollee.
As an alternative, I calculate the generosity of any plan based on a sample of
employees with similar risk profiles, and determine how much every plan offered to
those employees would pay out if each member of the sample was enrolled in the
plan, using the plan’s deductible(s), co-payments, coinsurance, and maximums. The
“absolute generosity” of a plan j is the mean percent of total spending that the plan
would pay for these hypothetical enrollees.
In the model, the employee chooses a plan from among her portfolio of offers
based on her expectations about her (and her family’s) expenditures during the
coming year. I do not observe this range of expectations. Instead, I define the range
of her possible outcomes as the empirical distribution of the ex-post realization of
expenditures by others in the MEPS linked employer-employee sample who are of
a “similar” risk type ex-ante. This risk type is defined by three variables: the
survey year, to account for the growth of spending over the six years; the employee’s
enrollment status, based on whether she chose a single or family plan; and whether
anyone in the employee’s family (or just herself, if she chose an individual plan) had
a chronic condition or health limitation before or during the plan year, to account
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for her baseline risk.17
The Nr employees in subsample r were offered a total of Jr plans, between one
and four plans per person. For each employee i in that subsample, I calculate how
much plan j ∈ Jr would have paid on i’s behalf, based on i’s actual sequence of care
events and total amount spent, hi. Plan j’s generosity is then







or the average plan-paid rate if every employee in subsample r were covered by plan
j, where Gj is the (possibly non-linear) coinsurance schedule for plan j.
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There are other factors that will lead a consumer to pick one plan over another
besides financial generosity and the employee contribution to the premium, includ-
ing the available network of doctors, restrictions on access to specialists, and the
availability of insurance for other types of care besides basic physician, hospital,
and prescription drug coverage. Physician networks and specialist access will differ
between health management organization (HMO) plans, preferred provider organi-
zation (PPO) plans, and fee-for-service (FFS) indemnity plans.19 HMO plans make
up about 47 percent of the plans chosen in this sample, while PPO plans make up 46
percent, and FFS plans are only 7 percent. Financial generosity may, then, have a
different effect depending on whether the selected plan was an HMO, PPO, or FFS.
17Chronic conditions range from cancer and heart disease to asthma and diabetes. A respondent is “limited” if
she reports a limitation during a battery of questions about activities of daily living and functioning. I include not
just conditions that exist before the plan year begins, but also conditions that are diagnosed during the year, as
employees may have some private information about undiagnosed conditions that may soon arise because of family
history or early onset symptoms.
18In a regression of the generosity measure on a comprehensive list of plan characteristics, the R2 is 0.63, and
the coefficients for most elements are significantly different from zero at the 99 percent confidence level, and in the
predicted direction: the plan is more generous when the deductible is zero or small, and when the coinsurance rates
and co-payments for physician and hospital visits are low. These results suggest that the financial generosity of a plan
relies on each cost-sharing element of the plan working in concert, rather than just one dominant plan characteristic.
19Generally, HMOs employ a network of health care providers, and within this network, care is covered at generous
rates; care sought outside the network is generally not covered, except for emergencies and where the primary care
physician has referred the patient to a specialist. PPOs pay for care received both in- and out-of-network, but
in-network coinsurance rates are lower. FFS or traditional indemnity plans pay either a flat fee or percentage of the
cost regardless of where the care is received. See Cutler, McClellan, and Newhouse (2000) or Moran, Chernew, and
Hirth (2001) for more details.
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Unfortunately, I am not able to directly compare the generosity of managed care
(HMO) plans to less-managed plans like PPOs and FFS plans. Cutler, McClellan,
and Newhouse (2000) find that the quantity of care does not vary much by plan type,
but that the price paid to providers for that care varies greatly, with HMOs paying
the least, FFS plans paying the most, and PPOs somewhere in between. Because
HMOs have lower payouts to providers, premiums and cost-sharing for these plans
need not be as high as PPO or FFS plans, and thus for the same dollar amount
of spending, the HMO plans appear to be more generous. This runs counter to the
assumption in other studies (Feldman and Dowd, 1982, Cutler and Reber, 1998) that
the HMO plan is the less generous option that should attract lower risk employees.
In addition, the total spending measure, the sum of the amounts paid by private
insurance and the patient herself, will be lower for HMO plans that are able to
negotiate lower prices for care.20
Because neither the expenditures nor the plans’ generosity are comparable be-
tween HMO and non-HMO plans, I limit my comparisons to plans of the same type.
If plans j and k are both HMOs, or both non-HMOs, then the relative generosity of
the chosen plan j is |gj − gk|.21
2.5.1 Indications of Adverse Selection
The concept of adverse selection suggests that when facing a higher premium for
more generous coverage than for a more restrictive plan, individuals with private
information that they are likely to need large amounts of care will pay the higher
20If my calculation overstated the generosity of HMOs by a consistent percentage (for instance, the 11-17 percent
difference between HMOs and PPOs in prices paid for the same procedure in Cutler, McClellan, and Newhouse), I
could just deflate the HMO generosity by this same percentage to make the generosity measure comparable across
plan types. Because total spending is lower for HMOs, however, I would have to estimate how much plans of each
type would pay for every procedure ever performed in any care event, which is beyond the scope of this paper.
21Because FFS plans are a small portion of the total number of plans, I include them with PPO plans. While
most of the non-HMO comparisons will be a PPO chosen over another PPO, I also classify a PPO chosen over a
FFS plan, or vice versa, as a valid comparison.
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price while lower risk individuals will opt not to. With only bad risks in the risk
pool, the premium increases, driving out more good risks and further increasing the
premium.
This would not be the case, however, if more generous coverage was not also
more expensive. If one plan was more generous in every way — not just financially,
but also with less restrictive access to specialists, a wider breadth for the provider
network, and coverage for secondary care types like dental and mental health — yet
cost the same as a less generous plan, there would be very little reason not to pick the
more generous plan, whether one’s expected expenditures were high or low. In this
case, both high and low risks are in the same pool, and there is no adverse selection.
(Moral hazard may still result in a positive correlation between insurance generosity
and expenditures, however.)
In practice, more generous plans often do not require the higher employee-paid
share of the premium (Table 2.2). Out of 3685 plan pairs (a comparison between
the chosen plan and each of the rejected alternatives, in turn), 1438, or 39 percent,
required a lower employee contribution from the more generous plan. Another 21
percent required the exact same contribution from both plans, with the majority of
those cases paid entirely by the employer.
Not surprisingly, employees are more likely to choose the more generous plan if
it requires the same or lower employee contribution than when the more generous
plan has a higher price. Still, 38 percent chose the lesser plan when it had a higher
employee contribution. The tradeoff faced by the employees who are offered a package
with employee contributions that are not proportional to generosity is less clear.
These individuals may sign up for plans that are more attractive on a non-financial
level; for example, perhaps one’s preferred doctor is in the network of only the plan
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that is less financially generous. It could also be that the less generous plan is the
default option, which keeps costs low for the employer and insurer, especially when
employees do not depart from this default.
This finding also extends to the total premium: the higher premium plan is often
not more generous, and when the less generous plan has a higher premium, it is still
selected nearly 39 percent of the time.22 While a plan with a higher total premium
may reduce the employee’s cash wage more than a plan with a lower total price,
it is unlikely that the employee feels the pinch of this incentive directly; thus, the
employee is likely to respond more to the portion of the premium she pays rather
than the total premium, which includes her employer’s contribution. Therefore, I
focus on the employee’s contribution to the premium, not the total premium itself,
in the estimation of adverse selection.23
The theoretical framework which leads to the derivation of h′, the threshold level
of spending above which employees should prefer the more generous plan, suggests
an approach for dealing with employees who face a higher premium for the less
generous plan. Recall that h′ is equal to the ratio of the relative premium to the
relative generosity of the selected plan. When the relative premium is the same for
both plans, h′ = 0, and the model predicts that the more generous plan will always be
selected; if non-financial differences are minor or not greatly valued, the employee has
no reason not to choose the more generous plan if it costs exactly the same as a lesser
alternative, no matter what her expected spending level. The employee should also
choose the more generous plan, regardless of how much she will ultimately spend, if
22While this finding may call the generosity measure into question, the R2 on a regression of the total premium
on plan characteristics is only 0.04, so total premium does not appear to hinge on the coinsurance schedule. This
matches the counterintuitive finding in Cebul, Rebitzer, Taylor, and Votruba (2008) that higher premium plans are
often not more generous because of the constant churning in both the employee-employer and the employer-insurer
relationships, encouraging insurers to chase short-run profits at the expense of quality.
23Chernew, Frick, and McLaughlin (1997) find that employees are more responsive to their share of the premium
than to the total premium itself.
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the lesser plan has a employee contribution (where the relative premium is negative).
Because the more generous plan is the preferred option at any spending level h ≥ 0,
I set h′ = 0 for any employee facing the same or lesser price for the more generous
plan.
On the other end of the spectrum, some plans have the same calculated generosity,
but different premiums. In that event, h′ should be infinite, as the denominator,
relative generosity, is zero. This means that regardless of how much the employee
plans to spend, the model predicts that “less generous” plan (in this case, the plan
with the same generosity but a lower premium) is always preferred. In practice,
because the relative generosity is often quite small (within one or two percentage
points), I cap h′ at the maximum level of expenditures observed in my sample,
approximately $201,000; because no employee’s expected expenditure is anywhere
close to this maximum, no one should pick the more generous plan when the relative
premiums is relatively large and the relative generosity is relatively small (or zero).
Still, many employees with h′ = 0 pick the less generous plan with the same or
higher employee contribution to the premium, while many others with h′ = $201, 000
pick the higher premium but barely more generous plan, as shown in Figure 2.3. Only
65 percent of HMO enrollees and 59 percent of non-HMO enrollees with a negative
(paying more for the less generous plan) or zero (same premium for both plans) h′
choose the more generous plan. The percent selecting the more generous of any two
plans should be declining in h′, but for both HMOs and non-HMOs, the graph is
relatively flat, with a slight decrease for most deciles of non-HMO enrollees reversed
by a large share of employees paying a higher premium even when the two plans have
equal generosity (h′ = $201, 000). According to the model that results in adverse
selection in the insurance market, employees with large values of h′ should never
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pick the more generous plan, but when the two plans are (approximately) equal in
generosity, nearly two-thirds of the sample opt for the higher premium option.
If the market is characterized by adverse selection between plans of the same type
(HMO or non-HMO), the percent picking the more generous plan would increase
with expenditures. Figure 2.4 indicates this is not the case for non-HMOs, where the
probability of selecting the more generous plan instead stays relatively flat through-
out the expenditure distribution. For HMOs, however, there is a noticeable increase
in the probability of selecting the more generous plan as total expenditure increases.
The model suggests that, unlike adverse selection, moral hazard depends only
on the absolute generosity of a plan — the more generous the selected plan is, the
more the employee (regardless of her risk type) will likely spend. This is exactly
what I observe for non-HMO enrollees, and less so for HMO enrollees, in Figure 2.5.
With each successive decile of absolute generosity, the average expenditure for that
decile tends to increase; i.e., a linear trend line through all three series is positive
and significantly different from zero. HMO expenditures are slightly lower for all but
three deciles.24
2.6 Empirical Strategy
To test for the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard in the employer-
sponsored insurance market, I estimate a series of regressions where the dependent
variable is total expenditure, and the key independent variables are measures of
absolute and relative generosity.
24Figure 2.5 by itself does not indicate moral hazard, however, because adverse selection may also lead to a positive
correlation between the selected plan’s generosity and expenditure. On the other hand, coupled with the evidence in
Figures 2.3 and 2.4, and Table 2.2, that the conditions for adverse selection do not exist, Figure 2.5 provides strong
evidence for moral hazard.
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2.6.1 Estimation Sample
The sample for these regressions consists of pairs of plans of the same type (HMO
or non-HMO), where one plan is the selected plan and the other is each rejected plan
in turn. If an employee is offered plans A, B, and C, and chooses A, I would like
to be able to measure the selection between A and the employee’s second-best plan;
unfortunately, we do not know whether B is preferred to C, or vice versa. Therefore,
I include every comparison between the selected plan and a rejected plan of the
same type, because it is unclear whether the selection of risk types is most relevant
between selected plan A and rejected plan B, or between A and rejected plan C.
This means that employees offered three plans are double-counted, while employees
offered four plans are triple-counted.25 Standard errors are clustered by individual, to
account for double- and triple-counting, and for the few employees that appear in the
linked employer-employee sample during both years of their observation by MEPS.
I include as many as three plan pairs per person; for government employees who
are asked about more than four plans, I retain only the selected plan and the three
rejected options with the highest enrollment among employees at that establishment.
I do not include a plan pair where one plan is an HMO and the other is a non-
HMO. That means that if the employee chose an HMO, I only consider relative
generosity and premium between the selected plan and other HMO plans in her
portfolio.
I exclude employees who are offered only one plan, and employees who are offered
only one plan of the type they ultimately selected. That is, if the employee chose an
HMO plan, and all of her rejected alternatives were non-HMO plans, I consider her
portfolio to consist of only one plan, and she is excluded. For one-plan employees,
25As a robustness check, I also estimate the main result using just one pair per person; see section 4.6.
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the other option is to go uninsured, where the generosity is g = 0, which means
that absolute and relative generosity are equal. The absolute generosity coefficient,
then, is also picking up the effect of adverse selection between insurance and being
uninsured. Similarly, for an employee offered only one plan of the type she chose,
the absolute generosity coefficient may pick up the effect of adverse selection across
plan types.
Information is asymmetric in the employer-sponsored insurance market because
very few plans allow the insurer to know, and charge different premiums based on, any
characteristics of the individual employee aside from firm characteristics. MEPS asks
employers in the establishment survey whether each plan’s premiums vary according
to age, gender, family size, wage, or some other factor. Approximately 83 percent of
chosen plans indicated that they do not vary premiums based on any of these factors;
I exclude the 17 percent of plans that have variable premiums.26
2.6.2 Specification
The medical expenditure variable in this paper, as in the existing literature, is
right-skewed and has a small mass point at zero. Figure 2.6 displays the distribution
of the natural logarithm of total expenditures for HMO and non-HMO enrollees.
There is a small mass point at zero expenditures, while the rest of the distribution
is normally distributed in log form. The HMO distribution is slightly to the left,
and more likely to have zero expenditures; this could suggest that HMO enrollees
are healthier, or that HMOs just pay out less for the same procedures.
Duan, Manning, Morris, and Newhouse (1983) suggest using a two-part model
when medical expenditures is the dependent variable. In the first equation, I estimate
26Of those that did vary premiums by observable characteristics, the most popular pricing scheme was based on
family size alone (8.2 percent of chosen plans), followed by “other reasons” alone (3.6 percent) and age alone (1.2
percent); no other combination of these factors totaled more than one percent of the sample of chosen plans.
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a logit regression where the dependent variable is an indicator for whether total
medical expenditure h for employee i (and her family, if she has family coverage) is
positive,
I(hi > 0) = f(α1gj + α2log(h
′) +Xiξ + νi) (2.4)
= f(α1gj + α2log(
pj − pk
gj − gk ) +Xiξ + νi),
where gj and pj is the absolute generosity and employee contribution, respectively, for
plan j. The logit estimation accounts for the mass point at zero in the expenditure
distribution.
In the second equation, I estimate a linear regression of the natural logarithm of
medical care spending, log(h), conditional on having non-zero expenditures, on the
absolute generosity (gj) of selected plan j and the natural logarithm of the threshold
level of spending (h′ = pj−pk
gj−gk ) above which the more generous of the two options j
and k should be preferred,
log(hi|hi > 0) = β1gj + β2log(h′) +Xiγ + εi (2.5)
= β1gj + β2log(
pj − pk
gj − gk ) +Xiγ + εi.
The loglinear estimation accounts for the long right tail of the expenditure distribu-
tion.
The predicted expenditure, ĥ, will be the product of the predicted probability
that the expenditure is positive from 2.4, p̂, multiplied by the conditional predicted
expenditure from the 2.5, ̂h|h > 0. Duan, et al., (1983) propose scaling the pre-
dicted expenditure by a smearing factor, ŝ, equal to the exponentiated residual from
the loglinear regression, as the error term is likely to be non-normal. So the final
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predicted expenditure is
ĥ = p̂( ̂h|h > 0)(ŝ). (2.6)
The smearing factor simplifies the differentiation of equation (2.6) with respect to
g and log(h′), in turn. The marginal effect of absolute generosity on total expenditure





1 + exp(α̂1gj + α̂2log(h′) +Xiγ̂)
ĥ. (2.7)
Similarly, the marginal effect of log(h′) on total expenditure is the predicted expen-
diture, ĥ, times the logit coefficient for log(h′) divided by the denominator of the
logistic function. In the results tables, I report the mean of this derivative evaluated
for each individual, with standard errors calculated by bootstrap (500 iterations).
The null hypothesis of no moral hazard assumes that the marginal effect of g on ĥ
is zero, while the null for no self-selection by risk type assumes that the marginal
effect of log(h′) on ĥ is zero.27 As the measures of spending (h) and generosity (g)
have different meanings due to the ability for HMOs to negotiate lower prices for
the same services, I estimate this two-part model separately for HMO and non-HMO
plan pairs.
X includes the few variables that insurers who sell coverage through employers
may be able to include in their pricing formula, so that we control for any symmetric
information in the transaction.28 The only two elements that vary at the individual
level in this matrix are an indicator for whether the policyholder has family coverage
rather than single coverage and, in the non-HMO regression only, controls for whether
the selected plan was a FFS plan or PPO plan. I also control for the characteristics
27Though both coefficients are expected to be positive, I perform two-sided tests; one possibility, contrary to my
model, is that self-selection could be favorable, if higher-spending employees choose the less generous plan in their
portfolio, perhaps because of liquidity constraints, higher discount rates, or higher risk tolerance.
28Nearly all employers in the sample employ only one MEPS Household Component respondent, so I cannot
estimate a firm fixed effect.
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of the firm and the local insurance market. These variables include the region of
the country, whether the policyholder lives within a metropolitan area, whether the
policyholder is a member of a union, the industry of the policyholder’s firm, the
firm’s size, whether the firm self-insures, whether the firm offers health savings or
flexible savings accounts, and year dummies.
2.6.3 Weights
The first two columns of Table 2.4 reinforce the warning in the MEPS documen-
tation that the sample of employees from the MEPS household survey linked to the
employer survey is not nationally representative, a problem made worse by my sample
inclusion requirement that employees are offered more than one plan of their selected
type (HMO or non-HMO). The first column presents summary statistics for the the
full MEPS Household Component sample of working adults with insurance through
their own employer, with means and standard deviations calculated using the popu-
lation weights provided by MEPS. The second column features the unweighted means
and standard deviations of my sample. The variables I have included in this table
are those that are most different between the estimation subset and the full MEPS
sample. White non-Hispanic, non-self employed, higher-income employees working
in large establishments or the government tend to be most likely to have multiple
health insurance offers of the same type, and are thus over-represented in my sample.
In order to produce results that are more easily interpretable and generalizable,
I re-weight my sample to account for this over-representation. Using the full (linked
and unlinked) household sample of employer-insured working adults, I create an indi-
cator variable for whether the employee is in the estimation sample. I then estimate
a logistic regression of the probability of inclusion on the gamut of personal and
firm characteristics from the household survey, including the variables in Table 2.4
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plus age categories, marital status, self-reported health status, education, region,
urbanicity, and occupation as explanatory variables. An employee’s weight is their
MEPS-provided weight divided by the predicted probability of inclusion in the sam-
ple, so that the groups that are over-represented in the sample are under-weighted.
The third column in Table 2.4 includes means and standard deviations calculated
using the new weights; the means are much closer to the means reported in the first
column.
Table 2.3 provides summary statistics for the regression variables of note, both
unweighted and weighted. The standard deviations on the expenditure variables
are very large relative to the means. On average the plans pay 75 percent of an
employee’s total annual medical care spending. The mean difference in generosity
between plans is between 8 and 10 percentage points; the difference in generosity
is smaller between HMO plans than between non-HMO plans. Conditional on the
employee’s premium contribution for the more generous plan being the higher than
for the less generous plan, the relative employee contribution is approximately $450
per year. The mean threshold spending level, h′, is lower for non-HMO plans because
a higher percentage of the more generous of two non-managed care plans require the
same, or even lower, employee contribution.
2.7 Results
2.7.1 Expenditures
In Table 2.5, I report the results of the regression of the natural logarithm of
total annual medical expenditures on the selected plan’s absolute generosity and the
natural logarithm of the threshold spending level (h′), separately by whether the
selected plan and rejected alternative are both HMO (top panel) or non-HMO plans
(bottom panel). All regressions include plan and firm characteristics and year fixed
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effects, and are weighted to reflect non-random missing observations in the MEPS
HC-IC Linked File.
Absolute generosity is positively associated with medical expenditure for both
HMO and non-HMO plans, but it is statistically significant only for non-HMO en-
rollees. The logit coefficient (column 1) indicates that non-HMO enrollees are more
likely to spend a positive amount on medical care the more generous is their selected
health plan. Conditional on having positive spending, the loglinear coefficient (col-
umn 2) indicates that for every additional percentage point paid by the plan, the
employee (and her family) enrolled in a non-HMO plan spends 2.1 percent more on
medical care. The marginal effect (column 3), which accounts for both the incentive
to spend some positive amount and the incentive to spend more thereafter, suggests
a large response to absolute generosity; a small change in generosity leads to more
than $460 in additional medical spending, approximately 14 percent of the average
non-HMO family’s spending.
The response is much smaller for HMO plans, and imprecisely estimated. Both the
logit and loglinear coefficients for absolute generosity are positive but not significantly
different from zero, and the point estimates are smaller than those estimated for non-
HMO plan pairs. The marginal effect suggests that a small increase in the generosity
of the selected plan increases spending by $180, or 6 percent of average spending,
but the standard error on the marginal effect is too large to rule out the absence of
an effect with any certainty.
The theoretical model predicts that, in an insurance market subject to adverse
selection, expenditures will be positively correlated with the threshold level of spend-
ing (h′) above which the insured would prefer the more generous of two insurance
contracts. This does not appear to be the case between employer-sponsored health
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insurance plans of the same type. For HMO enrollees, the logit coefficient is positive
and the loglinear coefficient is negative, while the opposite is true for non-HMO en-
rollees. Only the loglinear coefficient for non-HMO plans is positive and significant,
but the marginal effect that takes into account zero spenders is actually negative;
whereas theory would predict an increase, spending decreases by 1.5 percent with a
small increase in the relative premium (or a small decrease in the relative generos-
ity), though the effect is not statistically significant. The marginal effect is larger in
absolute value and positive for HMO plans, but the standard error is also larger.
I can further decompose medical care spending to examine whether moral hazard
or adverse selection differs by the type of care received (Table 2.6). The same pattern
holds for each care type: moral hazard leads non-HMO employees to spend more on
physician care, hospital care, and prescription drugs in more generous plans, while
HMO enrollees do not have the same response. The marginal effect for hospital care is
especially large; buoyed by the large increase in the probability of spending a positive
amount on hospital care, a small increase in non-HMO plan generosity increases
hospital spending by $1531, more than doubling the average hospital expenditure.
The marginal effects are much smaller, and statistically insignificant, for HMO plans.
There is no evidence of adverse selection, as each marginal effect is not significantly
different from zero.
These results indicate that moral hazard leads employees enrolling in more gen-
erous non-HMO, but not HMO, plans to spend more, and that the effect is substan-
tively large for non-HMO enrollees. There is no detectable adverse selection between
either two HMO nor two non-HMO plans, but this could be because so many port-
folios require the same employee contribution for both plans, so employees of all risk
types should select the more generous plan if its premium is no higher. The first two
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columns of Table 2.7 present regression results separately for employees who pay the
same portion (in dollars or percent) of the total premium for both plans, and for
those who contribute differently to each plan.
One of the assumptions in the model is that moral hazard does not depend on
premiums, neither absolute nor relative, and these results seem to confirm that as-
sumption: as I find in the main regression, the moral hazard incentive is weak for
HMO enrollees in both groups (top panel), and the marginal effect of generosity on
spending is positive and statistically significant, and of comparable magnitude, for
both groups of non-HMO enrollees (bottom panel). The marginal effect of log(h′) on
spending is a larger positive number for HMO and non-HMO enrollees that face a
higher premium for a more generous plan than for those who face the same premium
for both plans, but in neither case is it statistically significant.
In the third column of Table 2.7, I present the marginal effects from the two-part
model just for those who pay a higher employee premium for the more generous plan
(regardless of whether they chose the more or less generous plan);29 this group has
an h′ that’s greater than zero but less than infinity, so there is a range of expected
spending where the less generous plan is optimal, and other values where the more
generous plan should be preferred. The point estimates are similar, though because
of the smaller sample size, the standard errors are larger. The pattern of results is
the same: a large positive effect of absolute generosity on spending, and a small and
insignificant effect of log(h′), which together suggest moral hazard but not adverse
selection.
29The regression results are nearly identical between people who select the more or less generous plan.
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2.7.2 Utilization
Moral hazard and adverse selection, if present, should be detectable not only
in their effect on expenditures, but also in medical care utilization. A high-risk
individual, in addition to spending more, will likely also seek care more often, so
the total number of care events should be correlated with absolute and relative
generosity exactly like expenditures. Whether physician visits or hospital visits or
nights increases, however, is more ambiguous: more generous insurance may lead to
substitution toward going to the hospital rather than the physician, or it might lead
to more frequent office visits and fewer hospitalizations.
Because the number of care events in a year is a count variable, I use a Poisson
specification.30 The results in Table 2.8 suggest that non-HMO enrollees do increase
the number of both physician visits and hospital nights due to moral hazard, while
a generous HMO plan sees an increase only in physician visits. The marginal effect
of log(h′) is small and insignificant, so employees do not appear to self-select by
their frequency of care use. The effects are quite substantial: the marginal effect
of increasing generosity slightly leads to nearly 14 more physician visits and four
more nights in the hospital for non-HMO enrollees, and seven more visits to the
physician in an HMO plan. Moral hazard thus seems to materialize as an increase in
the frequency of medical care utilization, not just an increase in the amount spent
by consumers and their care providers.
2.7.3 Direct Measures of Selection
In most of the existing literature that uses data from a single employer, or a sample
of employers in a metropolitan area, to determine whether there is adverse selection
between plans, the authors look for significant differences in the demographic and
30OLS coefficients are similar in significance and relative magnitude.
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health composition of the enrollee pools in each plan. Fortunately, the MEPS data
provides information on measures of health status, so I can directly test for the
presence of adverse selection between plans of the same type (HMO or non-HMO).
Furthermore, because the measurement of these health measures across plan types is
not corrupted by HMO management’s skill at negotiating lower prices, I can also test
for whether adverse selection occurs across types, i.e., whether high risk employees
choose non-HMO plans while healthier employees opt for an HMO. I display the
results of these regressions in Table 2.9.
I estimate the correlation between absolute and relative plan generosity and, in
turn, six different health measures. The first such measure is the number of people
in the employee’s family (or just the employee, if the plan covers just the individual)
who have a chronic condition.31 The results of the OLS estimation are reported in
column 1.32 The number of family members with a chronic condition is positively
correlated with the threshold spending level (h′) in HMO plans, but the effect is very
small and not statistically significant; for non-HMO plans, the effect is even smaller
and similarly insignificant.
Other measures of health are similarly uncorrelated, or have a very small positive
correlation, with log(h′). Employees with family members who consider their own
physical health as “fair” or “poor” or have a limitiation are statistically more likely
to sort into the more generous of two plans, but the magnitude of the effect is quite
small. Those with infants or relatives over age 50 (where the age profile of health
spending begins to ascend rapidly) covered under their plan are no more likely to
31Because an individual may have more than one chronic condition, I also estimate a Poisson regression for the
total number of conditions in the family. The results match in significance, but the magnitudes are larger than those
reported in column 1.
32For all six health measures, Poisson coefficients are similar in significance. I also estimate a logistic regression
for whether the employees has any family members with each of the six health outcomes, and the results are also
similar.
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choose the more generous plan. Thus, there is no direct evidence of adverse selection
between plans of the same type.
Interestingly, the coefficient on absolute generosity is positive and significant for
three out of the six measures among non-HMO enrollees; this may arise because
conditions are more likely to be diagnosed and treated the more generous is the se-
lected plan, as care is sought more often (moral hazard), or because sufferers of these
conditions seek out firms that offer more generous plans (endogenous job selection).
This does not appear to be the case for the HMO plans, however.
In section 2.5, I outlined why HMO and non-HMO plans cannot be compared in
the total expenditure regressions; because HMOs are able to negotiate lower prices
than non-HMOs for the same procedures, expenditures and generosity are not mea-
sured on the same scale. With these regressions involving the direct health status
measures, however, there is no such limitation. I include both HMO and non-HMO
enrollees in the same regression, and include an indicator variable equal to one if
the plans in the pair were both HMO plans. The coefficient on the HMO indicator
is given in the bottom panel of Table 2.9. If, as expected, the healthiest employees
choose HMO plans, which are generally considered to be less generous than PPO or
FFS plans when measured properly, then we should observe that each of these coeffi-
cients should be negative and significantly different from zero. I find that employees
in HMO plans are less likely to have people in their families with chronic conditions
(6 percent), or over the age of 50 (7 percent), but neither effect is statistically sig-
nificant; the coefficient on the HMO indicator is also negative and fairly large (17
percent, statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level), in the regressions
where the dependent variable is the total number of chronic conditions in the family
(not shown). HMOs are actually significantly more likely (at the 90th percentile)
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to have young children (3 percent); while children under age 2 are expensive to in-
sure due to their frequent use of care, this would further indicate that HMOs enroll
younger, generally healthy families. These results (which are similar to Cutler and
Reber, 1998, and Feldman and Dowd, 1982), though weak statistically, suggest that
enrollees in the comparatively less generous HMO plans are less risky to the insurer,
as predicted by the model of adverse selection across plan types.
2.7.4 Robustness Checks
One plan comparison per employee The regressions above include every valid
(same plan type) comparison between plans for each employee. That means that
there are two observations for the employees who were offered three plans of the
same type as the one they selected (i.e., the HMO plan they selected plus two other
HMO options), and three observations for the employees who were offered four plans
of the same type as the one they selected. The dependent variable is the same for
each of the two or three observations for these employees, so there may be a concern
that the positive correlation between expenditures and the absolute generosity of
the selected plan, or between expenditures and the threshold level of spending that
divides risk types, may be biased upwards.
The employees who are offered exactly two plans of the same type should be
unaffected by the decision to double- and triple-count employees. The marginal effect
of absolute generosity on total spending for just this group (Table 2.10) is smaller
and insignificant for non-HMO enrollees, though the loglinear coefficient is positive
and significant as expected; the small sample size, leading to a larger standard error
in the logit regression, likely leads to the insignificance. Here, the marginal effect
for HMO enrollees is actually positive and significant, and larger in magnitude than
the marginal effect for non-HMO enrollees in Table 2.5, but this is entirely due to
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a large coefficient in the logit regression; the loglinear coefficient is negative and
insignificant. The marginal effect of log(h′) is positive and significant for HMO plans
despite a negative and significant coefficient in the loglinear regression, and negative
and significant, counter to theory, for non-HMO plans. While these results are
somewhat different than the main estimations, the disparities are mostly explained
by the small sample size.
Timing of medical care If an enrollee in the more generous plan foresees switch-
ing to the less generous plan when the fiscal year ends, she may increase her spending
now while the out-of-pocket price is low. Conversely, if the enrollee plans to switch
to a more generous plan, she will delay spending until the following year. Both sce-
narios suggest that the rejected plan’s generosity may actually influence spending
during the plan year, contrary to the model, so the absolute generosity coefficient
may be biased upward.
While I do not observe enough employees in multiple years to look at those who
switch plans, I can look at the timing of spending for all employees in the sample.
Figure 2.7 suggests that spending is relatively flat throughout the year, with no
increase in the beginning nor at the end of a plan year. As a robustness check, I re-
run the main regression with the log of total expenditures in the middle eight months
of the plan year, excluding the first two and last two months, as the dependent
variable. The results in Table 2.11 are very similar to the main results (though,
not surprisingly, smaller in magnitude, as the spending is over a shorter period)
suggesting that the results are not biased by delayed or accelerated care.
Coverage and marital status For most dual-earner couples, I observe only one
of the spouses’ choice set of health plans. The h′ I calculate for these families may
not represent the relevant choice between the first- and second-best plans, if the
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second-best plan was offered by the other spouse’s employer. I therefore estimate
the two-part regression model separately for unmarried people with single coverage,
married people with single coverage, unmarried employees opting for family coverage,
and married employees in family coverage. The results in Table 2.12 largely match
the main estimation: more generous coverage leads to more spending for each group
in non-HMO plans, and the coefficient on log(h′) is never significantly greater than
zero statistically.
Validity of the theoretical model of plan choice The theoretical model
predicts that employees who plan to spend more than h′ should enroll in the more
generous plan, while those planning to spend less than h′ will find that the lower pre-
mium paid in the less generous plan is a better fit for their needs. Expected spending,
even over a short period of time, is uncertain, but if I assume that consumers have
perfect foresight, then I should see that employees who ultimately spent more than
h′ should enroll in the more generous plan, and vice versa. About 55 percent of the
sample enrolls in the plan that is a better fit according to the theoretical model;
these employees who select a non-HMO have a greater response to the moral haz-
ard incentive than those who do not select the plan that the model predicts (Table
2.13). The marginal effect of log(h′) is actually negative, though insignificant, for
both HMO and non-HMO enrollees whose plan choice fit the theoretical model, but
positive and both statistically and substantively significant for HMO enrollees who
do not fit the model.
2.8 Conclusion
In this paper, I suggest a new method for determining whether adverse selection
and moral hazard affect the market for employer-sponsored health insurance, using
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the variation in health plan offers across employers. By controlling for both the
absolute generosity of a selected plan and the level of spending above which the
employee prefers the more generous option, I am able to separately identify the
effects of moral hazard from adverse selection, respectively.
My results indicate that the moral hazard incentive significantly influences the
employer health insurance market: the more (absolutely) generous the selected plan,
the more the enrollee tends to spend on medical care. This moral hazard incentive is
strongest in non-HMO plans, as expected. There is no evidence of adverse selection,
however; the correlation between medical expenditures and the level of spending
that makes the more generous plan optimal is never significantly greater than zero.
Enrollees in more generous plans are also no more likely to have an adverse health
outcome, even when they face a tradeoff between premiums and generosity, which
suggests that there is no self-selection by risk type between plans of the same gen-
erosity. There is some evidence that adverse selection occurs between plan types, as
HMO enrollees are less likely to have (or to cover family members with) a chronic
condition or be over the age of 50 than enrollees in non-HMO plans, but because
expenditures across plan types are not directly comparable, this evidence comes only
from the direct measures of risk type, whereas the adverse selection “death spiral”
is likely to arise from differences in expenditure (Feldman and Dowd, 1991).
The methodology used here can be applied to any insurance market where the
quantity of coverage is variable. Most insurance plans do not fully cover the damage
caused by a risky event, and even those that do may vary the deductible or other
cost-sharing involved in paying out claims, so there are very few markets where this
does not apply. To apply the distinction between absolute and relative generosity,
the researcher would need data on not only the selected plan but also the other plans
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available in the market. This may be difficult in some markets where customers are
allowed to shop around (and do not rely on an employer to do the shopping for them),
but rules against insurance plans crossing state or national boundaries often make a
market finite. Moreover, the calculated financial generosity may actually be a better
measure of the perceived value to the enrollee in insurance markets other than health
insurance, which is complicated by personal relationships with care providers.
While the moral hazard finding matches the qualitative conclusion of the RAND
Health Insurance Experiment and most subsequent studies, the lack of adverse selec-
tion stands in contrast to most single-firm studies (though, importantly, not struc-
tural estimates like Cardon and Hendel (2001), which use data from a similarly broad
sample of firms) and the prediction of the Rothschild-Stiglitz theoretical model, es-
pecially given the information gap between insurer and enrollee. This paper’s results
should be interpreted with some skepticism, due to limitations both with the data
and the model.
Using health insurance plan data from a nationwide sample of firms allows for
greater confidence in the external validity of the results, but has the disadvantage
of incomplete and possibly inaccurate information on the quality of each plan. In
this study, I focus entirely on the plan’s implied financial burden on the employee
for physician, hospital, and prescription drug expenditure, but other factors almost
certainly influence the decision to select one plan over another.33 One very important
missing plan parameter, especially as HMOs and PPOs have come to dominate the
market, is the breadth of the provider network under one’s plan — in particular,
whether the employee may keep seeing her, or her family member’s, preferred care
33Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) and Fang, Keane, and Silverman (2008) suggest that self-selection occurs along
other dimensions, including risk tolerance and cognition, and future work should take these important dimensions
into account. Unfortunately, MEPS lacks direct measures of risk tolerance and cognition like those used in these
two studies from the Health and Retirement Study. MEPS can, however, be linked to the National Health Interview
Survey, which includes self-reported information on smoking, alcohol use, exercise, and use of preventive care.
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provider under alternative plans. Employees may also desire coverage for types of
care that have their own coinsurance schedule, if they’re covered at all, such as men-
tal health or home health care. Lacking information on the provider network and the
coinsurance schedule for other care types, I cannot determine the extent to which em-
ployees are willing to trade off greater financial generosity in basic care for the ability
to see a specific care provider or to be covered for a more specialized care type; this
may partly explain the prevalence of employees who opt for a plan that has a higher
premium and lower measured financial generosity than some alternative. More gen-
erally, I am forced to make the strong assumption that unobserved differences in (real
or reputational) plan quality have the same impact on plan choice throughout the
health distribution, whereas in single-firm studies, plan-specific quality is differenced
away.34
It is also possible that there is adverse selection, but it does not manifest as
predicted by the model. Aside from adverse selection along other plan elements, such
as network breadth (sicker patients enrolling in broader, more expensive networks),
mental health, or long term care, it is also possible that h′ is not the relevant margin
between two plans. One weakness of the model is the assumption that the employee
chooses between exactly two plans of the same type; many employees have the choice
of three or more plans, which means that there may be multiple h′ thresholds along
the distribution of potential health spending.35 The model also assumes that the
consumer has complete knowledge of the plan’s financial parameters, but the effort
cost of differentiating between similar and complex plans may be prohibitive, so that
34Only comparing plans of the same type (HMO or non-HMO) likely reduces the importance of unobserved plan
differences, though this may be less true as non-HMO plans, especially PPOs, mimic the successes of HMO plans.
Eliminating cross-type comparisons also reduces the sample to the subset of employees offered multiple plans of
the same type; while I weight the observations to account for differences in observable characteristics between this
subsample and the full MEPS sample, the weights may not fully account for how the relationship between the plan
choice and care-seeking decisions may be different in this subsample.
35Risk aversion actually biases in the direction of finding evidence of adverse selection, so the assumption of risk
neutrality is not qualitatively problematic; see note 12.
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workers do not sort into the plan that is the best fit for their needs, even ex-ante.
I also assume that the ex-post realization of medical expenditures is a good proxy
for an enrollee’s risk type, but biases may arise if employees systematically under-
or overestimate their medical needs before the year.
Finally, I cannot estimate by how much moral hazard or adverse selection reduce
social welfare, only whether they exist or not. The implication of my finding of
insignificant adverse selection suggests that the social welfare impact is small, but
I cannot begin to estimate exactly how small unless I can trace out demand and
supply curves.36
While the reader is cautioned about taking these results at face value, adverse
selection appears to be restricted to sorting between plan types, not plans within
a type (e.g., HMO plan versus other HMO plans). Using managed care as a sort-
ing mechanism allows low-risk consumers to get actuarially fair insurance without
attracting the highest risks. At the same time, the employer-sponsored insurance
system effectively subsidizes the less healthy, as the employee’s contribution to the
premium does not depend on her health status, and the tax system favors compen-
sation in the form of health benefits. Feldman and Dowd (2000) suggest that the
combination of sorting by managed care and subsidization of the unhealthy through
the employer system strikes the right balance between efficiency and fairness. If there
is no further adverse selection beyond managed care versus more traditional plans,
then that balance is not upset.
The recent effort by the Obama Administration and Congress to reform the health
insurance market for individuals, and for small business employees that enter the
market without the benefit of diverse risk pools, use the large- and medium-firm
36The Einav-Finkelstein-Cullen (2008) approach appears promising, but in the national health insurance market
during the 1996-2001 period studied here, there is no obvious exogenous price variation required to estimate marginal
and average cost curves.
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employer-sponsored insurance market as a model. One concern is that proposals
that increase the amount of private information, including preventing screening for
pre-existing conditions and capping the degree to which premiums can vary based on
age, could result in adverse selection. The results in this paper suggest that, if the
composition of the risk pool of small business employees and individuals is similar
to employees in the existing employer insurance system, adverse selection will have
only a minimal impact.
Moral hazard, on the other hand, may be inevitable, as even the most tightly
managed health plan will lower the out-of-pocket cost below its actual marginal
cost. Still, this paper shows that managed care plans have diminished the moral
hazard incentive significantly over non-managed plans. Further monitoring of care,
especially in non-HMO plans, will likely reduce costs, and allow for more affordable
care for all.
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2.9 Appendix: Proof That Expected Value of Expenditures Increases
with the Threshold Spending Value h′.
Let f(h) and F (h) represent the probability density function and cumulative
density function of spending, h, respectively. The researcher does not observe the
threshold level of spending, h′, that separates enrollees in high-generosity planG from
enrollees in low-generosity plan C, but does observe whether G or C was selected,
and the ex-post realization of expenditures h.
The expected value of h for C enrollees is

















with the latter portion due to the fundamental theorem of calculus.















hf(h)dh = E(h|h < h′),
which must be true, as the expected value must be less than the upper bound for
that interval.
The expected value of h for G enrollees is


















with the latter portion due to the fundamental theorem of calculus.
For the derivative to be positive,
h′f(h′)












hf(h)dh = E(h|h > h′),
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Figure 2.1: Risk Distribution and Generosity at Two Hypothetical Firms With the Same
Less-Generous Plan (C)
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Figure 2.7: Average Total Medical Expenditure by Plan Month and Calendar Month
Table 2.1: Non-Financial Generosity Differences Between Plan Pairs
HMO Pairs Non-HMO Pairs
Selected Had Rejected Had Selected Had Rejected Had
Deductible 1.4 1.0 25.0 16.2
Lifetime Maximum 1.5 1.8 1.6 2.1
Annual Plan-Paid Max 0.9 0.7 0.8 0.7
OOP Annual Limit 9.9 10.6 7.2 5.4
Refuse for Pre-Existing 1.2 1.6 4.7 4.3
Wait Period for Pre-Existing 1.7 2.5 3.9 4.7
Specialist Referrals 3.4 7.2 11.2 8.5
Mammograms 1.8 1.9 1.3 0.6
Chiropractor 14.1 8.4 8.0 31.5
Rx Included 1.9 1.7 2.4 1.2
Dental Included 7.3 8.0 10.6 8.4
Orthodontal Included 6.9 6.2 4.9 9.3
Inpatient Mental Incl. 2.3 1.9 1.9 1.7
Outpatient Mental Incl. 1.8 1.9 1.0 1.0
Substance Abuse 1.6 1.3 1.0 0.3
Life Insurance Incl. 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.1
Disability Insurance Incl. 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.2
Physicals 1.6 1.2 25.1 8.1
Pap Smears 1.6 1.0 2.2 1.4
Prenatal Coverage 1.0 0.6 3.8 0.8
Adult Immunizations 1.9 1.6 5.8 3.7
Child Immunizations 1.6 1.3 1.3 0.5
Well-Infant Care 1.6 1.5 2.2 1.0
Well-Child Care 1.4 1.2 5.7 2.7
Other Non-Physician 5.3 3.3 5.1 1.4
Nursing Home 1.9 1.6 1.1 1.0
Home Health 1.5 0.8 27.9 5.3
Note: Table entry is the percent of plans with that characteristic.
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Table 2.2: Employee Contributions, Premiums, and Choosing the More Generous Plan
All HMO Non-HMO
Plan Pairs % More Gen Plan Pairs % More Gen Plan Pairs % More Gen
Employee Contributions
More Gen Has Lower Contrib 1437 61.5 690 64.5 747 58.8
Both Zero Contribution 529 56.1 396 53.8 133 63.2
Same Contribution 227 65.2 134 65.7 93 64.5
More Gen Has Higher Contrib 1490 51.3 686 64.1 804 40.4
Total Premiums
More Gen Has Lower Premium 1718 61.5 909 64.0 809 58.6
Same Premium 234 63.7 105 61.9 129 65.1
More Gen Has Higher Premium 1731 51.4 892 60.4 839 41.7
Total 3683 56.9 1906 62.2 1777 51.1
Table 2.3: Summary Statistics
Unweighted Weighted
HMO Non-HMO HMO Non-HMO
Total Expenditure 2900.73 3522.39 2831.41 3293.58
(6864.51) (8351.29) (6860.87) (9291.98)
Physician Expenditure 1092.86 1428.92 1067.10 1210.09
(1908.35) (2645.68) (1911.67) (2287.88)
Hospital Expenditure 1199.02 1372.99 1224.20 1474.16
(5658.72) (6378.78) (5738.07) (7784.03)
Prescription Drug Expenditure 589.55 698.87 511.45 579.35
(1304.39) (1238.61) (1364.44) (1001.55)
Chose HMO 1 0 1 0
(0) (0) (0) (0)
Chose PPO 0 0.90 0 0.87
(0) (0.30) (0) (0.33)
Chose FFS 0 0.10 0 0.13
(0) (0.30) (0) (0.33)
Chose More Generous 0.62 0.51 0.58 0.52
(0.48) (0.50) (0.49) (0.50)
Absolute Generosity 0.83 0.66 0.80 0.63
(0.12) (0.17) (0.17) (0.20)
Relative Generosity, More Generous 0.04 0.14 0.05 0.15
(0.10) (0.15) (0.13) (0.16)
Relative Generosity, Less Generous 0.05 0.14 0.06 0.16
(0.09) (0.13) (0.11) (0.17)
Relative Premium, More Generous 394.24 541.06 394.24 541.06
(713.48) (670.00) (713.48) (670.00)
Relative Premium, Less Generous 284.87 505.64 284.87 505.64
(442.13) (644.83) (442.13) (644.83)
Threshold Spending Level (h’) 17563 14219 17563 14219
(48770) (41881) (48770) (41881)
Number of observations 1907 1778 1877 1738
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. Relative premium means are from the sample
where the employee contribution for the more generous plan is larger than the less generous
plan.
53
Table 2.4: Selected Summary Statistics for Weighted Full Sample and Estimation Sample,
Unweighted and Weighted
Full MEPS-HC Estimation Estimation
Weighted Sample of Sample Sample
Insured Workers (Unweighted) (Weighted)
White 0.769 0.663 0.770
(0.421) (0.473) (0.421)
Black 0.112 0.158 0.115
(0.315) (0.365) (0.319)
Hispanic 0.080 0.142 0.082
(0.271) (0.349) (0.275)
Self Employed 0.044 0.011 0.047
(0.205) (0.104) (0.212)
Establishment Size
1-10 0.138 0.063 0.147
(0.344) (0.242) (0.354)
11-25 0.111 0.075 0.104
(0.314) (0.263) (0.305)
26-50 0.115 0.092 0.104
(0.319) (0.289) (0.305)
51-100 0.130 0.127 0.139
(0.336) (0.333) (0.346)
101+ 0.429 0.571 0.431
(0.495) (0.495) (0.495)
Industry (partial list)
Construction 0.047 0.020 0.065
(0.212) (0.138) (0.247)
Manufacturing 0.201 0.135 0.208
(0.401) (0.342) (0.406)
Sales 0.130 0.056 0.100
(0.336) (0.229) (0.300)
F.I.R.E. 0.070 0.054 0.067
(0.255) (0.226) (0.250)
Professional Services 0.257 0.318 0.263
(0.437) (0.466) (0.440)
Public Administration 0.077 0.222 0.081
(0.267) (0.416) (0.273)
After-Tax Family Income
Less than $25k 0.230 0.183 0.237
(0.421) (0.387) (0.426)
$25k-50k 0.356 0.348 0.324
(0.479) (0.477) (0.468)
$50k-75k 0.242 0.274 0.253
(0.428) (0.446) (0.435)
$75k-100k 0.098 0.107 0.109
(0.297) (0.309) (0.311)
$100k+ 0.074 0.088 0.077
(0.262) (0.284) (0.267)
Observations 32395 1996 1961
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.
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Absolute Generosity 0.939 0.330 177.05
(1.337) (0.379) (202.27)





Absolute Generosity 2.742 *** 2.112 *** 467.38 ***
(1.015) (0.421) (149.45)




Note: Regressions weighted to account for non-random missing observations
in HC-IC Linked File sample.
*** - Significantly different from zero at the 99% confidence level ** - 95%
confidence level * - 90% confidence level










R2 Logit 0.154 0.241
R2 LogLin 0.115 0.210
Ln(Hospital Expenditures)





R2 Logit 0.072 0.201
R2 LogLin 0.104 0.206
Ln(Prescription Drug Expenditures)





R2 Logit 0.206 0.317
R2 LogLin 0.177 0.139
Note: Regressions weighted to account for non-random missing observations
in HC-IC Linked File sample.
*** - Significantly different from zero at the 99% confidence level ** - 95%
confidence level * - 90% confidence level
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Table 2.7: Two-Part Regression of Total Expenditures on Absolute Generosity and Log
Threshold Spending Level, By Employee Contribution Scheme and h’ Level
Marginal Effects
Same Employee Different Employee More Generous Has Higher
Contributions Contributions Premium (0 < h′ < max)
HMO Enrollees
Absolute Generosity 579.592 -37.817 70.240
(400.068) (309.188) (629.713)
Log(h’) 2.707 6.556 2.027
(6.823) (6.427) (38.281)
N 1080 745 518
R2 Logit 0.171 0.373 N/A
R2 LogLinear 0.170 0.209 0.213
Non-HMO Enrollees
Absolute Generosity 1595.861 ** 596.516 *** 463.467 *
(781.468) (183.753) (277.813)
Log(h’) -10.884 2.230 3.998
(19.896) (4.164) (28.663)
N 462 1210 749
R2 Logit N/A 0.344 0.419
R2 LogLinear 0.358 0.229 0.292
Note: Regressions weighted to account for non-random missing observations in HC-IC Linked File
sample.
*** - Significantly different from zero at the 99% confidence level ** - 95% confidence level * - 90%
confidence level





Absolute Generosity 7.44 *** 7.27 *** 0.16
(2.61) (2.73) (0.88)
Log(h’) 0.041 0.020 0.020
(0.052) (0.042) (0.019)
N 1877 1877 1877
Non-HMO Enrollees
Absolute Generosity 16.21 *** 13.73 *** 4.00 ***
(2.26) (2.18) (0.93)
Log(h’) 0.066 0.046 0.007
(0.065) (0.059) (0.022)
N 1738 1738 1738
Note: Entry in each cell is marginal effect from Poisson regression; boot-
strapped standard errors in parentheses. Regressions weighted to account for
non-random missing observations in HC-IC Linked File sample.
*** - Significantly different from zero at the 99% confidence level ** - 95%






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.10: Two-Part Regression of Total Expenditures on Absolute Generosity and Log




Absolute Generosity 2.758 * -0.458 755.72 ***
(1.426) (0.561) (218.48)





Absolute Generosity 1.652 1.658 *** 186.79
(1.283) (0.603) (143.96)




Note: Regressions weighted to account for non-random missing observations
in HC-IC Linked File sample.
*** - Significantly different from zero at the 99% confidence level ** - 95%
confidence level * - 90% confidence level
Table 2.11: Two-Part Regression of Total Expenditures in the Middle Eight Months on Absolute




Absolute Generosity 0.406 0.479 39.31
(1.113) (0.410) (93.71)





Absolute Generosity 2.123 ** 1.263 *** 231.74 *
(1.047) (0.435) (137.86)




Note: Regressions weighted to account for non-random missing observations
in HC-IC Linked File sample.
*** - Significantly different from zero at the 99% confidence level ** - 95%
confidence level * - 90% confidence level
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Table 2.12: Two-Part Regression of Total Expenditures on Absolute Generosity and Log
Threshold Spending Level, by Coverage and Marital Status
Marginal Effects
Single Coverage Family Coverage
Unmarried Married Unmarried Married
HMO Enrollees
Absolute Generosity 800.337 84.261 -433.585 2795.770 ***
(804.028) (623.377) (929.763) (673.015)
Log(h’) -2.526 4.123 -7.585 7.797
(10.819) (12.836) (17.435) (7.729)
N 445 283 184 814
0.244 N/A N/A 0.652
R2 0.223 0.269 0.325 0.123
Non-HMO Enrollees
Absolute Generosity 1240.244 ** 676.847 822.619 1853.478 ***
(605.350) (1265.150) (4614.680) (501.334)
Log(h’) -7.664 -0.570 -18.208 11.882
(14.164) (21.630) (49.359) (9.057)
N 376 208 80 1001
0.363 0.404 N/A 0.579
R2 0.660 0.458 0.849 0.175
Note: Regressions weighted to account for non-random missing observations in HC-IC Linked
File sample.
*** - Significantly different from zero at the 99% confidence level ** - 95% confidence level
* - 90% confidence level
Table 2.13: Two-Part Regression of Total Expenditures on Absolute Generosity and Log





Absolute Generosity 239.010 178.401
(401.861) (312.134)













Note: Regressions weighted to account for non-random missing observations
in HC-IC Linked File sample.
*** - Significantly different from zero at the 99% confidence level ** - 95%
confidence level * - 90% confidence level
CHAPTER III
Decomposing the Growing Disparity in Health Insurance
Coverage between Hispanics and Non-Hispanic Whites
3.1 Introduction
Between 1987 and 2008, the number of Americans without health insurance grew
from 31.0 million to 46.3 million, or from 12.9 percent of the population to 15.4
percent (DeNavas-Walt et al, 2009).1 This expansion in the ranks of the uninsured,
despite public coverage expansions and a macroeconomy that was generally booming
during this time, is a concern for policymakers, as lower coverage rates could result
in more exposure to medical and financial risk and less access to necessary health
care. The growing uninsured rate has therefore received a great deal of attention
both in the mainstream media and by academic journals in the fields of medicine,
public health, and economics.
Less recognized has been the fact that for many population subgroups, the unin-
sured rate has remained constant, or actually declined, over this time. In 1983, 19
percent of children under age 18 were uninsured; in 2007, this rate had fallen to
17 percent, aided by expansions to Medicaid and SCHIP.2 The number of elderly
(over 65) uninsured remains negligible, due to pervasive Medicare coverage. The
uninsured rate fell even among some groups of nonelderly adults, who are largely
1These figures are from the Current Population Survey.
2These figures are from the Survey of Income and Program Participation.
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ineligible for public coverage. Though the uninsured rate for Blacks remains almost
ten percentage points higher than Whites, the proportion of Blacks without health
insurance fell slightly, mirroring the small decline in uninsured Whites. Asians and
Native Americans are also slightly less likely to be uninsured than they were in the
1980’s.
For Hispanics, though, the health insurance problem has only grown worse. Al-
ready sixteen percentage points higher than non-Hispanic Whites in the early 1980’s,
the uninsured rate for Hispanics increased to 38.7 percent in 2007, a gap of nearly
25 percentage points with non-Hispanic Whites. Whereas the uninsured rates for
Whites and Blacks have fluctuated, with increases in the early 1990’s and early
2000’s sandwiched by declines during the late 1980’s, late 1990’s, and mid-2000’s,
the Hispanic uninsured rate has grown almost monotonically throughout this period.
While much of the growth in the number of uninsured Hispanics has been concen-
trated in the non-native population, U.S.-born Hispanics are also more likely to be
uninsured compared to twenty-five years ago.
In a previous paper (Rutledge and McLaughlin, 2008), we analyze the trends in
the uninsured rate across racial and ethnic groups, and within the Hispanic group,
in more detail. We find that the overall uninsured rate would have been essentially
flat over the last two decades if the Hispanic noncitizen proportion of the popu-
lation had remained constant, and actually would have declined if the proportion
Hispanic (without regard to citizenship) had remained unchanged. We also suggest
that changes in the composition of the Hispanic population, particularly the growth
in the likelihood of having less than a high school education relative to other ethnic
groups, have contributed to the growing gap between Hispanics and non-Hispanics.
This paper extends our previous work on uninsured rate trends by formally ana-
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lyzing how differences in citizenship status, educational attainment, public coverage
eligibility, income, and labor market outcomes between Hispanics and non-Hispanic
Whites have contributed to the divergence in uninsured rates between the two groups.
We examine not only how observable differences contribute to point-in-time coverage
gaps, but also how these characteristics have contributed to the growth in the gap
over two decades.
We use two methods to decompose the contribution of observable variables to
the diverging uninsured rates: 1) the estimation of a regression-adjusted trend line,
from the coefficients of the interaction of the Hispanic indicator with year dummies,
and determining how this trend line changes when adding each variable sequentially,
and 2) a Blinder-Oaxaca-style decomposition of the trend from a base period to
the end of our sample. We find that, consistent across our decomposition methods,
differences in citizenship and educational attainment between Hispanics and non-
Hispanic Whites account for each about one third of the growth in the uninsured
rate gap, and a similar amount of the annual point-in-time gaps, more than any other
of the characteristics we observe. Still, in each of our decomposition methods, more
than half of the divergence in uninsured rates from 1984 to 2007 remains unexplained.
We also analyze the trends in the rate of coverage separately by insurance source.
The gap in public coverage has been reliably countercyclical, but after adjusting
for personal characteristics, Hispanic and white non-Hispanic public coverage rates
are essentially equal and constant over time. Adjusting for observable differences
between the groups, Hispanics and non-Hispanic Whites were also just about as
likely to have private coverage through their own employer. There was, however,
a sharp decline for Hispanics in coverage through another family member, the one
insurance source category where a significant portion of the gap with non-Hispanic
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Whites remains unexplained even after controlling for observable characteristics.
Our results indicate that the high, and growing, uninsured rate among Hispanics
cannot be attributed to lower educational attainment, citizenship rates, and income
only. In 2007, 9 million Hispanics between the ages of 18 and 55 were uninsured,
according to our sample. If, instead, the uninsured rate gap had remained constant
at its 1984 level, 6.6 million nonelderly Hispanic adults would have been uninsured.
Based on our estimates, only 0.7 to 1.4 million of this 2.4 million difference can
be explained by differences in observable characteristics, leaving an unaccounted-for
increase of more than one million uninsured Hispanic adults since 1984.
Because much of the increase in the uninsured rate for Hispanics relative to non-
Hispanic Whites remains unexplained, we offer some potential reasons for the widen-
ing gap, among them job composition, social networks, risk tolerance, and health
quality. Government, advocacy groups, and private individuals must address these
issues, in addition to improving labor market and educational outcomes, in order to
assure equitable access to health care and protection from high medical expenditures
to all Americans, regardless of ethnicity.
3.2 Previous Literature
The concentration of the growth in the uninsured within the growing Hispanic
population is well-established in the literature. Carrasquillo, Himmelstein, et al
(1999) analyzed trends in the uninsured rate from 1989 to 1996 and found that
Hispanics account for 36.4 percent of the increase in the number of uninsured during
that time. Rutledge and McLaughlin (2008) calculate that the growth in the Hispanic
share of the population accounts for 31 percent of the increase in the number of
uninsured adults.
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Though we focus on how the gap in uninsured rates between Hispanics and non-
Hispanics has changed over time, we begin by decomposing how personal character-
istics contribute to the gap within each year. Monheit and Vistnes (2000), using a
similar decomposition method to ours, find that wages, family income, and education
can account for most of the gap between Hispanic and white men in 1987 and 1996,
though a substantial portion remains unexplained.
Two other studies suggest separate analysis and decomposition by insurance
source. Waidmann, Garrett, and Hadley (2000) decompose how demography, hu-
man capital, labor and health care market changes, and state policies affect offers
and takeup of employer sponsored insurance (ESI), and find that most of the gap
is explained by English language proficiency and education. Buchmueller, LoSasso,
Lurie, and Dolfin (2007) sequentially add human capital and employer variables (sim-
ilar to our Method 1) to regressions of ESI eligibility, offers, and takeup, and find
that only the gap between natives and non-citizens in offer rates remains substan-
tially unexplained.
Other studies make clear that the Hispanic population is not uniform, suggesting
separate analysis by country of origin. In descriptive work, Shah and Carrasquillo
(2006) examine trends over a twelve-year period among Latino subgroups compared
to non-Hispanic Whites, and find that Mexicans were hardest hit by Medicaid cuts
in the 1990’s and employer coverage declines in the early 2000’s. Berk, Albers, and
Schur (1996) find similar results between 1977 and 1992. Fronstin, Goldberg and
Robins (1987) use Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition to compare Mexicans to Puerto
Ricans and Cubans, both of whom have lower uninsured rates, and find that most
of the difference can be explained by wages, age, education, industry, and firm size.
Besides county of origin, Hispanics differ in other ways, including nativity, gen-
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der, and employment, that influence their coverage probability. Hamilton, Hummer,
You, and Padilla (2006) separate Mexican-Americans by generation; while second-
generation Mexican-Americans have much lower coverage rates than Blacks, third-
generation Mexican-Americans actually have higher rates than Blacks and are similar
to Whites. Alegria et al. (2005) find gender differences for Latinos, with females far
more likely to have public coverage and males more likely to have private coverage,
and that only immigrants within their first five years in the U.S. have substantially
different coverage rates than U.S. natives. Schur and Feldman (2000) look at firm
size and industry, and find that even within a finely-defined industry, Hispanics have
lower coverage rates. While we are unable to directly control for generation, we
do include gender, taking into account that public insurance programs may affect
women differently from men, and industry.
Immigration is also an important issue with any public policy concerning His-
panics. Camarota and Edwards (2000) attribute much of the growth in the overall
uninsured rate to immigrants, due mostly to lower educational attainment and higher
poverty rates. Borjas (2003) found no significant change in the uninsured rate among
non-citizens following welfare reform in the mid-1990’s, as reductions in public cover-
age eligibility were canceled out by increased labor force participation and a greater
rate of employer-sponsored coverage. Kandilov (2007), though, finds no difference
in private coverage rates, and higher uninsured rates overall, among immigrants in
states with more restrictive Medicaid rules post-reform. Our study takes into ac-
count not only how citizenship impacts the likelihood of insurance coverage, but how
citizenship can differentially affect Hispanics and non-Hispanics.
Our paper analyzes not only the point-in-time uninsured rate difference between
Hispanics and non-Hispanic Whites, the most common approach in the existing lit-
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erature, but also how differences in personal characteristics between these groups
have resulted in diverging uninsured rates. No other paper uses a dataset as rich,
or with as long a sample window. In addition to the sequential regression method
used previously (Buchmueller, et al., 2007), we use a more formal and heretofore un-
derutilized method, a Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition of the growth in the uninsured
rate gap between two different points in time.3 We also decompose trends separately
by insurance source and Hispanic subgroup.
3.3 Data
The Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), is a panel survey of U.S.
individuals about income sources, welfare, household and family structure, jobs and
work history, and health insurance. Each individual in a household is interviewed
every four months (regarding each intervening month) for two to four years. New
panels began in each year from 1984 through 1993, and then again in 1996, 2001,
and 2004; questions are comparable across panels, though over time some answer
options changed (such as educational attainment). The samples sizes and length of
the panels vary (Table 3.1). Most of the panels track respondents for about three
years, or 8 to 9 interview waves, though the 1996 and 2004 panels lasted for four
years.
We pool each completed panel4 into one dataset of 9.3 person-months, resulting
in a continuous cross-section of respondents for all but seven months (March through
September 2000, between the end of the 1996 panel and the beginning of the 2001
panel) of the interval between June 1983 and December 2007.
3Three exceptions are Van Hook, Brown and Kwanda (2004) for trends in poverty among the children of im-
migrants, Fairlie and Sundstrom (1999) for the racial unemployment gap, and Ashraf (1996) for the gender wage
gap.
4The 1989 panel was discontinued after three waves, and lacks information on citizenship, so it was excluded from
our sample.
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We focus on individuals age 18 to 55, since the difference in the uninsured rate
between Hispanics and white non-Hispanics is most pronounced for this age group,
and public insurance programs are less likely to cover working age adults. The
uninsured rate among children declined slightly for both Hispanics and non-Hispanic
Whites over this time (Figure 3.1), and stayed relatively constant for those over age
55 and over (Figure 3.2).5
Our primary dependent variable is an indicator variable for whether the individual
reported health insurance coverage, irrespective of source, in the surveyed month.6
We consider individuals with missing values for the insurance questions to be out-
of-sample; in our time-series figures, we correct the SIPP-provided person-month
weights to account for potential non-random attrition (see Appendix), though all
regressions are unweighted.7
We represent the individual’s insurance coverage choice as a linear model with only
this one outcome, insured or uninsured. While we could run multinomial regressions
where the possible coverage outcomes are private, public, or none, public coverage is
an appropriate part of the choice set of only a select few, since Medicaid is typically
available only to expectant mothers, the elderly, and the disabled. Unfortunately, we
do not know with certainty who is eligible for public coverage.8 Our proxy for public
5Because of pervasive Medicare coverage, the uninsured rate for non-Hispanic Whites over the age of 65 is negligible
throughout. Like their younger counterparts, elderly Hispanics are more likely to be without health insurance (3 to 4
percent each year), but the uninsured rate for this group has remained relatively stable throughout the sample. The
uninsured rate gap between Hispanics and non-Hispanic Whites between the ages of 55 and 64 has also remained
stable since 1983.
6SIPP asks about insurance status for each month individually; while there could be seam bias, where the
retrospective months are less reliable than the interview month, our results are no different using only the interview
months. The Current Population Survey (CPS) uninsured rates are more often quoted in the press, but the CPS
asks whether the individual ever had health insurance during the previous year; this is a very different question
than the SIPP, as insurance status often changes during the calendar year. Researchers have found that the CPS
measure of insurance status actually follows the point-in-time status around the interview month more closely than
the ever-in-year status implied by the question. In addition, the CPS did not ask about citizenship status until 1993,
so using the CPS would result in a shorter sample window. We repeat our analysis for the CPS for 1993 through
2007 and get similar results.
7The coefficients in weighted regressions, using either the uncorrected or corrected weights, are nearly identical
to the unweighted regressions.
8If we had a clear indicator of public coverage eligibility, we would a multinomial regression for just those who are
eligible, while leaving the remainder in a more traditional linear or nonlinear single-choice model. Even if we knew
the eligibility rules in the individual’s state, however, we would likely have a large number of individuals who appear
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coverage eligibility is an indicator variable equal to unity when the individual is below
the (time-varying) federal poverty line. We also interact this variable separately with
our female and Hispanic indicators; female because poor women are more likely to
be eligible than poor men, Hispanic because we hypothesize that Hispanics may have
different takeup responses to public coverage eligibility than non-Hispanics.9
In addition, SIPP provides data on the source of insurance. Though the ex-
act options on the questionnaire change between panels, we are able to construct
a consistent indicator for whether an individual has coverage through a public pro-
gram (grouping Medicare, Medicaid, SCHIP, and other federal and state programs
together) or through a private insurer. We further divide private coverage into cover-
age obtained through one’s own employer, coverage obtained in one’s own name from
some source other than own’s employer (including the individual market), and cover-
age obtained in someone else’s name (irrespective of who that person is, or where that
person obtains coverage). We separately analyze trends by each insurance source cat-
egory, and separately decompose how the same right-hand side variables contribute
to the Hispanic-White gap in each insurance source.
3.4 Trends in the Uninsured Rate
The uninsured rate among adults aged 18 to 55 in the U.S. increased slightly
between 1983 and 2007 (Figure 3.3). The uninsured rate increased from 18 percent
to be ineligible but have public coverage. The other kind of error, where individuals who appear to be eligible do
not have public coverage, are considered “conditionally covered” in the health insurance literature. While hospitals
will assist them in acquiring their rightful public assistance when they present for emergency care, they miss out
on regular preventive and non-emergency care. Because of this difference in what kind of care is covered, there is
a debate over whether these individuals should be considered insured or uninsured. The definition of “covered by
health insurance” that is consistent with the SIPP questionnaire would include non-emergency care, so we consider
the “conditionally covered” to be uninsured.
9While the percent of public coverage recipient above 100 percent of the federal poverty line increased slightly
during our sample window, the vast majority of public coverage recipients had family incomes below the poverty
line. Throughout our sample period, the proportion of the population under the poverty line was greater than
the proportion with public coverage, indicating a large number of “conditionally covered” (see note 8). Also, the
percent uninsured closely matches the difference between our eligibility proxy and the percent with public coverage,
suggesting that the “conditionally covered” did not have any health insurance.
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in the mid 1980’s to almost 20 percent in 1993 and 1994, before falling during the
economic boom of the late 1990’s. After 1998, the proportion uninsured increased
again, but fell slightly after 2003, resulting in an overall 25-year upward trend of
0.04 percentage points per year, which is statistically significant at the 90 percent
confidence level.
The overall uninsured rate increased despite statistically significant downward
trends among non-Hispanic Whites and non-Hispanic Blacks, particularly since the
early 1990s. Both groups follow the pattern of the overall rate, but the larger de-
creases in the 1990’s led to a decline in the uninsured rate for Whites of 0.1 per-
centage points per year, and 0.14 percentage points for Blacks. The uninsured rate
among Asians and Native Americans (not shown) also had a statistically significant
downward trend, of 0.14 and 0.60 percentage points per year, respectively.
Alone among the racial and ethnic groups investigated, the uninsured rate for
Hispanics trended upward, and by amounts that dwarf the improvement in the other
groups. The Hispanic uninsured rate was 27.7 percent in 1984, more than twelve
percentage points greater than the uninsured rate for non-Hispanic Whites. Over
the next 25 years, the proportion of Hispanics without health insurance increased by
0.4 percentage points per year, to more than 40 percent in the early 2000’s. The gap
with non-Hispanic Whites more than doubled, increasing to 22 percentage points in
2007. At the beginning of our sample, a nonelderly Hispanic adult was nearly twice
as likely to be uninsured as her non-Hispanic White peer; by the end of our sample,
she is almost three times as likely.
Most, but not all, of the growth in the Hispanic uninsured rate was among non-
citizens (Figure 3.4). In 1984, the uninsured rate among Hispanic non-citizens was
37.4 percent. By 2004, their uninsured rate was more than 60 percent, before falling
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slightly to 53.7 percent in 2007. For the full 25-year period, the uninsured rate
grew by 0.7 percentage points each year, statistically significant at the 99 percent
level. Since 1996, non-citizens of Hispanic origin are more likely to be uninsured
than insured.
While the level of insurance coverage is higher and the rate of growth smaller than
for those born elsewhere, native-born Hispanics also saw an increase in the likelihood
of being uninsured. The uninsured rate for native-born Hispanics increased from 24.5
percent in 1983 to 30.5 percent in 2002. Though the uninsured rate for this group
fell sharply thereafter, to 20.3 percent in 2007, the proportion of native Hispanics
who are uninsured remains far above native Asians (11.0 percent) and Whites (11.5
percent), and comparable to Blacks (21.0 percent). The insurance coverage gap for
Hispanics, then, cannot be written off as just an immigration problem.
Still, over this period, the health insurance status of all immigrants got worse.
Non-Hispanic non-citizens also saw an increase in their uninsured rate, from 15.6
percent in 1984 to 26.3 percent in 2007, a statistically significant upward trend of 0.32
percentage points per year, and as high as 30 percent in 1996 and 2004. Naturalized
Hispanics (not shown) also saw a slight but significant increase, from 26.0 percent in
1983 to 32.9 percent in 2007, a slower rate of increase than Hispanic natives, while
naturalized non-Hispanics had a slower, insignificant increase.10
Besides citizenship, previous studies have indicated that education, income, and
age explain significant portions of both the growth rate of the uninsured population
and the Hispanic-non-Hispanic coverage gap.
Figures 3.4(a) (Hispanics) and 3.4(b) (non-Hispanics) display the sharp increase in
the uninsured rate among those with less than a high school diploma. This increase
10The uninsured rate among Hispanics without immigration information increased steadily, from around 30 percent
in the mid 1980’s to more than 45 percent in the 2000’s.
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is especially large for Hispanics, nearly 0.8 percentage points per year, but is also
significant for non-Hispanics. It is among college graduates, however, where the
Hispanic gap is most stark. The uninsured rate for non-Hispanic college graduates
declined from 10.4 percent to 8.2 percent from 1983 to 2007. For Hispanic college
graduates, though, the uninsured rate actually increased, from 14.2 percent in 1984
to more than 19.8 percent in 2007. Also, while the uninsured rate for non-Hispanics
with just a high school diploma increased slightly, and for those with some college
experience was nearly exactly flat over this time, the Hispanic uninsured rate for
these groups significantly increased.
A similar story is told in Figures 3.5(a) and 3.5(b). Even the lowest income non-
Hispanics are less likely to be uninsured in 2007 than they were in the early 1980’s,
but the uninsured rate for even the highest income Hispanics has grown significantly.
For each category of family income, normalized to the percent of the federal poverty
line, the uninsured rate among Hispanics was already higher than non-Hispanics,
and that gap has steadily grown over the last 25 years.
Within age groups, the gap between Hispanics and non-Hispanics has also in-
creased (Figures 3.6(a) and 3.6(b)). The non-Hispanic uninsured rate has changed
only within a tight band, with the youngest group at the highest level. The Hispanic
age groups, though, have each increased, though generally at a slower rate than we
see in the education and income categories.
These graphs seem to indicate that differences between Hispanics and non-Hispanics
in citizenship, education, and income, and to a lesser extent age,11 have a great deal
of influence on the divergence of the uninsured rate between the two groups. We will
focus on these variables, along with our measure of public coverage eligibility (which
11When the age categorical variables are added separately to Method 1, the Hispanic-year coefficients do not change
much. Also, in the trend decomposition in Method 2, the effect of age is much smaller than education, citizenship,
income, and public coverage. As a result, we include age only in the X variables.
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is represented by the top line in Figures 3.5(a) and 3.5(b)), in our analysis.
But these variables are likely to be closely related, and their influence is hard
to differentiate; greater educational attainment will generally lead to higher income,
and the age-income profile is well documented. Though identifying the trends in
these variables and how they relate to the uninsured rate is interesting and impor-
tant, we will not be able to perceive of the relative contribution of each variable to
insurance status separate from the others by merely graphing the means. Our two
decomposition methods allow us to better separate the effect of each variable on the
trends in the uninsured rate.
Previous studies have indicated that the Hispanic population is far from homo-
geneous, and that we must also consider country of origin within Hispanic ethnicity,
as the uninsured rate is higher for individuals of Mexican heritage than for those
from other areas in Latin America. Indeed, in each year in our sample, Mexicans
had a higher uninsured rate than Puerto Ricans, Cubans, and those from other Latin
countries, with a higher growth rate over the two-decade period through 2003.12 The
uninsured rate is highest for Mexican non-citizens, though Hispanic non-citizens from
countries other than Mexico narrowed that gap slightly (Figure 3.8), particularly
among Cubans. The greater growth rate for Hispanics of Mexican heritage is due to
the faster increase among Mexican-Americans, while there was no significant trend
among non-Mexican Hispanics born in the U.S. Because of the very different rates
of growth seen in Figure 3.8, we decompose the contribution of each variable to the
growth in the uninsured rate gap for Mexicans separately from other Hispanics, and
also the difference between the two groups.
12SIPP has consistent Hispanic heritage indicators only for Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans, with all other
Hispanics grouped together. Only in the 1996 and 2001 panels did SIPP further differentiate Hispanics. Also, the
question that differentiates Hispanics by country of origin was eliminated from the 2004 panel, so the time series
ends in 2003.
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We may also be concerned with the source of insurance and how the coverage type
has changed over time for Hispanics relative to non-Hispanics, particularly if we feel
that employer-sponsored coverage is a “better” (or at least more stable) source than
public coverage or non-group private plans. From the mid-1980’s through the mid-
1990’s, the public coverage rate increased nearly across the board, with the largest
growth rate among Blacks (Figure 3.9). Since welfare reform in 1996, however, only
Whites have maintained their public coverage level, while a smaller percentage of
Hispanics are covered by Medicare, Medicaid, or a state program. The increase in
the public coverage gap was especially pronounced for Hispanic non-citizens; the pro-
portion of Hispanic non-citizens’ with public coverage rate fell by three percentage
points with passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconcil-
iation Act in 1996, which limited Medicaid coverage for new immigrants (Ku and
Bruen, 1999), but White and Black non-citizens actually saw a small increase in
public coverage.
Private coverage rates were relatively constant for most groups, but fell from
more than 60 percent to less than 50 percent among Hispanics. There was a slight
increase in the proportion with employer-sponsored insurance among Whites and
Blacks, but among Hispanics, there was a substantial decrease from an already much
lower percentage (Figure 3.10). All groups saw small, (but statistically insignificant,
declines in private insurance from a source other than one’s employer. Finally, while
the proportion of Whites receiving insurance through someone else’s policy declined
slightly (and this percentage among Blacks actually increased, albeit insignificantly),




At its most basic, we run the following linear regression model, for individual i in
month t:




[ζyI(yearit = y) + δyHispiI(yearit = y)],(3.1)
where I(yearit = y) is an indicator function that equals unity when the person-month
of observation occurs in year y. Thus, our “adjusted” measure of the Hispanic-White
is the uninsured rate in year y, accounting for observable variables, is β1 + δy.
Our Xit vector in each regression includes indicator variables for whether the
individual is black, Asian, or Native American,13 female, married, has children of
one’s own, and a categorical variable for one’s age in 3-to-5-year increments. We
also control for the seasonally-adjusted unemployment rate in her state during that
month, as a control for local economic conditions.14 Finally, we include indicator
variables for the interview wave, to control for the increased probability of non-
random attrition in later waves. Sample means are reported in Appendix Table
3.2.
We choose a linear model for simplicity, but it is important to note that our re-
sults hold for a probit model. Using a linear model allows for easier interpretation of
coefficients and marginal effects, and with our multiple methods of decomposition,
we should attempt to keep the interpretation as simple, and as comparable between
methods, as possible. While a Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition from a nonlinear re-
13In our regressions, we exclude non-Hispanic Blacks, Asians, and Native Americans from the sample. Our goal
is to explain the difference in the trend in the uninsured rate between Hispanics and the majority group, white
non-Hispanics, where the gap is most stark; we thus obtain no additional explanatory power by the inclusion of
individuals who are in these other groups. The coefficients and standard errors in regressions including all Blacks,
Asians, and Native Americans are nearly identical. We do include race indicators in the regressions to account
for potential differences between white and black Hispanics (or Asian Hispanics, or Native American Hispanics,
though these interactions with Hispanic are much less common), though the results excluding these variables are not
substantially different.
14Cawley and Simon (2005) find that state unemployment rate is positively correlated with insurance coverage,
and that this correlation survives even after controlling for employment transitions.
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gression is possible (Fairlie 2005), the calculation of the trend decomposition becomes
unwieldy.15
We use two different methods to determine how differences in particular variables
(or categories of variables) between Hispanics and non-Hispanic Whites may con-
tribute to the growing gap in the probability of being uninsured between the two
groups: (1) the statistical significance of the trend line in the uninsured rate gap,
regression-adjusted for each variable sequentially, and (2) pairwise Blinder-Oaxaca-
style decomposition of the annual gap, and the change in the gap between starting
(e.g., 1984) and ending (e.g., 2007) years.16
3.5.1 Method 1 - Regression-Adjusted Trend Line
In the first method, we see how β1 + δy, the adjusted gap, changes when we add
variables sequentially to the regression. After adding each group of related variables,
we then determine whether the slope of the trend in the annual uninsured rate gap
is significantly different from zero.
We begin with the unadjusted trend line, the difference in the (unweighted)17 unin-
sured rate between Hispanics and non-Hispanic Whites, averaged over each month
in the specific calendar year.
We then add categories of variables one-by-one. If the variables were independent,
then the order they are added to our regression would be immaterial, but this is
likely not the case with education, income, and citizenship, among other variables.
We must then determine an order for their addition. We choose to add variables
15Of the 9.3 million person-month observations in our OLS regression, the predicted value of the dependent
variable is below zero for 985,000 of them (10.6 percent), but 75 percent of those are between zero and -0.04. Only
86 observations have a predicted value of greater than one.
16The results of a decomposition of each variable’s contribution to the change in the gap’s trend in the style of
Bound and Freeman (1992) are similar to both of the included methods.
17As the uninsured are more likely to leave the sample, and perhaps more so if they are also Hispanic, our
unweighted estimates may actually underestimate the gap. Our results should thus be considered a lower bound on
Hispanic-White coverage differences.
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in rough order of when they were endowed to the individuals in our sample. We
start with the variables that are largely out of the individual’s control: gender, race,
age, and family structure. Next, individuals are either born or choose to live in the
United States and, if the latter, whether to become citizens. Then, they decide what
level of education to acquire. Next, they (and their families) settle on a certain living
standard, which either meets or fails to meet the poverty threshold calculated by the
U.S. government. Finally, the individual and his or her spouse choose how much to
work, in what industry, and for what pay.
Our first adjusted trend line, therefore, includes controls for Hispanic, the vari-
ables in Xit, and the year and Hispanic-year dummy variables.
Second, we add citizenship variables. Each SIPP respondent is asked their cit-
izenship status, country of birth, and year entering the U.S. (if non-native) once
during their time in the panel, in a special “topical module” separate from the usual
(“core”) questions.18 The topical module including the immigration and citizenship
questions was during the second interview wave for all panels but the 1984 (wave 8)
and 1985 (wave 4) panels. Because these questions are asked just once, and early
in the life of the panel, there are many individuals who are never asked about their
citizenship status. Also, not surprisingly, there are also many individuals who have
no response for these questions. We may worry that the late-arriving and/or non-
responding individuals may not be randomly distributed with respect to the other
variables (especially if those with missing information are more likely to be undoc-
umented immigrants), so we include “no answer” as one possible citizenship status,
along with naturalized citizen, noncitizen, and native-born (the omitted condition).
We also interact citizenship status with Hispanic origin. In addition, we include
18The one exception is the 2004 panel, where respondents were asked citizenship and immigration questions both in
the core and the second topical module. Between the two sources, no individual in this panel has missing citizenship
information.
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a categorical variable for how long the individual has been in the U.S.: less than
ten years, ten to twenty years, or twenty-plus years, with native-born (or missing
information) as the omitted condition.19
Next, we add a categorical variable for one’s education level: less than high school,
high school degree only, or some college, with bachelors degree or higher as the
omitted condition.20
We next add the proxy variable for public coverage eligibility, an indicator variable
for whether family income is below the federal poverty line for that year. We include
interactions between this proxy variable and Hispanic ethnicity, and between the
proxy and the female indicator. In addition, we include interactions with each of the
three citizenship indicators, and with both citizenship and Hispanic ethnicity.
Finally, we add variables that account for labor supply and income. We add a
categorical variable for the respondent’s family income as a percent of the federal
poverty level. We include controls for whether the individual is working full time, part
time, self employed, or unemployed (the omitted condition), and a broad categorical
variable for her industry, based on the job for which she earns the highest hourly
wage (imputed or directly reported).21 In addition, we include indicator variables
for spouse’s work status, on the theory that a spouse working, especially full time,
should increase one’s access to health insurance.
As we add more variables, our “adjusted gap” shrinks toward zero in each year.
We measure the amount of the gap that remains unexplained in each year, and
19We have experimented with adding each of these variables and interactions separately. After adding citizenship
status, the interactions and time in U.S. variables have little effect on the Hispanic coefficients; most are significant,
though, so we include them.
20Interactions between educational attainment and citizenship status are mostly insignificant and changed the
other coefficients negligibly.
21We can also include an indicator variable for union membership. If we do, though, we lose all observations in
1983 and most of 1984, because union status was not part of the SIPP in the 1984 panel. As the results including a
union dummy are not substantially different, we have opted to restore the full sample and drop the union dummy
from our regressions.
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its significance, as the difference between the sum β1 + δy (for year y) and zero.
More importantly, as a measure of how much the upward trend in the gap remains
unexplained, we run a linear trend through the unexplained portion of the gap in
each year and determine its significance. There are also some obvious trend breaks
in the data, so we also include results for piecemeal linear trends.
3.5.2 Method 2 - Pairwise Blinder-Oaxaca Change Decompositions
As mentioned above, conclusions made about the analysis of Method 1 are some-
what limited, because the order that the variables are added to the regression controls
the amount of influence we detect for each set of variables. For instance, if income
has a large effect on the Hispanic-year coefficients, but much of that effect is sopped
up by controlling for variables that are added earlier, such as education or public
coverage eligibility, we may incorrectly conclude that income is not an important
explanatory variable.
A more thorough method, and one independent of the order of addition for vari-
ables, is the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition. In this paper, we perform two different
types of Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition. First, we decompose the contribution of
particular variables to the annual uninsured rate gap between Hispanics and non-
Hispanic Whites. Then, we decompose the contribution of each variable to the change
in the gap between the base year and each given year.
Adapting the setups from Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973), we start with two
mutually exclusive and exhaustive groups, non-Hispanic Whites (denoted W ) and
Hispanics (H). For a particular outcome y (in our primary estimates, the indicator
variable for uninsured), we have two parallel models of the effect of variables X on
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that outcome y:
yH = βHXH + εH ,
yW = βWXW + εW , (3.2)
where the error terms εH and εW are mean zero. We expect ŷH > ŷW , where
ŷJ = β̂JXJ , the fitted value for y for group J ∈ {H,W}. The difference between the
two fitted outcomes (suppressing the hat notation for simplicity) is:
yH − yW = βHXH − βWXW . (3.3)
Traditional Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition then adds and subtracts either βWXH or
βHXW . In the former case, after grouping terms, the following equation results:
yH − yW = βW (XH −XW ) + (βH − βW )XH . (3.4)
which decomposes the difference between y in populations H and W into the portion
that can be explained by differences in the mean of the variables X in the two groups
(the first part, commonly called the “explained” portion) and the portion owing to
differences in the coefficients between the two groups for the same values of X (the
latter part, or the “unexplained” portion).22
A similar process can be used to decompose the change in the uninsured rate gap
between Hispanics and white non-Hispanics between any two points in time (Altonji
22Alternatively, if we added and subtracted βWXH from equation (5), our decomposition equation would be
yH − yW = βH(XH −XW ) + (βH − βW )XW . (3.5)
Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) demonstrate that these two methods bound the actual Hispanic effect on the probability
of being uninsured. Jann (2005) puts the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition in general form:
yH − yW = β(XH −XW ) + [(βH − β)XH + (β − βW )XW ], (3.6)
where β is the “benchmark coefficient.” In the case outlined in the text, β = βW ; in the footnote case, β
 = βH . We
present results from only the decomposition that uses the white non-Hispanic coefficient as the benchmark (β = βW ),
since most of our sample is white non-Hispanic (between 84 and 94 percent) and therefore the population-weighted
average coefficients (Reimers, 1983, and Cotton, 1988) and the pooled coefficients (Neumark, 1988) are very similar
to βW .
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and Blank, 1999). For members of group J ∈ {H,W}, the change in y between
periods t and t′ can be written as
ΔyJ ≡ yJt′ − yJt = βJt′XJt′ − βJtXJt
= βJt′XJt′ − βJtXJt + βJt′XJt − βJt′XJt
= βJt′(XJt′ −XJt) + (βJt′ − βJt)XJt, (3.7)
where the first line uses the definition ΔzJ = zJt′ − zJt, for some vector z.
Then, we can decompose the change in the gap between H and W for outcome y
as
ΔyH −ΔyW = βHt′(XHt′ −XHt) + (βHt′ − βHt)XHt
− βWt′(XWt′ −XWt)− (βWt′ − βWt)XWt. (3.8)
We use the white non-Hispanic coefficients βWt′ and βWt as benchmarks for their
respective years, so the decomposition between base year t and ending year t′ is
ΔyH −ΔyW = βWt[(XHt′ −XWt′)− (XHt −XWt)]
+ (βWt′ − βWt)(XHt′ −XWt′)
+ [(βHt′ − βWt′)− (βHt − βWt)]XHt
+ (βHt′ − βWt′)(XHt′ −XHt). (3.9)
Altonji and Blank (1999) identify the first line as the effect of relative changes over
time in the observed characteristics of the two groups, and the second line as the
effect of changes over time in the white non-Hispanic coefficient, holding differences
in the observed characteristics fixed; these two parts make up the “explained” por-
tion of the change decomposition. The third line is the effect of changes over time
in the relative coefficients between the two groups, and the fourth line “captures
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the fact that changes over time in the characteristics of [the two groups] alter the
consequences of differences in group coefficients” (p. 3226); these two lines make up
the “unexplained” portion of the change decomposition.23 We isplay only the total
explained and unexplained portions of equation (9), rather than separately present
the results for each of the four portions.
In our main analysis, t is 1984, the first full year of the sample and the year where
the uninsured rate gap between Hispanics and non-Hispanic Whites is smallest, while
t′ is the last year of the sample, 2007. It is clear from the graphs that there is a
break in the trend between the 1993 and 1996 SIPP panels, probably due to subtle
differences in surveying or weighting techniques or variable definitions. Also, the gap
has a clear peak in 2001, decreasing slightly in the last years of the panel. Therefore,
we will also decompose the change in the gap between 1984 and 1995, between 1996
and 2001, and between 2002 and 2007.
One disadvantage of this method is that we are unable to ascertain the amount of
the annual gap, or the change in the annual gap, that can be explained by variables
that are perfectly collinear with Hispanic. In particular, we can no longer include
the interaction between Hispanic and the public coverage eligibility proxy, or His-
panic and citizenship status. While the coefficients on these variables (in the last
regression of Method 1) are significantly different from zero, they are of relatively
small magnitude, and their exclusion leaves the key coefficients largely unchanged.
3.6 Results
3.6.1 Regression Adjusted Trend Line
The first column of Table 3.3 is the actual (unweighted, because the regressions are
all unweighted) gap in uninsured rates between Hispanics and non-Hispanic Whites,
23Fairlie and Sundstrom (1999) have a mathematically equivalent change decomposition, but have a broader
definition of the “explained” portion that would include parts of the third line of equation (3.9).
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averaged over the months in each year. The actual gap grew from a low of 12.4
in 1984 to a high of 28.7 in 2001, decreasing in the remaining years of the sample.
Fitting a linear trend to the numbers in this column (bottom panel of Table 3.3),
we find a slope of 0.505, and we can reject the null of a zero slope at 99 percent
confidence level.
The remaining columns of Table 3.3 present the adjusted Hispanic-White gap,
the sum of the coefficient on the Hispanic intercept term plus each Hispanic-year
coefficient (β1 + δy). In the second column, we add the X variables: gender, race
and ethnicity, family structure, age categories, and the state unemployment rate. On
average, the annual gaps shrink by six percent, or about 0.3 percentage points. Most
annual gaps are at least a little smaller, with the 2004 gap shrinking by the greatest
percent (4.1 percent, or 1.1 percentage points). The slope of the fitted linear trend
line is flatter at 0.476 percentage points per year, a decrease of 5.7 percent in the
slope from the unadjusted gap, but is still significantly different from zero.
Next, we add citizenship variables, including indicators for naturalized citizen and
non-citizen, an indicator for missing citizenship information, interactions of each of
those three statuses with the Hispanic dummy, and a categorical variable for how
long the individual has spent in the United States. On average, the annual gaps
fall by an additional ten percentage points, or about half of the actual gap. The
reduction is largest for the early years; the gap shrunk by at least 50 percent in nine
out of the first thirteen years, and on average by about 40 percent in the 2000’s. The
trend line is 26.2 percent flatter than the unadjusted trend, but is still significantly
different from zero.
In the fourth column, we add categorical variables for educational attainment.
The annual gaps are an additional 3.5 percentage points smaller on average, and the
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average adjusted gap is now a third of the unadjusted gap for that year. Still, this
reduction is substantially smaller for the more recent years in the sample, and the
linear trend has a statistically significant slope of 0.341 percentage points per year.
We next add our proxy variable for public coverage eligibility, plus interactions
between the proxy and Hispanic, female, each citizenship status, and both Hispanic
and citizenship status. Accounting for public coverage eligibility actually increases
the gap slightly in most years, particularly in the years after welfare reform, sug-
gesting that Hispanics would be even less likely to have insurance coverage than
non-Hispanic Whites were it not for the increased likelihood of being eligible for
Medicaid. This leads to a steeper slope in the trend line, though still a 29 percent
slower average annual increase in the gap than the unadjusted figures.
Finally, we add income and labor supply variables, including indicators for whether
one is full time, part time, or self employed, the same employment status categories
for one’s spouse, and five industry categories. Controlling for these variables reduces
each of the gaps, undoing the reversal caused by adding public coverage eligibility.
Again, though, the reduction in the gap is largest in the early years; in fact, the 1984
gap disappears. Still, 30 to 40 percent of the gap in each year of the 2000’s remains
unexplained. As a result, the trend line is slightly steeper than in column 4, with
the gap growing at a statistically significant 0.351 percentage points per year, only
30.4 percent less steep than the unadjusted trend. Despite significant contributions
by citizenship and education, about 70 percent of the divergence in the uninsured
rate between Hispanics and non-Hispanic Whites remains unexplained.
Figure 3.11 graphs these adjusted gaps. It is clear from the graph that citizenship
and education have the largest effects, while income also reduces the annual gaps, but
most of its effect worked through variables added previously. Drawing one trend line
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through all of the points in each series, we see that we can explain some of the growth
of the gap, but that a significant upward trend remains even in the all-inclusive series.
In Figure 3.11, there appears to be a break at 1996, possibly due to subtle dif-
ferences between earlier panels and the 1996 panel (though the definitions for most
of the variables we use appear to be largely unchanged), or because of the growth
of the economy during this period. It may be more appropriate to draw separate
trend lines, one from 1983 to 1995, another from 1996 to the peak of the uninsured
rate gap in 2001, and another from 2002 to the end of the sample. Table 3.4 gives
linear trend coefficients through Figure 3.11 for these time periods. Between 1983
and 1995 (second panel), the unadjusted gap has a positive slope of 0.37 percentage
points per year, significantly different from zero, but becomes essentially flat once we
control for citizenship. The gap grew the most between 1996 and 2001 (third panel),
and adding personal characteristics actually makes the positive trend line steeper.
In the later period, between 2002 and 2007 (bottom panel), the uninsured rates for
the two groups started to converge; the adjusted trend lines suggest that this con-
vergence should have been even faster, based on relative improvements in Hispanics’
citizenship status and education. Except for the last few years, decomposing the 25-
year trend into smaller portions strengthens the finding that the growing (and then
ameliorating, somewhat) gap in uninsured rates between Hispanics and non-Hispanic
Whites cannot be explained by observable differences between the groups.
The other coefficients are largely in the expected direction, and because of our
large sample size (9.3 million person-months, with standard errors clustered by nearly
360,000 individuals), almost all statistically significant. Females and married indi-
viduals are less likely to be uninsured, while those with children are more likely to
be uninsured. The uninsured rate is decreasing in age (between ages 21 and 55),
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education, and family income, and increasing in the state unemployment rate. Non-
citizens are most likely to be uninsured, more so if they are also Hispanic, and while
naturalized citizens are more likely to be uninsured than native-born citizens, there is
no difference between Hispanic and non-Hispanic naturalized citizens. Foreign-born
individuals that have been in the U.S. for more than ten years are less likely to be
uninsured than even the native-born, all else equal. Those with family income less
than the poverty level (our proxy for public coverage eligibility) are far more likely to
be uninsured, though being female, Hispanic, or a non-Hispanic immigrant reduces
this probability. Hispanic immigrants (both non-citizens and naturalized citizens)
are particularly vulnerable to being uninsured. Finally, full time workers, or those
with a working spouse, are least likely to be uninsured, while the self-employed are
actually worse off than the unemployed, though a self-employed spouse is better than
an unemployed spouse. Coefficients are unchanged, for the most part, when adding
each new set of controls, except for those variables that are directly correlated, such
as citizenship variables interacted with the public coverage eligibility proxy, or the
married dummy with spouse’s work status.
3.6.2 Blinder-Oaxaca Decompositions
The Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition for the Hispanic-White uninsured rate gap
in each year yields similar results to the adjusted trend line (Appendix Table 3.6).
Except for citizenship in 1984, each variable contributes some positive amount to
“explaining” the actual gap in all years. Differences in educational attainment con-
sistently explain between ten and 20 percent of the actual gap, growing slightly more
important in later years. Income and labor market differences seem to be important
from 1990 through 1995 and in the last years of the sample, but otherwise do not
contribute much. Citizenship becomes much more important starting in 1990, but
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remains less influential than differences between the two groups in education level.
Differential public coverage eligibility is crucial from 1983 to 1989, explaining up to
half of the actual gap, but gradually fades in importance. Still, in most years, the
largest portion of the actual gap is “unexplained,” growing to more than half of the
actual gap in the 2000’s.
The results in Table 3.5, which formalize the linear trend analysis in the previous
section, reach a similar conclusion: much of the divergence in uninsured rates between
Hispanics and non-Hispanic Whites over 25 years remains unexplained by differences
in personal characteristics between the groups. Of the 12.3 percentage point increase
from 1984 to 2007 (top line), differences between Hispanics and non-Hispanic Whites
in citizenship account for 6.4 percentage points (50.7 percent). Citizenship accounts
for almost half of this amount, with income somewhat less important. Much as we
saw (though to a lesser extent) in Method 1, Hispanic-White differences in public
coverage eligibility actually work in the wrong direction, suggesting that Hispanics’
greater likelihood of living below the poverty line should actually make the increase
in the gap greater than it is. Again, a large portion of the decomposition in Table
3.5, 5.2 percentage points (42.4 percent of the actual gap), is “unexplained.”
The other lines in Table 3.5 decompose the change in the uninsured rate gap
between varying starting and ending years. As in Table 3.4, the decomposition
results for the change between 1996 and 2001 indicate that differences in personal
characteristics between Hispanics and non-Hispanic Whites should result in a larger
increase in the uninsured rate gap, and the gap’s decrease between 2002 and 2007
should have been larger considering changes in the citizenship, education, and age
compositions of the Hispanic population. Also, the largest portion of the increase
in the gap between 1984 and 1995, and between the gap’s lowest (1984) and highest
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(2001) points, is unexplained. Other than the last six years of the sample, then,
observable differences between Hispanics and non-Hispanic Whites do not explain
the largest portion of the divergence in these groups’ uninsured rates.
3.6.3 Decompositions by Insurance Source
Figure 3.12 repeats the analysis from Method 1, with an indicator for public cov-
erage, rather than uninsured, as the dependent variable. Adding our X variables
reduces the average annual public coverage gap by 16 percent. Accounting for cit-
izenship, the adjusted gap is actually larger than the unadjusted gap in all years.
The education variables induce about a 30 percent reduction in the average gap and,
not surprisingly, accounting for public coverage eligibility makes the gap nearly dis-
appear. Adding variables does not change the shape of the public coverage gap’s
long-term time series; the unadjusted gap and all of the adjusted gaps each ini-
tially decline, increase during the early 1990’s, fall through 2000, and then rise again
sharply at the end of our sample. The public coverage gap between Hispanics and
Whites is almost fully explained by Hispanics’ greater probability of having family
income below the poverty line, and unlike the uninsured rate gap, there does not
seem to be a concern for the widening of the public coverage gap.
If the public coverage gap can be almost completely explained away, but the
uninsured rate gap persists even after controlling for observable characteristics, then
the private coverage adjusted gap must also be growing, as we see in Figure 3.13.
The unadjusted gap is negative, meaning the private coverage rate for Hispanics is
lower than the rate for non-Hispanic Whites, and getting progressively more negative
as our sample advances. Adding citizenship variables reduces the private coverage
gap by about a third, education by about 20 percent, and public coverage eligibility
(which could have a crowdout effect on private coverage), and income each reduce
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the gap by about 10 percent. Still, about a quarter of the average annual gap remains
unexplained, and the adjusted trend indicates an increasing divergence for the full
sample, 1983 through 1995, and 1996 through 2001, though the gap shrinks after
2002.
The persistence of the private coverage gap between Hispanics and non-Hispanic
Whites, even after accounting for observable characteristics, does not appear to be
because of differences in rates of coverage by employer-sponsored insurance rates.
Figure 3.14 shows that citizenship explains about half of the average annual gap in
coverage from one’s own employer, while the difference in educational attainment
covers nearly the rest. While the own employer coverage gap is increasing at a small
but significant rate, 0.17 percentage points per year, nearly all of this growth is
between 1996 and 2001, while Hispanics’ adjusted employer coverage rate is nearly
equal to non-Hispanic Whites’ in 2007.
The growing private coverage gap also does not seem to be due to a divergence
in non-group coverage, as seen in Figure 3.15. The gap in own private coverage
through a source other than one’s employer is never larger than 3.5 percentage points,
and accounting for observable characteristics reduces the gap to approximately one
percentage point. There is no significant widening of the gap; in fact, unlike most of
the other graphs, the trend after 1996 is toward zero, reflecting a tightening of the
gap.
The source of the widening adjusted gap in the uninsured rate seems to be the
decreased likelihood of private coverage through someone else, usually a spouse or
parent. While this rate has remained constant at around 28 percent for non-Hispanic
Whites, the proportion of Hispanics covered by someone else fell from 21 percent to
14 percent (Figure 3.16). Differences between the groups in citizenship and education
88
each explain only about 14 percent of the average annual gap, public coverage eligi-
bility another 11 percent, and income about 24 percent, but more than 40 percent
the average annual gap remains unexplained. In each time period, the adjusted trend
line, including all variables, is no different than the trend in the unadjusted gap; over
the full sample period, there is a significant increase of 0.2 percentage points per year
in gap in coverage through a family member, with the largest increase between 1996
and 2001.
3.6.4 Decompositions by Hispanic Subgroup
Figure 3.8, and previous studies, suggest that the uninsured rate has been much
different for Mexicans living in the U.S. compared to other Hispanic subgroups. In
Appendix Table 3.7, we present the results of separate decompositions for the growth
in the uninsured rate gap between each Hispanic subgroup and non-Hispanic Whites.
The largest subgroup, and the one with consistently the highest uninsured rate,
is Mexicans, including both Mexican immigrants and U.S.-born Mexican-Americans.
Between 1984 and 2003, the uninsured rate among Mexicans increased from 33.7
percent to 43.5 percent, an increase in the gap with non-Hispanic Whites of 14.7
percentage points. As we found in Table 3.5, differences in education and citizenship
account for the largest portion of this gap, but 9.4 percentage points, or nearly two-
thirds, of the Mexican-White gap remains unexplained. Similarly, the gap between
Puerto Ricans and Whites, and other Hispanics (those who are neither Mexican,
Puerto Rican, nor Cuban) and Whites, are largely left unexplained even after con-
trolling for observables. The Cuban-White gap has actually shrunk slightly, despite
differences in citizenship that suggest the gap should have widened.
We also repeat the analysis from Fronstin, Goldberg, and Robins (1997), de-
composing the differences within the Hispanic group (Appendix Table 3.8). The
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uninsured rate among Mexicans increased much faster than the uninsured rate for
Puerto Ricans or Cubans, but the widening of these intra-Hispanic gaps remains
largely unexplained after controlling for observables. Again, education and citizen-
ship differences between Mexicans and these two groups seem to be most important,
especially considering nearly all individuals of Puerto Rican heritage are citizens.
The gap between Mexicans and the remaining Hispanics did not widen nearly as
much, and observables account for more than the actual gap.
3.7 Discussion
Irrespective of the decomposition methodology, a large portion of the growth in the
uninsured rate for Hispanics relative to non-Hispanic Whites remains unexplained,
even after accounting for differences in income, education, citizenship, and other
factors available in our data. To get an idea for the magnitude of this unexplained
portion, we can do some simple accounting.
The uninsured rate for white non-Hispanic nonelderly adults fell from 19.6 percent
in 1984 to 14.0 percent in 2007. The uninsured rate for Hispanics increased from
32.0 percent in 1984 to as much as 42.2 percent in 2001, before falling to 38.7 percent
in 2007; the gap, therefore, increased from 12.4 to 28.7 percentage points, and then
back down to 24.7 percentage points, during that time. Of that 12.3 percentage
point increase in the gap over the full sample, we can explain 3.9 percentage points
under the first decomposition method,24 and 7.1 percentage points under the more
statistically rigorous method.25
If the gap had remained constant at 1984 proportions, the Hispanic uninsured rate
in 2007 would have been 26.4 percent, or 6.6 million uninsured out of 25.1 million
24For Method 1, we multiply the trend coefficient (0.351) times 24 years, so the regression-predicted change in the
gap for 2003 is 8.4 percentage points.
25For Method 2, a change of 5.2 percentage points remains unexplained between 1984 and 2007, as can be seen in
the last row of Table 3.5.
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Hispanic nonelderly adults. Instead, there were 9.0 million nonelderly Hispanic adults
without health insurance in the average month in 2007, an increase of almost 2.4
million over the counterfactual. Accounting for income, education, citizenship, and
other variables, we can explain 749,000 (Method 1) to 1.37 million (Method 2) of the
difference between the actual and the counterfactual. In other words, between 1.0
and 1.6 million of the increase in the number of uninsured Hispanic nonelderly adults
remains unexplained by observable differences between Hispanics and non-Hispanic
Whites.
Another counterfactual can help us estimate how the growth of the Hispanic
population in the U.S. has led to an increase in the number of uninsured. The non-
Hispanic White population grew by 4.4 percent between 1984 and 2007; in contrast,
the Hispanic population more than tripled. If the Hispanic population had grown
by only 4.4 percent, but experienced the same increase in the uninsured rate as they
actually did over that time (to 38.7 percent uninsured), there would have been 3.0
million uninsured Hispanics in 2003, 6.0 million fewer than the actual figure. Based
on our regression estimates, we can only explain between 1.9 million (Method 1) and
3.5 million (Method 2), leaving an extra 2.5 to 4.1 million uninsured Hispanics for
whom we cannot account from interethnic differences in observable characteristics.
Though our data cannot account for the extra several million uninsured Hispanics,
there are other potential explanations. We suggest a number of possible factors
that could have increased the price of insurance, changed preferences for health
insurance, or decreased the (relative) income available to purchase insurance for
Hispanics during this time.
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Price of Insurance
Our estimation by source of insurance indicate that most of the unexplained
increase in the Hispanic uninsured rate is from fewer Hispanics acquiring coverage
through another person. There is also some evidence that employer coverage is harder
to come by, though we can explain much of the Hispanic-White difference in employer
coverage by controlling for observable characteristics. Perhaps employers are still
offering coverage to employees at roughly the same rate, but are attempting to control
costs by being more restrictive about coverage for family members. Unfortunately,
SIPP does not consistently ask whether an individual receives an offer of coverage
from her employer, and whether that offer will include not just her but also her
family members; we are able to determine whether she accepted the offer, but SIPP
does not ask whether an offer was rejected.
If jobs that are considered “high-quality” are also the ones who are more likely
to offer health insurance for the whole family as part of the compensation package,
then perhaps Hispanics have grown more likely to take lower-quality jobs. Whether
because of labor market tightness or changing returns to relative skill level, Hispanics
could be increasingly likely to be stuck in jobs that offer lower total compensation,
less certainty over hours or eventual job tenure, or less workforce bargaining power,
all of which would reduce the probability of comprehensive insurance offers. While
we find little change in the industrial composition of the Hispanic workforce in our
data, it could be that Hispanics more often find themselves in positions that are less
generous with insurance offers within these broad industrial categories.
Also worth considering is the percentage of Hispanics who are self-employed or
work in small businesses owned by others, since both groups are likely to face higher
and more volatile health insurance plan prices. While SIPP does not have a consistent
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measure of the size of an employee’s firm throughout the years, we do know from our
data that the proportion of Hispanics for whom self-employment is their primary job
has decreased slightly, from 4.8 percent in 1983 to 3.5 in 2007. The self-employment
rate for white non-Hispanics has fallen by a higher percentage, from 9.7 percent in
1983 to 6.3 in 2007. Still, Hispanics are, and have been throughout our sample, much
less likely to be self-employed, and this explanation is probably not overly relevant.
It’s also possible that Hispanics have increased job volatility. Since many jobs,
even “high quality” positions, do not offer health insurance until after a probationary
period (often six months or one year), people who change jobs frequently will often
experience long spells without health insurance while they wait for eligibility. If, over
the time covered in our sample, job tenure declined and job volatility increased for
Hispanics, then this could explain part of the growing disparity; we will explore this
possibility in future research on insurance transitions.
As with most large survey datasets, we should note that there is no information
in the SIPP about an immigrant’s legal status. An immigrant lacking proper doc-
umentation is likely to find jobs that are of lower quality, as she has little leverage
in the job market. Very few of these jobs will offer health insurance for her, and
even fewer will extend coverage to her spouse or children. If the proportion of the
immigrant population without documentation grew larger from the mid-1980’s to
the 2000’s, then the immigrant population would be less likely to acquire affordable
private coverage, in ways that are not captured by our citizenship variables.26
Another problem with the SIPP data is the lack of a primary language variable
(other than in the 2001 and 2004 panels). If language or thickness of one’s accent is
26This possible difference in the immigrant population relies on the assumption that SIPP is able to interview the
same proportion of undocumented immigrants that it currently does, and that a larger undocumented population will
result in more interviews with undocumented immigrants. On the contrary, if currently no additional undocumented
immigrants respond to SIPP interview requests, then there would be no measured difference in the immigrant
population.
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a significant barrier to acquiring health insurance, whether through finding a quality
job or discovering eligibility for a public program, many foreign-born (and even some
U.S.-born) Hispanics would be more likely to go without coverage. We probably
control for most of the language impact by including citizenship variables and their
interaction with Hispanic ethnicity and poverty, but within these groups we could
still have some with language difficulty having trouble getting insurance, with others
with English proficiency being more successful.
For non-English speakers, social networks could prove to be very important when
attempting to access health care and health insurance. Gresenz, Rogowski, and Es-
carce (2007) find that Mexican immigrants are more likely to be insured when they
live in a neighborhood with a high concentration of Spanish-speakers and other His-
panics, though this effect disappears for U.S.-born Mexican-Americans, suggesting
that those who are more acculturated are less reliant on networks to find access to
affordable health care. Also, Borjas and Hilton (1996) find that immigrants are more
likely to be covered by Medicaid if earlier immigrants from that same country also
had high levels of Medicaid coverage. Our finding of a widening gap in coverage
through another person fits into the social network model of these two papers. Still,
since network effects are less important for native-born Hispanics, these spillovers
are unlikely to explain much of the growing gap with other groups.
Preferences for Risk, Health Care, and Insurance
The lack of insurance among Hispanics could be a matter of personal preference
as it relates to risk, in ways that we are not capturing in the variables we have.
Barsky et al. (1997) find that in hypothetical questions on a survey, Hispanics are
the second-most (after Asians) risk tolerant group, and that those with higher risk
tolerance are less likely to have health insurance coverage. The survey responses are
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consistent with increased prevalence of risky behaviors found by other researchers,
including lower saving rates (Engen et al. 1999), more credit card usage (Medina
and Chau 1998), lower seatbelt usage rates (Campos-Outcalt et al. 2003), and lower
vaccination rates (Herrera, Zhao and Klevens 2001).
If native-born Hispanics are healthier, it may make sense for more of them to
choose to go without health insurance. But Hendee (1991) finds that Hispanics have
a higher risk of diabetes, hypertension, tuberculosis, HIV, alcoholism, cirrhosis, some
cancers, and violent deaths. On the other hand, Hispanics may be less likely to seek
treatment in an emergency department (Taylor, Larsen, and Correa-de-Araujo 2006),
use prescription drugs (Weinick et al. 2004), or have a usual source of care (Weinick,
Zurekas, and Cohen 2000), so even if they are less healthy, access to and financial
coverage of medical care may be less important. Future research should consider
whether Hispanic health care utilization has changed over this time; the decreased
likelihood of insurance relative to other groups makes more sense if Hispanics are
using less care than they were in the early 1980’s, not just that they’re less likely to
use care at any particular point in time.
Also, Hispanics may value insurance less as a part of their total compensation
package, whether it be from an employer or part of a welfare plan. Non-citizens
who are remitting income to their families in other countries may prefer to receive
compensation in the form of wages rather than fringe benefits, particularly if their
time in the U.S. labor market is short or seasonal. This is less likely for citizens,
though we should also consider whether Hispanics are more likely to be a secondary
wage earner, or have the possibility of being covered by another family member’s
plan.
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Income Available for Insurance
Another possibility is that many Hispanics’ lower income makes them unable to
afford insurance, even if the price is reasonable and their preference is for coverage. If
Hispanics have fallen further behind non-Hispanic Whites in income over the sample
period, then affordability could explain some of the unexplained health insurance
disparity. In our data, though, Hispanics have actually gained on white non-Hispanics
in family income relative to the federal poverty level. Hispanics’ increased likelihood
of being in the poorest part of the distribution has shrunk somewhat, and Hispanics
are also more likely to be in the 300-400 percent “middle class” range, relative to how
the distribution has changed for non-Hispanic Whites. On the other hand, Hispanics
are even less likely than Whites to be in the highest income group relative to where
they were in the 1980’s. Still, the most constrained group seems to have shrunk
somewhat, so growing income disparity is likely not the culprit.
Income could be insufficient to purchase insurance if long term or frequent illness
cuts into earning power. A person with tuberculosis or cirrhosis would probably be
unable to work, or would have frequent interruptions in their work schedule which
would make them less attractive to potential employers (not to mention more expen-
sive to insure under a small business employer sponsored plan). The Hendee paper
cited above makes the case that Hispanics are more likely to have the type of long
term health conditions that could prevent a stable income source.
3.8 Conclusions
Hispanics were already more likely to be uninsured in the early 1980’s. Over the
course of the next 25 years, they fell even further behind, not only compared to
non-Hispanic Whites, but also relative to non-Hispanic Blacks, Asians, and Native
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Americans. Our research suggests that, though differences in education and citi-
zenship between Hispanics and non-Hispanic Whites can account for some of the
divergence in health insurance coverage, a substantial portion of the growth in the
uninsured rate gap remains unexplained, particularly among individuals of Mexican
heritage. In fact, we estimate this portion to represent more than one million extra
uninsured Hispanics in 2007. Looking further into how health insurance is delivered,
we find that most of the unexplained increase was due to lower rates of coverage
through a family member, while gaps in public programs and employer-sponsored
coverage largely disappear when controlling for observable characteristics.
While we are confident in our findings, we should stress that our paper has some
limitations. The biggest downside to using the SIPP is that English language pro-
ficiency is not included, except in the 2001 and 2004 panels. While we expect that
we have controlled for most of the effect that language would have on the likelihood
of being uninsured with our citizenship status variables, it is likely that English
proficiency varies within the Hispanic non-citizen group, and immigrants with bet-
ter understanding of English will be more likely to find a “quality” job that offers
insurance, or better understand their public coverage eligibility.
We are also reliant upon the data being accurate and complete, with only random
attrition, though our results are no different when re-weighting observations to con-
trol for non-random attrition (see Appendix). Of particular concern is citizenship
status; we control for the possibility that those who do not answer the citizenship
question could be different than those who do, but it is possible that many non-
citizens, especially those without proper documentation, may claim to be citizens,
even native-born. We are also unable to tell which immigrants are legal and which
are not, which probably has a substantial impact on the likelihood of having health
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insurance and access to affordable health care.
Our preliminary research indicates that, in addition to the increased likelihood
of being uninsured at any particular time relative to other groups, insured Hispan-
ics have also grown more likely to lose coverage, while uninsured Hispanics are less
likely to gain coverage, though the divergence is not nearly as monotonic as the
point-in-time coverage analyzed in this paper. While some medical care can wait
until the individual has insurance, frequent transitions may subject policyholders to
restrictions on pre-existing conditions, and leave those who have dropped coverage
vulnerable to medical and financial risk from poorly timed illnesses or injuries. In
the near future, we would like to apply the analysis from this paper to insurance
transitions, to determine if the variables we found to be important sources of cover-
age disparities, such as citizenship and education, also account for the disparity in
coverage lapses.
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3.9 Appendix: Inverse Probability Weighting for Time Series Graphs
As with most panel surveys, the SIPP experiences nonrandom attrition from the
sample. The nonrandom nature of this attrition is a concern for us because evidence
suggests that those who are most likely to be uninsured are also the most likely
to attrit from the sample. To account for nonrandom attrition, we reweight each
observation by the inverse probability of its being present in the sample. Following
Robins, Rotnitzky, and Zhao (1995) and Wooldridge (2000), we first determine the
probability of individual i being present in the sample at time t using a probit
regression, where the covariates are the time t− 1 (or time-invariant) characteristics




where Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function and Z is a vector of
personal characteristics. Note that because, by definition, we do not know the value
for any time-varying characteristic when the individual is not present, Z includes
the value of each characteristic at time t− 1 (unless, of course, it is time-invariant),
with the exception of the SIPP interview wave. In addition to the wave variable, we
include dummy variables for being uninsured, unemployed, Hispanic, black, Asian,
Native American, female, and married in Z, and use the SIPP weight (lagged as
necessary) when running the probit regression.
After fitting a selection probability, π, to each observation, we then find the
probability of being present in time t, conditional on being present in each previous
period from entry time (t = 1) to time t− 1:
pit = πi1 ∗ πi2 ∗ πi3 ∗ ... ∗ πi,t−1 ∗ πit
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The new bias-corrected weight is then the SIPP-created weight times 1/pit.
Finally, we rescale all weighted totals so that they match the total number of
nonelderly adults in the United States for that month, according to the Census
figures.
We use the inverse probability weights in our graphs of the time series of insurance
status for different groups, but not in our regressions. Regression results using the
weights are not substantially different than the unweighted results, despite SIPP’s
oversampling of lower income communities. These results are available from the
authors upon request. We should also note that we control for the interview wave
of the person-month observation in our regressions, in order to pick up some of the



































Figure 3.2: Uninsured Rate By Ethnicity, Age 55 and Over
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Figure 3.10: Employer-Sponsored Coverage in Own’s Name Rate By Racial and Ethnic Group,
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Figure 3.16: Hispanic - White Non-Hispanic Gap in Rate of Private Coverage From Someone
Else
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Table 3.1: Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) Panels
Panel Waves Sample Size Beginning Month Ending Month
1984 9 23,283 June 1983 July 1986
1985 8 16,011 October 1984 July 1987
1986 7 13,292 October 1985 March 1988
1987 7 13,681 October 1986 April 1989
1988 6 13,793 October 1987 December 1989
1990 8 25,595 October 1989 August 1992
1991 8 16,358 October 1990 August 1993
1992 9 22,438 October 1991 December 1994
1993 9 22,694 October 1992 December 1995
1996 12 41,378 December 1995 February 2000
2001 9 39,551 October 2000 December 2003
2004 12 150,282 October 2003 December 2007
Note: Sample size reflects number of nonelderly adults in the first month of Wave 1 of that
panel.
Table 3.2: Sample Means
All Hispanic White Non-Hispanic
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
Uninsured 0.180 (0.384) 0.369 (0.483) 0.154 (0.361)
Hispanic 0.119 (0.324) 1.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Female 0.512 (0.500) 0.522 (0.500) 0.511 (0.500)
Black 0.008 (0.090) 0.069 (0.254) 0.000 (0.000)
Asian 0.001 (0.035) 0.010 (0.100) 0.000 (0.000)
Native American 0.002 (0.047) 0.019 (0.136) 0.000 (0.000)
Married 0.211 (0.408) 0.302 (0.459) 0.198 (0.399)
Own Children Present (0/1) 0.662 (0.473) 0.757 (0.429) 0.648 (0.477)
Age
18-20 0.078 (0.268) 0.099 (0.299) 0.075 (0.263)
21-23 0.076 (0.265) 0.094 (0.292) 0.074 (0.262)
24-26 0.080 (0.271) 0.097 (0.296) 0.078 (0.267)
27-30 0.113 (0.316) 0.133 (0.340) 0.110 (0.313)
31-35 0.145 (0.353) 0.159 (0.365) 0.144 (0.351)
36-40 0.146 (0.353) 0.140 (0.346) 0.147 (0.354)
41-45 0.138 (0.345) 0.117 (0.321) 0.141 (0.348)
46-50 0.121 (0.326) 0.091 (0.288) 0.125 (0.330)
51-55 0.103 (0.304) 0.070 (0.256) 0.108 (0.310)
State Unemployment Rate 5.782 (1.640) 6.152 (1.481) 5.732 (1.654)
Citizenship
N/A 0.153 (0.360) 0.140 (0.347) 0.154 (0.361)
Non-Citizen 0.054 (0.227) 0.323 (0.468) 0.018 (0.132)
Naturalized citizen 0.029 (0.168) 0.108 (0.311) 0.018 (0.133)
Citizenship Interacted with Hispanic
N/A 0.017 (0.128) 0.140 (0.347) 0.000 (0.000)
Hispanic Non-Citizen 0.039 (0.193) 0.323 (0.468) 0.000 (0.000)
Hispanic Naturalized 0.013 (0.113) 0.108 (0.311) 0.000 (0.000)
Time in U.S.
Less than 10 Years 0.032 (0.177) 0.179 (0.384) 0.012 (0.110)
10 to 20 Years 0.022 (0.147) 0.126 (0.331) 0.008 (0.089)
More than 20 Years 0.019 (0.138) 0.076 (0.265) 0.012 (0.108)
Less than HS 0.128 (0.334) 0.368 (0.482) 0.095 (0.293)
HS Graduate 0.337 (0.473) 0.321 (0.467) 0.339 (0.473)
Some College 0.230 (0.421) 0.174 (0.379) 0.237 (0.425)
College 0.306 (0.461) 0.137 (0.344) 0.329 (0.470)
Public Coverage Eligibility Proxy
Under 100% FPL 0.116 (0.321) 0.228 (0.420) 0.101 (0.302)
Female Under 100% FPL 0.067 (0.251) 0.138 (0.345) 0.058 (0.233)
Hispanic Under 100% FPL 0.027 (0.163) 0.228 (0.420) 0.000 (0.000)
Citizenship Interacted with Eligibility Proxy
N/A 0.025 (0.156) 0.037 (0.188) 0.023 (0.151)
Non-Citizen 0.013 (0.112) 0.087 (0.282) 0.002 (0.050)
Naturalized citizen 0.004 (0.061) 0.020 (0.138) 0.002 (0.040)
Citizenship Interacted with Hispanic and Eligibility Proxy
continued on next page
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continued from previous page
All Hispanic White Non-Hispanic
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
N/A 0.004 (0.066) 0.037 (0.188) 0.000 (0.000)
Non-Citizen 0.010 (0.102) 0.087 (0.282) 0.000 (0.000)
Naturalized citizen 0.002 (0.048) 0.020 (0.138) 0.000 (0.000)
Family Income as % of Poverty Line
Less than 50 0.059 (0.236) 0.098 (0.297) 0.054 (0.226)
50-100 0.057 (0.232) 0.131 (0.337) 0.047 (0.212)
100-150 0.075 (0.263) 0.150 (0.357) 0.065 (0.246)
150-200 0.088 (0.283) 0.139 (0.346) 0.081 (0.273)
200-300 0.185 (0.388) 0.203 (0.403) 0.182 (0.386)
300-400 0.163 (0.369) 0.121 (0.327) 0.168 (0.374)
More than 400 0.374 (0.484) 0.158 (0.365) 0.403 (0.491)
Part Time 0.127 (0.333) 0.115 (0.318) 0.128 (0.334)
Full Time 0.581 (0.493) 0.536 (0.499) 0.587 (0.492)
Self Employed 0.082 (0.274) 0.048 (0.214) 0.086 (0.281)
Unemployed 0.606 (0.489) 0.567 (0.495) 0.611 (0.487)
Industry
N/A 0.231 (0.422) 0.307 (0.461) 0.221 (0.415)
Manufacturing 0.244 (0.429) 0.240 (0.427) 0.244 (0.430)
Utilities 0.047 (0.212) 0.037 (0.190) 0.048 (0.215)
Sales 0.144 (0.351) 0.136 (0.343) 0.145 (0.352)
Service 0.295 (0.456) 0.250 (0.433) 0.301 (0.459)
Government 0.039 (0.193) 0.030 (0.170) 0.040 (0.196)
Spouse Work Status
Part Time 0.064 (0.245) 0.049 (0.216) 0.066 (0.249)
Full Time 0.355 (0.479) 0.310 (0.463) 0.361 (0.480)
Self Employed 0.062 (0.241) 0.034 (0.182) 0.066 (0.247)
Unemployed 0.117 (0.321) 0.151 (0.358) 0.112 (0.316)
Mexican Origin 0.071 (0.257) 0.614 (0.487) 0.000 (0.000)
Public Insurance 0.463 (0.499) 0.333 (0.471) 0.481 (0.500)
Private Insurance 0.055 (0.228) 0.033 (0.178) 0.058 (0.234)
Own Employer-Sponsored Insurance 0.260 (0.439) 0.162 (0.369) 0.273 (0.446)
Own Non-Employer Private Insurance 0.768 (0.422) 0.517 (0.500) 0.802 (0.399)
Covered by Family Member 0.062 (0.241) 0.124 (0.330) 0.053 (0.225)
Number of Observations 9,268,530 1,107,374 8,161,156
Number of Person Clusters 359,033 44,435 314,598
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Table 3.3: Predicted Hispanic - White Non-Hispanic Gaps in Uninsured Rate (Method 1)
Predicted Gap (Percentage Points)
Actual Gap Add Add Public
(Percentage Citizenship Coverage Add Income,
Points) Add Basic and Time Add Eligibility Proxy Work Status,
Controls in U.S. Education and Interactions and Industry
1983 15.9 15.2 6.9 3.5 3.1 1.4
1984 12.4 12.5 4.0 0.6 0.9 -0.6
1985 14.0 14.0 5.7 2.5 3.3 1.3
1986 18.7 18.8 10.6 7.6 7.8 5.4
1987 18.5 18.3 10.1 7.1 7.2 5.1
1988 18.6 18.6 9.9 7.0 7.0 4.9
1989 19.0 19.1 9.7 6.8 7.0 4.9
1990 20.4 20.8 10.1 6.8 6.7 5.1
1991 18.7 19.1 8.3 5.0 4.8 3.2
1992 18.4 18.5 7.7 4.6 4.4 2.8
1993 18.5 18.3 7.6 4.4 4.1 2.5
1994 18.3 18.1 7.7 4.5 4.3 2.7
1995 18.8 18.4 8.6 5.4 5.2 3.4
1996 24.9 24.1 13.3 9.3 9.4 7.4
1997 23.6 23.2 12.7 8.7 8.9 6.9
1998 23.5 23.1 12.7 8.7 8.9 7.0
1999 23.0 22.7 12.5 8.5 8.9 7.3
2000 27.9 27.3 17.1 12.5 12.7 10.6
2001 28.7 28.1 17.6 13.0 13.9 12.0
2002 26.9 26.6 16.6 12.1 13.0 11.4
2003 25.7 25.3 15.5 11.1 12.0 10.3
2004 25.9 24.8 14.9 10.9 11.4 9.2
2005 23.6 23.0 13.3 9.8 10.3 8.0
2006 24.2 23.7 11.6 8.9 9.1 6.9
2007 24.7 24.3 12.4 9.8 9.7 7.5
Linear Trend, 1983-2007
Coefficient 0.505 0.476 0.373 0.341 0.360 0.351
t-statistic 8.0 7.8 5.6 6.0 5.8 5.9
Percent of Trend
in Actual Gap 5.7% 26.2% 32.6% 28.7% 30.4%
Explained
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Table 3.4: Linear Time Trends in the Uninsured Rate Gap between Hispanics and Non-Hispanic
Whites
Predicted Gap (Percentage Points)
Actual Gap Add Add Public
(Percentage Citizenship Coverage Add Income,
Points) Add Basic and Time Add Eligibility Proxy Work Status,
Controls in U.S. Education and Interactions and Industry
1983-2007
Coefficient 0.505 0.476 0.373 0.341 0.360 0.351
t-statistic 8.0 7.8 5.6 6.0 5.8 5.9
Percent of Trend
in Actual Gap 5.7% 26.2% 32.6% 28.7% 30.4%
Explained
1983-1995
Coefficient 0.365 0.370 0.133 0.138 0.096 0.120
t-statistic 2.7 2.6 0.9 0.9 0.6 0.9
Percent of Trend
in Actual Gap -1.4% 63.5% 62.2% 73.6% 67.0%
Explained
1996-2001
Coefficient 0.914 0.911 0.986 0.849 0.969 0.983
t-statistic 1.9 2.1 2.5 2.4 2.7 3.1
Percent of Trend
in Actual Gap 0.2% -7.9% 7.1% -6.0% -7.6%
Explained
2002-2007
Coefficient -0.522 -0.517 -0.980 -0.549 -0.751 -0.883
t-statistic -2.5 -2.4 -6.1 -4.0 -6.2 -6.2
Percent of Trend
in Actual Gap 0.9% -87.9% -5.2% -44.1% -69.2%
Explained
Table 3.5: Blinder-Oaxaca Decompositions for the Change in the Hispanic-White Non-Hispanic
Uninsured Rate Gap
Actual Percentage Point Change Percent of Actual Change in Gap
Change Change
between in Gap Inc Educ Cit Pub Oth Unexp Inc Educ Cit Pub Oth Unexp
1984 and 2007 12.3 1.9 3.4 6.3 -4.7 0.3 5.2 15.0 27.3 50.7 -37.9 2.4 42.4
1984 and 1995 6.4 1.8 1.1 1.9 -3.5 1.1 4.0 28.5 17.6 30.0 -54.9 16.4 62.4
1984 and 2001 16.4 1.9 2.9 3.3 -5.0 0.9 12.4 11.7 17.5 20.1 -30.4 5.5 75.6
1996 and 2001 3.9 0.4 0.5 -0.2 -1.9 -0.1 5.3 10.6 12.6 -6.3 -50.2 -3.2 136.4
2002 and 2007 -2.2 -0.1 -0.1 3.2 0.6 -0.5 -5.3 4.5 4.9 -141.0 -25.1 20.5 236.2
Note: Benchmark coefficient is from the White Non-Hispanic regression.
Key:
Inc includes family income as a percent of poverty, work status (own and spouse), and industry of employment.
Educ includes the three categories of educational attainment.
Cit includes citizenship status and time lived in the U.S.
Pub includes the public coverage eligibility proxy and its interaction with gender and citizenship status.
Oth includes gender, marital status, presence of children, wave of interview, age, and state unemployment rate.
Unexp is the total of the ”unexplained” portions of the decomposition, including the constant term.
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Table 3.6: Blinder-Oaxaca Decompositions for Annual Hispanic-White Non-Hispanic Uninsured
Rate Gap
Actual Percentage Points Percent of Actual Gap
Gap Inc Educ Cit Pub Oth Unexp Inc Educ Cit Pub Oth Unexp
1983 15.9 1.3 2.3 0.1 5.6 1.0 5.6 8.5 14.3 0.5 35.4 6.2 35.1
1984 12.4 0.3 1.7 -0.1 7.1 0.1 3.3 2.7 13.7 -1.2 57.3 0.4 27.0
1985 14.0 0.9 1.7 0.5 6.9 0.0 4.0 6.4 11.9 3.3 49.5 0.1 28.8
1986 18.7 0.9 2.0 1.2 7.2 0.2 7.2 5.0 10.6 6.3 38.2 1.3 38.5
1987 18.5 0.6 1.9 0.9 7.6 0.2 7.4 3.3 10.2 4.9 40.9 0.8 39.9
1988 18.6 0.8 1.8 0.2 7.7 0.2 7.8 4.5 9.5 1.2 41.5 1.2 42.0
1989 19.0 1.1 2.0 1.1 7.1 0.3 7.4 5.5 10.4 5.7 37.5 1.8 38.9
1990 20.4 2.9 3.1 2.9 3.5 0.3 7.7 14.3 15.3 14.1 17.2 1.3 37.8
1991 18.7 2.5 2.8 2.0 4.1 0.0 7.3 13.4 14.9 10.6 22.1 0.1 38.9
1992 18.4 2.4 3.0 1.5 3.5 0.1 7.8 12.9 16.3 8.1 19.3 0.7 42.7
1993 18.5 2.5 3.1 1.5 3.8 0.4 7.1 13.8 16.8 8.2 20.6 2.3 38.4
1994 18.3 2.6 2.8 1.2 2.7 1.0 8.1 14.0 15.1 6.3 14.7 5.6 44.3
1995 18.8 2.2 2.8 1.8 3.6 1.1 7.4 11.6 15.1 9.5 18.9 5.9 39.1
1996 24.9 1.9 4.1 3.4 4.0 1.1 10.4 7.4 16.4 13.6 16.3 4.3 42.0
1997 23.6 2.0 3.6 2.3 4.1 1.0 10.6 8.6 15.3 9.7 17.3 4.2 44.9
1998 23.5 1.7 3.8 2.3 3.7 1.4 10.6 7.4 16.0 9.8 15.7 5.8 45.3
1999 23.0 1.5 3.8 2.5 3.2 1.1 10.9 6.6 16.6 10.9 14.0 4.7 47.3
2000 27.9 2.3 4.2 1.5 3.3 1.3 15.3 8.2 15.2 5.4 11.8 4.6 54.9
2001 28.7 2.3 4.6 3.1 2.1 1.0 15.7 7.9 15.9 10.9 7.3 3.3 54.7
2002 26.9 2.3 5.2 2.9 1.9 0.8 13.9 8.5 19.2 10.9 6.9 3.0 51.5
2003 25.7 2.4 4.9 3.5 2.1 0.6 12.2 9.5 18.9 13.8 8.3 2.3 47.2
2004 25.9 2.8 4.6 4.8 3.3 0.8 9.6 10.8 17.8 18.5 12.6 3.0 37.2
2005 23.6 2.9 4.2 4.1 2.8 0.6 8.9 12.2 18.0 17.4 12.0 2.6 37.9
2006 24.2 2.7 4.1 5.6 2.5 0.5 8.7 11.3 16.8 23.4 10.2 2.3 36.1
2007 24.7 2.2 5.1 6.1 2.4 0.3 8.6 8.9 20.5 24.7 9.8 1.4 34.7
Average 20.7 1.9 3.3 2.3 4.2 0.6 8.9 9.3 16.0 11.0 20.5 3.0 43.2
Note: Benchmark coefficient is from the White Non-Hispanic regression.
Key:
Inc includes family income as a percent of poverty, work status (own and spouse), and industry of employment.
Educ includes the three categories of educational attainment.
Cit includes citizenship status and time lived in the U.S.
Pub includes the public coverage eligibility proxy and its interaction with gender and citizenship status.
Oth includes gender, marital status, presence of children, wave of interview, age, and state unemployment rate.















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Another Moment to Consider: Health Plan Choice and the
Distribution of Out-Of-Pocket Medical Spending
DISCLAIMER: The research in this paper was conducted while the author was a
Special Sworn Status researcher of the U.S. Census Bureau at the Michigan Census
Research Data Center. Any opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of
the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Census Bureau. All
results have been reviewed to ensure that no confidential information is disclosed.
4.1 Introduction
More than seventy percent of insured Americans obtain their health insurance
coverage from an employer (DeNavas-Walt, Proctor, and Smith, 2009). According
to the Kaiser Family Foundation’s Employer Health Benefits Survey (2005), 63 per-
cent of covered workers are offered two or more plans. The decision to choose one
health plan over potentially multiple other options has interesting implications for
economists, including the willingness to pay for insurance against medical expen-
ditures, the perceived value of fringe benefits, whether adverse selection effects the
employer insurance market, and whether plans are chosen rationally and without
error.
Health insurance is an especially interesting product, because unlike most con-
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sumer goods, the “price” of insurance coverage is paid over time and is contingent
on how much it is used. The upfront price, or premium, is analogous to the price of
traditional consumer goods, though it is complicated by the fact that in the U.S. the
premium is subsidized, often heavily, by employers. The portion of the cost of care
paid by the consumer during the plan year, meanwhile, is both part of the price of
coverage (especially to the extent that care cannot be delayed or is sought at regular
intervals) and perhaps the most important measure of the quality of the plan. More-
over, this part of the price may depend on the consumer’s prior use of care, which
is difficult to predict ex-ante; paradoxically, insurance coverage, which is meant to
reduce financial uncertainty, has a price which is itself uncertain.
In this paper, I examine how each element of the price of coverage influences how
consumers choose between the health insurance plans offered by their employers,
using a national sample of employer plan offers that should provide a more general
conclusion about demand for insurance than existing single-firm studies. In addition
to the employee’s contribution toward the premium, I derive a measure of potential
out-of-pocket spending under each health plan, allowing me to consider how both the
mean and the variance of medical costs over the next year affect the choice of plans. I
also estimate how other elements of the plan, including supplemental coverage, plan
characteristics, and plan popularity at one’s establishment, influence the choice of
plans. To my knowledge, this is the first paper to measure consumers’ responsiveness
to each aspect of the price of coverage, including the upfront premium as well as the
level and variance of plan generosity.
I find that employees are less likely to choose a plan the higher is the expected
level of out-of-pocket spending. The variance of the within-year “price” of coverage,
however, does not influence employees’ choice of plans. I find weak evidence that
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employees are responsive to their share of the premium, but no evidence that the
types of insurance coverage beyond basic medical care that are included or optional
in the plan influence their choice. Holding plan parameters constant, an employee
is substantially more likely to choose a plan the larger is its market share among
her coworkers, which suggests the presence of unobserved differences in plan quality
and/or that employees choose the default option rather than negotiate the complex,
and often small, differences between plans.
While there has been a rich literature on the choice of plans, most previous studies
use data from a single employer or a small sample of firms, and nearly all consider only
the level, but not the variance, of plan generosity. This paper fills some of the gaps
in the literature outlined by Scanlon, Chernew, and Lave (1997), as I use data from a
recent national sample of employers and employees with detailed information on the
plans and personal characteristics, and take into account the important differences
in the modern insurance market between health maintenance organization (HMO)
plans and more traditional fee-for-service (FFS) or preferred provider organization
(PPO) plans that offer less restrictive access to providers at a higher cost. Unlike
most of the existing literature, I also examine the influence, or lack thereof, of non-
standard coverage types and covered medical services that are either missing in most
data sources or are differenced away in a one-firm sample.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 4.2, I discuss the existing literature on
plan choice and the distribution of plan generosity and this paper’s contribution. I
outline a theoretical framework that yields predictions on the role of each plan char-
acteristic in the consumer’s utility function in section 4.3. In section 4.4, I introduce
the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey data. I address the empirical specification
and discuss unconditional means in section 4.5. In section 4.6, I present the esti-
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mation results, and in section 4.7, I conclude with a discussion of other factors that
may contribute to plan choice.
4.2 Related Literature
Many researchers over the last several decades have examined the question of how
consumers pick among their choice set of health insurance plans. Most of these stud-
ies, though, focus on the elasticity of plan choice with respect to premiums. Scanlon,
Chernew, and Lave (1997) review the literature and conclude that health insurance
enrollees’ response to price is reasonably well understood and consistently negative
and significant across studies, but much less is known about elements other than
price, and how price and these other elements interact with personal characteristics.
They also are hopeful that future studies would use newer data that includes infor-
mation on not just the chosen plan but also rejected alternatives, and will be not be
specific to one market, geographic area, or type of consumer.
Many of the older studies reviewed by Scanlon, et al., and Feldman, et al. (1989)
use data from a single employer, which calls into question the identification of pre-
mium differences at firms that likely charge the same price to every employee for any
particular plan, and whether the findings are broadly applicable. Another potential
source of bias is the estimation strategy used in most of these studies. Short and
Taylor (1989) use a national sample of firms, but estimate two unrelated logit regres-
sions, whether to select an HMO or FFS plan and whether, conditional on choosing
some FFS plan, to select the high- or low-premium option, even though the probabil-
ities associated with each of these decisions are likely related. Barringer and Mitchell
(1994) estimate a conditional logit model on a large multi-state firm that charges
different premiums by state for the same plans. These studies find that employees
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are especially responsive to the premium and coinsurance of non-HMO plans, and
that consumers are more likely to select a plan that has additional features, including
dental or mental health coverage.
Feldman, Finch, Dowd, and Cassou (1989) suggest that the independence of ir-
relevant alternatives (IIA) assumption necessary for the conditional logit approach
is easily violated in a health insurance market with close substitutes. The sharp
contrast between health maintenance organization (HMO) plans, that feature lower
premiums and cost sharing but restrict access to providers and specialists, and more
traditional fee-for-service (FFS) plans means that when a new HMO plan is offered,
it is likely to draw enrollees mostly from the other HMO plan. They instead es-
timate a nested logit model, which relaxes the IIA assumption by grouping strong
substitutes into a nest (HMO vs. non-HMO), estimating the probability of choosing
any plan in the nest, and then estimating the conditional probability of selecting a
particular plan within that nest.1 Using data from a small group of Minneapolis-area
firms, they find that consumers have a significant negative elasticity with respect to
the premium, but each individual element of the coinsurance schedule is either in-
significant or significant in the wrong direction, suggesting that consumers are not as
responsive to cost sharing as theory would predict. They also find that older people
(but not those with chronic conditions, surprisingly) are more likely to choose the
non-HMO nest, and that a premium increase for one HMO plan will increase the
market share for both the other HMO plans in the same nest and plans in the other
nest.
Most recent papers have adopted the nested logit empirical framework. Abraham,
Vogt, and Gaynor (2006) estimate a nested logit model using a subset of the same
1Though Feldman, et al. (1989) reject the equivalence of the conditional logit model and the nested logit model,
Royalty and Solomon (1999) do not. The latter paper reports only conditional logit results, which requires that the
IIA assumption holds.
123
data I use in this paper. They find that employees are sensitive to employee con-
tributions to the premium for both HMO and non-HMO plans. They also interact
personal characteristics with the employee premium, finding that married employees
and those who file the full IRS-1040 form are less price-sensitive, and federal gov-
ernment workers have higher elasticities (in absolute value). Although the approach
and data are strikingly similar to mine, there are some important methodological
differences. They include only two incomplete measures of cost sharing under the
plan, deductibles and the outpatient coinsurance rate; the effect of the deductible
on plan choice is small and insignificant for both HMOs and non-HMOs, and the
coinsurance rate is statistically insignificant for HMOs and significant in the wrong
direction for non-HMOs. They ignore other elements of the plan besides premium,
deductible, coinsurance, and plan type (HMO vs. non-HMO). Finally, they join
with nearly the entire stock of the literature in neglecting higher moments of the
out-of-pocket spending distribution and their effect on plan choice.
Only a handful of papers consider aspects of the medical cost distribution other
than the mean. Marquis and Holmer (1986, 1996), as part of the RAND Health
Insurance Experiment, use self-reported expected total medical expenditures and
coinsurance information of one’s randomly-assigned plan to simulate the distribution
of one’s expected out-of-pocket expenditure. They find that a model of asymmetric
utility over monetary gains and losses, rather than eventual net income, is a better
fit for consumers’ behavior. Ellis (1989) uses a nonparametric method to determine
which plan offered to employees of a single financial services firm is optimal at various
points in the distribution. Fang, Keane and Silverman (2007) include the variance of
expected expenditures, calculated as part of an effort to predict missing expenditure
data in the Health and Retirement Study, as a potential source of advantageous
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selection.
My paper contributes to the literature on health plan choice in several ways. Sat-
isfying the Scanlon, et al. (1997), critique, I use data from a recent national sample
of employers that includes detailed information on each plan they offer their em-
ployees, reweighted to be nationally representative, from a period where HMO and
non-HMO plans were both prominent in the marketplace. I calculate the distribution
of a family’s potential out-of-pocket expenditure in a way that completely summa-
rizes how the deductible, differences in coinsurance by care type, and out-of-pocket
and plan-paid maximums interact, using the actual expenditure profiles of others
in the national sample. This calculation allows me to consider how both the mean
and the variance of the distribution influence one’s choice of health insurance plans,
which most previous work ignores. In addition to the employee contribution and
the two moments of the out-of-pocket expenditure distribution, I also consider other
plan elements like supplemental coverage and covered services that are not usually
available in most data sources.
4.3 Theoretical Framework
In the choice of health plans, the consumer likely has utility over many factors
related to health care delivery and non-financial elements of the plans. For exposition,
though, I first model the consumer’s utility over a single dimension, the money
remaining to spend on all other goods after accounting for necessary health care
spending (“disposable income,” ỹ).
The consumer earns a fixed after-tax annual salary y, and is offered J health plans
by her employer, with plan j ∈ J requiring an annual employee contribution toward
the premium of pj.
2 For a given level of health spending h, the plan will reimburse
2I do not model the employer’s decision over which plans to offer; see Moran, Chernew, and Hirth (2001) and
125
the employee’s care providers for gj(h) on the dollar, requiring (1 − gj(h))h of the
employee. Thus, for fixed h, plan j will leave the employee with ỹ = y − pj − (1 −
gj(h))h to spend on all other goods.
3
I model the consumer’s utility as a quadratic function of disposable income, u(ỹ) =
bỹ + cỹ2, though this specification could indicate either that the utility function
is indeed quadratic, or represent a second-order approximation of the true utility
function. Hanoch and Levy (1970) derive that this utility function must have b ≥ 0
because the marginal utility u′(ỹ) = b + 2cỹ must be positive for all ỹ and ỹ = 0 is
a valid value, and c < 0 because −u′′/u′ > 0 for all ỹ.4 The consumer will select
the plan that maximizes her expected utility, Eu(ỹ). In ỹ, y and p are both known
with certainty as part of the contractual arrangement with the employer, and g(· )
is known for any particular value of h. But h itself is subject to uncertainty about
the health of her and her family. Because of the often complex coinsurance schedule
1 − g(h), it is both notationally and empirically convenient to consider the entire
expression (1 − g(h))h, or her total out-of-pocket spending, to be uncertain, and
distributed H(μ, σ2). Her expected utility while covered by plan j is therefore
Euj(ỹ) = bE(ỹ) + cE(ỹ
2) (4.1)
= bE[y − pj − (1− gj(h))h] + cE[(y − pj − (1− gj(h))h)2]
= by − bpj − bE[(1− gj(h)h] + cy2 + cp2j − 2cypj
− 2cyE[(1− gj(h))h]− 2cpjE[(1− gj(h))h] + cE[((1− gj(h))h)2]
= by − bpj − bμ+ cy2 + cp2j − 2cypj − 2cyμ− 2cpjμ+ cμ2 + cσ2,
Bundorf (2002). I also assume that employees sort into jobs exogenously with respect to the composition of insurance
offers, a conventional, albeit potentially problematic, assumption in the literature on employees’ plan choice.
3It is likely that the more generous is plan j, i.e. the larger is gj , the higher h will be due to moral hazard,
which will reduce ỹ even further for more generous plans. Furthermore, this moral hazard effect will likely result in
a higher premium for plan j to cover the increased payments to care providers. The model will therefore understate
the tradeoff of all other goods required for more generous health insurance.
4This framework requires that ỹ have an upper bound which keeps marginal utility positive.
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where the last two terms derive from the definition of variance.5
Recalling that c < 0, equation (4.1) suggests that the consumer’s expected utility
from selecting a particular health plan depends on her after-tax income (with an
expected positive effect) and its square (negative), the premium she pays and its
square (both negative), the mean expected out-of-pocket spending (in levels) under
that plan (negative), the pairwise interaction of these three terms (all positive), and
the second moment of the out-of-pocket spending distribution (the sum of the distri-
bution’s variance and its squared mean, with an expected negative sign). Intuitively,
larger and more uncertain out-of-pocket medical costs are unattractive, a higher pre-
mium is undesirable and increasingly so as it gets larger, and the marginal utility of
income is increasing but at a decreasing rate.6
Of course, utility is also likely to be a function of other characteristics of the
plan, such as whether the consumer is required to get a referral to see a specialist or
whether the plan includes coverage for mental health or long term care, as well as
characteristics of the consumer, including demographic variables and the health care
needs of her and her covered family members. Let X represent the plan characteris-
tics, which include p, p2, μ, μ2, σ2, and their interactions both with each other and
with y. Let Z represent the characteristics of the consumer, which includes y and its
square. Most of the existing literature (e.g., Barringer and Mitchell, 1994) estimates
a conditional logit model, where the expected utility function for consumer i,
Euij = Xijβ + Ziα + εij
includes an independently and identically distributed error term with an extreme-
5By definition, σ2 = E[(x− μ)2] = E[x2 − 2xμ+ μ2] = E[x2]− 2μE[x] + μ2 = E[x2]− 2μ2 + μ2 = E[x2]− μ2, so
E[x2] = σ2 + μ2.
6Hanoch and Levy (1970), in the context of evaluating two portfolios of financial assets, discuss the conditions
under which one portfolio strictly dominates another in a quadratic utility model. In a pairwise comparison where the
means and variances of both portfolios’ distributions are known, portfolio A dominates portfolio B if (Δμ2−Δσ2) > 0,
where ΔX = XA − XB for each parameter X. To make this applicable to health plans, one would have to assume
that the premium for each plan is proportional to its desirability.
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value distribution.
In the model of plan choice, however, the error terms are likely to not be indepen-
dent in one important variable: how much the plan restricts the consumer’s choice
of providers. Feldman, Finch, Dowd, and Cassou (1989) give the example of a firm
that offers two plans, one traditional fee-for-service plan and another that is part of
an HMO, each enrolling half of the firm’s employees (so the odds ratio of selecting
the HMO plan to the FFS plan is 1:1). If the firm begins to offer another HMO
plan, the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption that is inherent
in the conditional logit model requires that the odds ratio between the two plans,
1:1, remains unchanged, so that the third plan picks off enrollees equally from the
two existing plans (e.g., each plan enrollees one-third of the employees). More likely,
because they are less concerned about restrictions on provider choice, most of the
enrollees in the new HMO plan will come from the existing HMO plan, which is its
closest substitute. This reduces the odds ratio, violating independence.
Feldman, et al., instead suggest the nested logit model. The choice set of J
plans can be split into two nests: HMO plans on the one hand, and plans that offer
less restrictive access to providers like FFS plans or preferred provider organizations
(PPOs) on the other. For example, a firm may initially offer just two HMO plans and
two non-HMO plans. Within the HMO nest, a third HMO plan offered on top of two
existing ones may pull enrollees disproportionately from the plan that is its closest
substitute, violating IIA. Some of the new HMO plan’s enrollees may also come from
the non-HMO plans in the choice set, but because HMO and non-HMO plans are
different enough with respect to provider choice, both non-HMO plans should lose
enrollees to the new plan proportionally, so the IIA assumption is maintained across
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nests.7
The consumer selects the plan that yields the highest expected utility. Plan j
among the Jk plans in nest k will yield the highest utility with probability Pjk,
which equals the probability of choosing plan j conditional on choosing any plan in
nest k, Pj|k, times the probability of choosing any plan in nest k, Pk. The nested
logit model therefore estimates how the variables in X and Z, respectively, affect
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∑
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Xpkβ/τ ) is called the “inclusive value.”
In this paper, there are two possible nests, HMO plans or non-HMO plans, so





The smaller the coefficient τ , the more important are the characteristics of the
nest, or plan type. If τ = 1, then consumers make no distinction between HMOs and
non-HMOs and are equally likely to substitute across plan type, so IIA holds. An
estimate of τ < 1, therefore, serves as a specification test for the nested logit model
compared to the conditional logit model.
4.4 Data
The Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) is a series of surveys conducted
by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. The Household Component
7One commonly misunderstood implication of the nested logit model is that the consumer need not first decide
whether to select an HMO plan or not, and then choose from the options within that category. On the contrary,
Hensher, Rose, and Greene (2005, p. 482) make clear that the nest structure of this model does not imply such a
temporal ordering. More realistically, the consumer considers each plan simultaneously, but her choice is influenced
by, among other things, the degree to which the plan restricts access to providers.
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(HC) includes information about demographics, labor market outcomes, self-reported
health status, and insurance coverage by month and source from a household sur-
vey conducted five times over a two-year period. In addition, households provide
information about the source and frequency of health care they have received, which
MEPS uses to survey medical providers about which conditions were treated, the
treatments that were performed, drugs prescribed, and the amounts and sources of
payment for care. The information from the Household and Medical Provider Com-
ponents are publicly available and nationally representative (when weighted), with
a new two-year panel starting each year since 1996.
MEPS also interviews employers about firm and establishment characteristics and
the plans they offer to their employees. The Insurance Component (IC) includes in-
formation on up to four plans for private employers and up to 36 plans for public
employers, including employee and employer contributions to premiums, coinsur-
ance/copayments, out-of-pocket and plan-paid maximums, included and optional
coverage types, covered services, and plan requirements (such as whether there is a
waiting period for a pre-existing condition or if one needs a referral to see a specialist)
for each offered plan.8
During five of the first six years of the MEPS survey, 1996 through 1999 and 2001,
the IC sample purposefully included employers of individuals in the Household Com-
ponent, thus allowing for a link between demographic and health variables from the
household survey and details about offered plans’ premiums, coinsurance schedule,
and nonfinancial elements for approximately 8000 employees. MEPS warns that the
link rate is low and not nationally representative; in my sample, employees at large
firms (100 employees or more) are particularly over-represented, so all results are re-
8I include up to seven plans per employee: the union of the selected plan, the next three most popular plans
overall and the next three most popular plans of the type (HMO or non-HMO) ultimately selected by the employee.
The weighted average, excluding those with a single offer, was 3.2 plans per employee.
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weighted to reflect the differences between the (weighted) nationally representative
sample in the full HC and the smaller sample from the HC-IC Linked File.
I focus only on the intensive margin of insurance coverage; the decision whether to
take up any employer-sponsored health insurance plan is left for further research. My
sample excludes, therefore, all employees who were offered only one plan and thus
were not choosing between plans, and anyone who refused employer coverage and
either remains uninsured or received coverage though an individual with an employer
who was not part of the HC-IC Linked File. I observe generally one employee per
employer, and plans or insurers are not linked across employers, so I have no way of
controlling for firm-, insurer- or plan-specific fixed effects.
Because the choice of health plans is often a family decision, I estimate each
regression separately for unmarried individuals and married employees without a
working spouse. I exclude individuals with a working spouse for two reasons. First,
for most dual-earner families (about 92 percent), I observe only one of the two
employed spouses’ employer insurance offers; if both spouses were offered insurance,
the choice set is incomplete. Second, as Feldman et al. (1989) point out, the IIA
assumption may be violated for dual earner families if plans in one spouse’s choice
set are close substitutes for the other’s offers. To properly account for the family’s
full choice set, I would need more information than the data can provide.
4.5 Empirical Implementation
The coefficients for the plan (X) and individual (Z) characteristics and the in-
clusive value (I) in the nested logit model, β, α, and τ , respectively, are estimated
by maximum likelihood, separately by coverage status (single coverage or family
coverage excluding those with working spouses).
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Two variables among the plan characteristics (X) are of particular interest: the
mean and variance of the distribution of out-of-pocket spending in one’s plan. If
the consumer, when choosing among her plan offers, knew with certainty how much
she would spend in the coming year, only her projected out-of-pocket spending in
each plan would affect her decision. While the consumer likely has some information
about her imminent health needs, much remains uncertain, and hence the desire for
health insurance. Ideally, the researcher would know the shape of the distribution of
her expectations about her future spending, but this is a difficult question to include
on a survey. Instead, I use data on medical spending by others in the MEPS sample
to trace out the distribution of potential out-of-pocket spending under each plan.9
The MEPS Insurance Component includes detailed information on the cost-sharing
elements of each offered plan. Thus, for any given pattern of spending during the
year, I can calculate how much the individual would have paid out-of-pocket, taking
into account whether and when the deductible (if applicable) was satisfied, differ-
ences in coinsurance or co-payments for spending on physician care, inpatient or
outpatient hospital visits, and prescription drugs, and whether an out-of-pocket or
plan-paid maximum is reached. The MEPS Household Component sample includes
thousands of these patterns of spending; therefore, following Chapter II, I calculate
how much any individual in the MEPS would have spent had he or she had any par-
ticular plan from the HC-IC Linked File.10 I then calculate the mean and variance
of the resulting distribution of possible out-of-pocket spending outcomes.11
9Another approach would be to use the distribution of out-of-pocket spending by other enrollees in the same plan,
but MEPS lacks an identifier variable that would link plans across employers, so as far as I know, I observe only one
enrollee per plan. Also, nearly all of the households in the Linked File appear during the first of their two years in
the MEPS-HC, so I cannot use the previous year’s expenditures (as does Ellis, 1989) to predict the current year’s
spending.
10The calculated mean and variance is similar when I restrict the distribution to individuals in the Linked File,
rather than the full MEPS household sample.
11In Chapter II, I calculated the out-of-pocket and plan-paid rates, rather than the levels used here, but the process
is the same.
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I refine the sample of MEPS-HC observations that are included in the out-of-
pocket calculation in two ways. First, if the employee has only individual coverage,
I restrict the sample to other people with single coverage; likewise, employees opting
for family coverage are compared to other families.12 Second, an employee likely
has some sense of the shape of the distribution based on whether she, or at least
one of her family members, has a chronic condition that requires regular medical
care. Therefore, if there is at least one chronic condition in her family, I included
only individuals or families with a chronic condition in the distribution calculation,
while limiting the sample to those without chronic conditions if no one in her family
has one. There are thus four risk groups, in ascending order by mean out-of-pocket
spending: single coverage without a chronic condition, family coverage without a
chronic condition, single with a chronic condition, family with a chronic condition.
Table 4.1 shows how elements of the plan’s coinsurance schedule contribute to
whether the plan is a high- or low-generosity, and high- or low-volatility plan. As
expected, plans with low mean out-of-pocket spending, and with low variance on that
spending, are less likely to have deductibles, have lower coinsurance and co-payments,
and are less likely to have plan-paid annual or lifetime maximums (though, somewhat
surprisingly, are also less likely to have annual out-of-pocket limits). There is also
little difference in most alternative coverage types, though the higher likelihood of
requiring referrals suggests that HMO plans are disproportionately represented in
the lower quartiles.13
12I do not impute whether any individual from the MEPS sample would have chosen single or family coverage.
As a result, the uninsured and those with public coverage, who face much different prices and incentives for medical
spending, are excluded from the distribution calculation. The exclusion of Medicare recipients likely eliminates many
of the highest spending outcomes, but the elderly may not be the best comparison for working-age individuals and
their families.
13Normally, HMO plans are considered less generous, not more generous. Cutler, McClellan, and Newhouse (2000)
find that HMOs are better able to negotiate low prices for care, so both total and out-of-pocket spending will be
lower under HMO plans, which will make HMO plans look more generous. Due to this difference in measurement, I
feel that the nested logit model is the appropriate choice, as HMO plans are compared only to other HMO plans.
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Table 4.1 also suggests the high degree of correlation between the mean and
variance of out-of-pocket spending. High deductible plans, for example, are likely
to have both high mean out-of-pocket spending, as well as a high variance of out-
of-pocket spending. Indeed, the overall correlation between the mean out-of-pocket
spending level and its variance is 0.62; the correlation between the difference in mean
spending between any plan and the most generous plan offered by a firm and the
difference in variance between any plan and the least volatile plan is 0.76. While the
correlation between level and volatility is high, the estimation below allows for each
moment of the out-of-pocket spending distribution to have its own impact on plan
choice, controlling for the other moment.
In addition to the mean and variance of the out-of-pocket spending distribution,
X includes the employee’s contribution to the premium (“co-premium”). In some
specifications, I also include the square of the co-premium, and the pairwise in-
teractions between income, co-premium, and mean out-of-pocket spending level, as
suggested by the model in Section 4.3. Approximately 20 percent of employees pay
no portion of the premium for a single coverage plan, and 8 percent pay nothing
for a family plan (Table 4.2). Six percent pay the same non-zero amount for all
plans, and another 19 percent pay the same amount for each HMO plan and the
same for each non-HMO plan.14 For these individuals, there is no tradeoff between
more (financial) generosity and a greater upfront price, so it should be a relatively
easy decision to choose the most (financially) generous plan, all else equal. I run the
estimation separately just for those who pay different premiums for each plan, as
this is the group whose response to price, both upfront and during the year, is most
relevant.
14This includes individuals who are offered exactly one HMO and one non-HMO plan, the most popular combination
of plans at 22.8 percent of the sample. The next most common combination is 1 HMO and 2 non-HMO plans (11.7
percent), 2 HMO plans and no non-HMO plans (9.4 percent), and 2 HMO plans and 1 non-HMO plan (9.2 percent).
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Table 4.3 displays weighted and unweighted summary statistics for the key vari-
ables, including the moments of the out-of-pocket distribution, the employee’s share
of the premium, and after-tax income. The effect of the weight is most apparent in
the reduction in the average number of enrollees in a plan between the first three
and last three columns.
Another X variable of interest is the share of enrollees in the plan. The coin-
surance schedule for a plan may be confusing, and even if perfectly understood, the
consumer may have trouble predicting their probability of becoming ill or injured
and evaluating the consequences (Liebman and Zeckhauser, 2008). A simple way to
choose a plan would be to ask a coworker, or to choose the plan that the human
resources department has set as the default option. In either event, employees would
be more likely to select a plan the greater is the share of employees at one’s establish-
ment that have also selected that plan, so the predicted effect is positive. Because
there may be diminishing returns to the plan’s popularity, I include the square of
enrollee share as well.
X also includes the benefits in the plan aside from financial coverage for basic
care: whether the plan includes (or has as an option for) coverage for dental, mental
health, and long-term care; whether the plan requires a referral from the primary
care provider to see a specialist; and indicator variables for whether the plan includes
a deductible or an out-of-pocket stop loss limit. Table 4.4 presents the probability
of selecting a plan given whether that plan and/or one of the employee’s alternative
offers included a particular service. Most services are either offered in both plans or
in neither plan, so there is little variation in nonfinancial plan characteristics between
offers off of which to identify the influence of these factors on plan choice.
The variables in Z do not vary between plans, so their primary purpose is to
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provide an estimate of adverse selection between HMO and non-HMO plans. In
the most basic specification, Z includes only after-tax family income, though in
subsequent specification Z also includes the square of income, indicator variables
for whether the employee is female or married, age and its square, and categorical
variables for race and ethnicity and educational attainment. I also include in the
full regression measures of the relative health of the individual and her family, with
indicators for whether the employee herself only (for single coverage employees; for
employees, it is the the number of family members she covers) has a chronic condition,
has a disability or limitation (i.e., answers “yes” to any Activities of Daily Living or
Instrumental Activities of Daily Living question in the MEPS survey), reports fair
or poor physical or mental health (on a 5-point scale), or is age 2 or younger (family
coverage only); these variables will measure the degree to which there is adverse
selection between HMOs and non-HMOs (Feldman, et al., 1989; see also Chapter
II). Finally, Z includes characteristics of the firm, including categorical variables for
the number of employees in the establishment and the region of the country, whether
the firm is in an urban area, and indicator variables for union status and whether
the firm self-insures.15
The coefficients on the variables of interest, the first and second moments of the
out-of-pocket spending distribution and the premium, are identified off variation in
plan offers. Figures 4.0(a), 4.0(b), and 4.0(c) plot the distribution of the differences
in the mean out-of-pocket total, variance of the out-of-pocket total, and employee-
paid premium, respectively, between the selected plan and each rejected alternative.
While the largest portion of the mean out-of-pocket spending level distribution for,
especially, singles is at zero, there is a fair amount of dispersion, particularly for
15In another specification, I included 11 categorical variables for industry, but none of the coefficients were signif-
icant, and the estimation had trouble converging with so many fewer degrees of freedom.
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employees with family coverage.
The model predicts that as the mean out-of-pocket spending total increases, the
plan becomes less attractive. Figure 4.1(a) displays the probability of selecting a plan
given how much greater the out-of-pocket spending level is than the most generous
plan in an employee’s portfolio. Nearly 45 percent of employees select the most
generous plan. As the difference in out-of-pocket burden increases, the plans are
chosen with less frequency; greater than 30 percent of plans in the first decile of mean
out-of-pocket spending difference are selected, but only 20 percent of the plans in the
highest decile are selected.16 The model also suggests that more uncertainty in out-
of-pocket spending is undesirable, so we should observe that as the relative variance
of the out-of-pocket spending distribution for a plan increases, the probability of
selecting the plan decreases. Figure 4.1(b) suggests that this is weakly the case
for single employees, but there is no negative relationship between the difference in
out-of-pocket spending variance with the least volatile plan and the probability of
selecting a plan for employees in family coverage without a working spouse. Looking
at premium alone ignores differences in out-of-pocket burden and other measures of
plan quality, but single employees more frequently opt for less expensive plans, while
employees in family coverage appear to be more likely to consider other elements
besides upfront price (Figure 4.1(c)).
4.6 Results
Table 4.5 presents the results of the nested logit regression for the single coverage
subsample. For each observation, I evaluate the derivative of each X (top panel) and
Z (bottom panel) variable given that observation’s values for the other variables, and
16A linear trend line through the points in Figure 4.1(a) has a significantly negative slope for both single employees
and employees with family coverage and no working spouse.
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then report the mean derivative over the sample. Standard errors (in parentheses)
are estimated by bootstrap over 100 iterations of the nested logit model.
The first column of Table 4.5 includes only the basic characteristics of the plan —
the first two moments of the out-of-pocket spending distribution, the employee-paid
premium, and whether the plan is a fee-for-service plan, plus after-tax family income,
which is constant across plans and thus outside the nest. The marginal effects for
most of the plan characteristics are in the expected direction. A small increase in
the mean out-of-pocket spending under a plan decreases the likelihood it is chosen
by 2.6 percent, which is significantly different from zero at the 99 percent confidence
level. The effect of the employee contribution toward the premium is also negative
and statistically significant; a small increase leads to a 1.2 percent decrease in the
probability that the plan is selected. The effect of an increase in the second moment
is unexpectedly positive but minuscule and not statistically significant.
In the second column, I include quadratic terms for the co-premium and income,
as well as pairwise interactions between the mean out-of-pocket amount, co-premium,
and income, as suggested by the theoretical model. As in the first column, a small
increase in family income leads to a statistically significant but fairly small (0.1
percent) increase in the probability of choosing an HMO plan. The effect of mean
out-of-pocket spending decreases in magnitude but remains statistically significant,
so that a small increase in the patient’s financial burden would result in a 2.1 percent
decrease in the probability the plan is selected. The magnitude of the effect of the
second moment remains tiny and statistically insignificant. The negative effect of the
employee premium also decreases in absolute value, enough to make it statistically
insignificant at conventional levels.
To account for the effect of plan elements aside from price and the financial
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generosity for basic care types, in specification 3, I add indicator variables for mental
health care, long term care, and dental care coverage; whether the plan requires
referrals, has a deductible, and has an out-of-pocket stop loss; and the share of
employees at one’s establishment that select that plan and its square, which will proxy
for the de facto or de jure default option in the choice set. I also include additional
personal characteristics outside the nest, including gender, race, education, marital
status, geographic variables, union status, firm size, age and its square, and health
measures.
In the full specification (column 3), the effect of a small increase in mean out-
of-pocket spending still reduces the probability a plan is selected by 1.6 percent,
but the magnitude decreases enough that the confidence interval includes zero. The
effect of the second moment is negative, but even smaller than before and not close
to statistical significance. The co-premium actually has a positive, albeit small and
statistically insignificant, effect. Only one plan characteristic has an effect that
is significant, either substantively or statistically — a small increase in the plan’s
market share in the establishment increases the probability that plan is selected by
45 percent, which is statistically different from zero at the 95 confidence level.17
The marginal effects in the bottom panel of column 3 provide little evidence
of adverse selection between HMO and non-HMO plans. Older people, those with
chronic conditions, or employees that report fair or poor physical or mental health
are all less likely to choose a (generally less-generous) HMO plan, consistent with
adverse selection, but none of the effects are statistically significant. I can only reject
the null for the indicator for whether the employee has a limitation, which actually
makes one more likely to select an HMO plan; this runs counter to the effect I would
17The coefficient on the quadratic term for enrollee share is positive and statistically insignificant, suggesting that
the effect of plan’s popularity at the establishment does not diminish as it increases.
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observe if there was adverse selection.18
In Table 4.6, I change the specification slightly — instead of including the second
moment, which is shown above to be the sum of the square of the first moment plus
the variance, I include these two variables separately. The marginal effect of mean
out-of-pocket spending, which now includes its square, is greater in magnitude than
in the matching column in Table 4.5, and remains statistically significant at the 90
percent confidence level after the addition of other characteristics of the plan and
employee. The variance has the predicted negative effect, but small enough to ignore.
The mean derivative for the other coefficients, including the co-premium, are almost
exactly the same as in Table 4.5.
One complication with plan choice is that many employers ask for the same em-
ployee contribution for any plan they offer, or at least the same employee contribution
for any plan of the same type. Table 4.7 repeats the analysis just for the sample
that pays a different co-premium for each plan, and the results are largely similar.
Without controlling for plan or personal characteristics, the effect of a small increase
in mean out-of-pocket level is almost identical in magnitude to estimate with the full
sample of single coverage employees, but in the full model, the effect becomes larger
and statistically significant for this refined sample. As one might expect, employees
appear to be more price sensitive when I eliminate those who face the same premium
for each plan, though the marginal effect of co-premium on plan choice is statisti-
cally insignificant when I include all plan and personal characteristics. The effect of
the market share of a plan is larger; on average, a small increase in plan popularity
increases its likelihood that any individual will pick the plan by 60 percent. There
18All of the reduction in the marginal effect of mean out-of-pocket spending between specifications 2 and 3 is due
to the addition of personal characteristics. Adding these variables without adding the other plan characteristics
results in a smaller (in absolute value) marginal effect of the co-premium as well, but it remains negative, while the
effect of the second moment is basically unchanged.
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is somewhat more evidence of adverse selection between HMO and non-HMO plans,
as HMO enrollees are younger and less likely to report fair or poor physical health,
but oddly more likely to have a limitation.
Some of the employees in the sample in Table 4.7 pay a larger contribution for
a less generous and/or more volatile plan. In Table 4.8, I further parse the sample
into just those who pay the lowest premium for the plan with the highest mean out-
of-pocket spending and largest out-of-pocket spending variance. The magnitude of
the effect of mean generosity on plan choice is larger than in the full sample when I
do not control for other plan characteristics, but matches the estimate in Table 4.5
when I include other plan parameters. Most of the other effects match the estimates
from the full sample, both in magnitude and significance.
The results for employees in family coverage, excluding those with a working
spouse, are quite similar (Table 4.9). Not accounting for other plan characteristics, a
small increase in the mean out-of-pocket spending level decreases the likelihood the
plan is selected by a statistically-significant 2.1 percent, but this effect approaches
zero and is imprecisely measured when controlling for other measures of plan quality.
The second moment again has no effect on plan choice when controlling for the
first moment. The employee contribution to the premium has a much smaller (and
statistically insignificant) effect for employees with family coverage. Plan popularity
is an even bigger factor for families; holding plan characteristics constant, a small
increase in market share at the establishment increases the probability the plan will
be selected by over 80 percent. There is also no evidence of adverse selection between
HMO and non-HMO plans.
At the bottom of each table of regression results, I report the coefficient τ on
the inclusive value for both HMOs and non-HMOs. None of the τ estimates are
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significantly less than one; I cannot rule out that the independence of irrelevant
alternatives assumption holds, so the conditional logit model, which makes the IIA
assumption, may be appropriate.19 In Table 4.10, I report mean derivatives based on
the conditional logit estimates for the full single coverage sample, without (column
1) and with (column 2) interactions between the HMO dummy variable and each
basic plan characteristic, to account for the different implications of plan generosity
in an HMO plan. The magnitude of the effect of mean out-of-pocket spending level
is negative, as expected, but smaller and statistically insignificant than in the nested
logit estimates, while the effect of the second moment is again minuscule. The co-
premium has a stronger negative effect on plan choice, though I have not controlled
for other plan characteristics, which diminished the employee’s price sensitivity in
previous specifications. An HMO plan is twenty percent more likely to be chosen,
an effect which decreases only slightly when I interact the HMO dummy with plan
parameters.
4.7 Conclusion
This paper estimates the relative influence of employee-paid premiums and both
the level and variance of financial plan generosity in the selection of health plans from
among the options offered by one’s employer. Essentially, this paper is measuring
the price responsiveness of demand for health insurance (and the health care costs
which it insures against); where it differs with traditional consumer products is that
the price has both upfront and ongoing elements, and that the ongoing portion is
subject to uncertainty. In order to control for that ongoing element, I use detailed
plan information from an employer survey combined with comprehensive medical
19This runs counter to the finding in Feldman, et al. (1989), but is consistent with Royalty and Solomon’s (1999)
result.
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spending data from employees and their providers to derive a unique, flexible measure
of potential out-of-pocket spending under any hypothetical plan.
The results suggest that the employees are more concerned with the level of this
ongoing element than the upfront price, though their choice is not influenced by
any uncertainty in the within-year price. Employees in single coverage, especially,
are less likely to choose a plan the greater is the expected value of out-of-pocket
spending under that plan, but the potential variance of out-of-pocket spending has
a minuscule, imprecisely-estimated effect on the probability a plan is selected. The
employee’s contribution toward the premium also has a small and, when controlling
for the full menu of plan parameters, imprecisely-estimated effect on plan choice.
Coverage types beyond basic physician and hospital care, and plan characteristics
such as required referrals and deductibles, also have little influence on the choice of
plans.
One concern in the estimation of price elasticity is that an observed good is not
homogeneous; if a higher price reflects higher unobserved quality, quantity demanded
may not be decreasing in price. With health insurance, the most important element
of plan quality is the ongoing portion of the plan’s price, its potential out-of-pocket
cost to the employee; using multiple moments of the distribution of out-of-pocket
spending yields a more complete picture of the impact of this quality measure on
demand for a plan. My model also includes other ways in which plans differ, including
the structure of the plan (HMO, PPO, or FFS), the types of coverage beyond basic
care that are included or optional, and whether the plan requires specialist referrals.
I also include the plan’s market share at the firm, which is in part a proxy measure
of quality, as higher quality plans should be more popular, all else equal.
Still, among the disadvantages to using a national sample of employers rather
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than a single firm or small group of firms is that plan heterogeneity remains, due
to missing information and measurement error. While MEPS includes information
on whether many potential elements are offered in the plan, other factors which
are harder or more sensitive to measure, including network breadth (in particular,
whether an employee’s desired care provider is in the given plan), waiting times,
coverage refusals, enrollee satisfaction, and employees learning about plan quality
over time, are missing. Even for the variables that are present, aside from coverage
for physician and hospital care, the researcher knows at most the extensive margin
of, e.g., mental health coverage. Measurement error is also likely a factor; respon-
dents across firms may have different answers for the same health plan, based on the
particular respondent’s understanding of the question and his or her personal expe-
rience with the plan. At a single firm, many of these unobserved differences across
employees and insurers are differenced away. A researcher using a national dataset
like MEPS must therefore tradeoff the increased measurement error and missing
information for increased external validity.
While higher-quality data may yet find that consumers are, in fact, responsive to
upfront price and the variance of within-year costs, one result here stands out: the
finding that the probability a plan is chosen is substantially increasing in the mar-
ket share of the plan within the employee’s establishment. As mentioned, this may
reflect unobserved measures of plan quality. Alternatively, consumers may simply
choose their company’s explicit default option, if one exists, or simply “follow the
herd” and choose the most popular plan. Figures 4.0(a) and 4.0(b) suggest that for
many employees, there is little difference between any two plans in generosity. Even
establishing that the plans are essentially equal in generosity may be too difficult
or time-consuming for some employees. Gibbs, Sangl, and Burrus (1996) cite focus
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groups of private insurance, Medicare, and Medicaid consumers that report confu-
sion and frustration with the information they receive at the time of enrollment on
comparisons between plans, and that consumers would require a great deal more
training to interpret the more detailed descriptions in the Health Employer Data
Information Set report cards, which were meant to assist in plan choice. Abaluck
and Gruber (2009), analyzing the recent Medicare Part D expansion that offered
the elderly expanded prescription drug benefits but with a possibly overwhelming
number of options, find that the vast majority of enrollees chose a plan that offered
less generous benefits at a higher price than some other option available to them.
Similarly, I find in Chapter II, using the same MEPS data as this study, that of em-
ployees given a choice between one plan and another less generous, more expensive
option, nearly half choose the strictly dominated plan.
Employers can counter their employees’ confusion by providing more information,
particularly about the consequences of each plan’s cost sharing elements. Schoen-
baum, Spranca, Elliott, Bhattacharya, and Short (2001) find in an experimental
setting that providing supplemental cost information to potential health insurance
consumers increases the amount of risk that consumers are willing to bear, which
they interpret as evidence that under-informed and therefore uncertain consumers
overinsure in the absence of clear information. An interesting extension of my paper
would consider the choice of plans separately by educational attainment, the number
of years the consumer has been insured by their current (or any) employer, and other
measures of consumer informedness.
Other authors suggest that the problem is not only under-informed consumers, but
under-informed researchers with models that do not properly account for advances
in behavioral economics. Ellis (1989) and Marquis and Holmer (1986, 1996), both
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motivated by the “prospect theory” outlined by Kahneman and Tversky (1979),
measure how responsive individuals are to gains and losses relative to a fixed referral
point, rather than focusing on overall medical costs predicted by the expected utility
model. Liebman and Zeckhauser (2008) suggest that the structure of health plans
in today’s market, including the expectation that relatively small co-payments will
adequately control excess demand for health care and the inability of consumers
to recognize that a dollar of employer contribution toward the premium is one less
dollar they could have been paid in cash wages, is better predicted by a behavioral
model than a more traditional expected utility model. Future models of plan choice
should better account for the implications of recent behavioral studies on consumer
behavior.
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4.8 Figures and Tables
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Mean Out-of-Pocket Spending ($)
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Employee Contribution to the Premium ($)
Single Coverage Family Coverage (Excl. Dual Earners)
Figure 4.1: Distribution of Differences between Selected and Non-Selected Plans
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Figure 4.2: Probability of Selecting Plan, By Decile of Difference with Most Generous (Lowest
Co-Premium) Plan
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Table 4.1: Plan Characteristics by Out-of-Pocket Mean and Variance Quartile
OOP Mean Quartiles OOP Variance Quartiles
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 1st 2nd 3rd 4th
Any Deductible 0.7 12.3 29.8 48.4 6.9 18.7 26.8 39.0
$0.01 to $100 36.8 16.3 6.6 1.7 8.0 9.6 5.7 3.1
$100.01 to $200 15.8 53.4 26.8 11.8 69.7 22.2 25.2 11.9
$200.01 to $500 5.3 24.3 37.2 41.8 14.9 30.3 40.1 43.7
$500.01 to $1000 0.0 0.0 2.0 35.3 0.0 0.8 10.4 37.9
$1000.01 to $2000 0.0 0.0 0.2 8.4 0.0 0.0 0.3 10.4
$2000.01 or more 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.4 0.0 0.2 0.1 4.1
Physician Co-Payment 79.6 89.4 85.5 62.5 80.9 89.9 84.7 61.6
$0.01 to $5 44.3 24.9 14.4 9.9 41.9 22.9 16.6 11.6
$5.01 to $10 41.9 48.9 55.0 46.0 46.1 51.5 51.4 41.9
$10.01 to $20 13.8 25.6 30.0 42.0 11.9 25.3 31.3 44.2
$20.01 or more 0.0 0.6 0.6 2.1 0.0 0.3 0.7 2.3
Physician Co-Insurance 0.6 5.1 12.9 35.9 0.6 5.1 13.3 35.5
0.01% to 10% 93.8 54.2 27.0 21.5 58.8 62.9 32.6 18.6
10.01% to 20% 6.3 41.7 65.8 67.3 41.2 35.7 62.1 69.0
20.01% to 50% 0.0 4.2 6.6 10.9 0.0 0.7 5.3 11.9
50.01% or more 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.4 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.5
Hospital Co-Payment 13.4 25.1 27.8 24.1 10.5 23.6 28.8 27.8
$0.01 to $50 44.7 35.2 33.5 19.3 53.6 35.5 34.5 17.6
$50.01 to $100 28.9 24.0 27.6 24.6 29.9 25.3 25.6 25.5
$100.01 to $300 25.0 34.9 34.2 42.0 15.8 36.7 34.3 42.1
$300.01 to $500 0.5 3.9 3.2 9.6 0.0 2.3 3.4 9.9
$500.01 or more 0.8 2.0 1.5 4.5 0.7 0.3 2.2 4.8
Hospital Co-Insurance 3.0 11.7 19.8 48.7 1.0 10.4 20.8 51.2
0.01% to 10% 86.0 67.1 40.9 31.2 82.8 80.3 44.7 30.0
10.01% to 20% 14.0 31.7 55.4 60.8 17.2 19.3 52.8 61.7
20.01% to 50% 0.0 1.2 3.2 7.7 0.0 0.0 2.5 7.8
50.01% or more 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.4 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.5
Out-of-Pocket Maximum 38.6 52.0 62.0 61.7 40.6 57.7 62.6 53.9
$0.01 to $1000 31.8 25.9 16.5 9.1 29.4 24.6 19.3 6.5
$1000.01 to $2000 37.6 42.5 45.9 32.9 40.5 41.1 46.2 30.7
$2000.01 to $3000 16.1 22.4 26.9 28.3 17.4 26.4 23.5 28.2
$3000.01 or more 14.5 9.1 10.8 29.7 12.7 8.0 11.0 34.6
Annual Plan-Paid Max 1.5 2.1 2.0 5.3 1.2 2.0 2.5 5.1
$0.01 to $10K 2.3 0.0 7.1 14.7 0.0 1.8 1.4 17.2
$10K to $100K 9.3 5.1 3.6 2.7 0.0 10.9 4.2 2.8
$100K to $200K 0.0 0.0 1.8 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.1
$200K or more 88.4 94.9 87.5 81.3 100.0 87.3 94.4 77.9
Lifetime Plan-Paid Max 6.1 8.7 11.5 23.0 5.5 8.5 13.2 22.3
$0.01 to $1 Mil 51.7 63.3 64.3 62.9 48.4 66.5 63.4 62.7
$1 Mil to $2 Mil 40.2 28.6 29.0 31.6 41.5 24.6 29.4 32.9
$2 Mil or more 8.0 8.1 6.7 5.5 10.1 8.9 7.2 4.4
Require Referral (0/1) 81.1 65.7 49.6 33.8 76.8 59.3 52.9 41.0
Rx Coverage (0/1) 91.0 91.3 89.8 87.1 91.6 92.2 90.5 84.7
Dental Coverage (0/1) 67.5 69.3 69.0 68.0 69.0 72.0 67.1 65.7
LTC Coverage (0/1) 63.1 66.6 65.7 56.0 64.1 68.7 65.3 53.4
Mental Coverage (0/1) 82.9 83.0 83.2 77.9 83.5 84.6 82.1 76.9
Note: In each panel, the first row (non-italicized) is the proportion of plans in the
quartile that include the plan parameter. In subsequent rows (italicized), the entry
is the proportion of plans with values in the category, conditional on including the
plan parameter.
Table 4.2: Employee Premium Sharing Arrangements, By Coverage Type
Single Coverage Family Coverage, No Working Spouse
Employee Premium Arrangement All HMO Non-HMO All HMO Non-HMO
All zero 21.3 17.4 23.6 7.9 10.2 6.4
All same (non-zero) 5.4 6.8 4.6 6.7 4.9 7.9
All HMO same, all Non-HMO same 18.3 14.1 20.9 19.9 11.7 25.4
All HMO same, Non-HMO different 20.7 41.0 8.5 23.9 46.2 8.9
HMO different, all Non-HMO same 17.6 4.9 25.3 26.2 8.0 38.4
All plans different 16.6 16.0 17.0 15.4 18.9 13.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
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Table 4.3: Summary Statistics for Unweighted and Weighted Samples
Unweighted Weighted
All Single Family All Single Family
Selected (0/1) Mean 0.308 0.311 0.308 0.342 0.346 0.344
(SD) (0.462) (0.463) (0.462) (0.475) (0.476) (0.475)
Employee Contribution ($) Mean 1012.46 400.98 1545.58 926.69 383.47 1486.92
(SD) (1166.02) (459.51) (1429.65) (1125.39) (493.93) (1415.78)
Mean OOP Amount ($) Mean 413.70 276.48 518.18 435.51 302.64 573.33
(SD) (457.62) (253.54) (559.25) (477.62) (314.75) (663.30)
Std Dev OOP Amount ($) Mean 458.48 318.51 576.94 498.21 363.06 709.86
(SD) (940.66) (437.74) (1243.18) (972.72) (534.19) (1622.99)
After-Tax Family Income ($) Mean 51664 43056 38900 49746 40312 38991
(SD) (33960) (29171) (31902) (32815) (28538) (32073)
Family Coverage (0/1) Mean 0.565 0 1 0.528 0 1
(SD) (0.496) (0.000) (0.000) (0.499) (0.000) (0.000)
HMO (0/1) Mean 0.591 0.624 0.599 0.585 0.628 0.585
(SD) (0.492) (0.485) (0.490) (0.493) (0.483) (0.493)
FFS (0/1) Mean 0.056 0.051 0.063 0.069 0.065 0.077
(SD) (0.231) (0.221) (0.242) (0.254) (0.247) (0.267)
Enrollee Share Mean 0.144 0.156 0.136 0.152 0.161 0.154
(SD) (0.215) (0.222) (0.209) (0.219) (0.221) (0.222)
Any Chronic Conditions* Mean 0.730 0.452 0.927 0.670 0.416 0.944
(SD) (0.811) (0.498) (0.932) (0.808) (0.493) (1.012)
Physical Health Fair/Poor* Mean 0.157 0.105 0.284 0.128 0.080 0.274
(SD) (0.424) (0.307) (0.597) (0.390) (0.272) (0.604)
Mental Health Fair/Poor* Mean 0.062 0.040 0.110 0.049 0.031 0.094
(SD) (0.267) (0.196) (0.379) (0.242) (0.175) (0.372)
Any Limit/ADL/IADL* Mean 0.286 0.201 0.398 0.259 0.171 0.394
(SD) (0.523) (0.401) (0.629) (0.502) (0.376) (0.637)
Number of Observations 11328 4890 2129 11095 4731 2108
*Note: Health variables are indicator variables for whether a single coverage employee has each































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4.5: Mean Derivatives from Nested Logit Regression of Plan Choice, Single Coverage Only
(1) (2) (3)
Within Nest
Mean OOP Amount -0.026 *** -0.021 ** -0.016
(0.010) (0.010) (0.012)
2nd Moment, OOP Amount 0.000026 0.000026 -0.0000013
(0.000097) (0.000099) (0.0001179)
Employee Premium* -0.012 *** -0.0084 0.00031
(0.005) (0.0051) (0.00716)
FFS -0.017 -0.016 -0.013
(0.061) (0.070) (0.061)
Enrollee Share* 0.452 **
(0.187)
Quadratics and Interactions N Y Y
Supplemental Coverage N N Y
Plan Characteristics N N Y
Nest - Picking HMO
After-Tax Family Income* 0.0010 *** 0.0016 *** -0.00024
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.00068)
Any Chronic Conditions -0.019
(0.023)
Fair/Poor Physical Health -0.0032
(0.0369)
Fair/Poor Mental Health -0.090
(0.063)




Quadratics and Interactions N Y Y
Demographics N N Y
Firm Characteristics N N Y
τ HMO 1.304 * 1.378 ** 1.337
(0.173) (0.182) (0.217)
τ Non-HMO 0.951 1.111 0.931
(0.242) (0.255) (0.442)
Number of plans 4731 4731 4731
Number of employees 1479 1479 1479
Note: Specifications 2 and 3 include quadratic terms for variables marked with * and pairwise
interactions between Mean OOP Amount, Premium, and Income. All regressions weighted to account
for non-random missing observations in HC-IC Linked File sample.
*** - Significantly different from zero at the 99% confidence level ** - 95% confidence level * - 90%
confidence level
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Table 4.6: Mean Derivatives from Nested Logit Regression of Plan Choice, Single Coverage
Only, Splitting The Second Moment
(1) (2) (3)
Within Nest
Mean OOP Amount* -0.034 *** -0.032 *** -0.029 *
(0.011) (0.010) (0.016)
Variance OOP Amount -0.000010 -0.000056 -0.000070
(0.000205) (0.000202) (0.000172)
Employee Premium* -0.012 *** -0.0084 0.00004
(0.004) (0.0069) (0.00723)
FFS -0.007 -0.002 -0.005
(0.061) (0.067) (0.056)
Enrollee Share* 0.424 **
(0.185)
Quadratics and Interactions N Y Y
Supplemental Coverage N N Y
Plan Characteristics N N Y
Nest - Picking HMO
After-Tax Family Income* 0.0010 *** 0.0016 *** -0.00008
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.00063)
Any Chronic Conditions -0.019
(0.027)
Fair/Poor Physical Health -0.0025
(0.0415)
Fair/Poor Mental Health -0.090
(0.066)




Quadratics and Interactions N Y Y
Demographics N N Y
Firm Characteristics N N Y
τ HMO 1.230 1.280 1.277
(0.181) (0.186) (0.219)
τ Non-HMO 1.011 1.187 1.013
(0.227) (0.234) (0.386)
Number of plans 4731 4731 4731
Number of employees 1479 1479 1479
Note: Specifications 2 and 3 include quadratic terms for variables marked with * and pairwise
interactions between Mean OOP Amount, Premium, and Income. All regressions weighted to account
for non-random missing observations in HC-IC Linked File sample.
*** - Significantly different from zero at the 99% confidence level ** - 95% confidence level * - 90%
confidence level
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Table 4.7: Mean Derivatives from Nested Logit Regression of Plan Choice, Single Coverage
Only, Different Premium for Each Plan
(1) (2) (3)
Within Nest
Mean OOP Amount -0.021 -0.018 -0.037 *
(0.013) (0.012) (0.022)
2nd Moment, OOP Amount 0.00012 0.00012 0.00047
(0.00032) (0.00023) (0.00034)
Employee Premium* -0.015 ** -0.0138 ** -0.0042
(0.006) (0.0065) (0.0080)
FFS -0.073 -0.079 -0.127
(0.064) (0.071) (0.124)
Enrollee Share* 0.597 *
(0.333)
Quadratics and Interactions N Y Y
Supplemental Coverage N N Y
Plan Characteristics N N Y
Nest - Picking HMO
After-Tax Family Income* -0.000047 0.0004 -0.00144
(0.000772) (0.0010) (0.00092)
Any Chronic Conditions -0.012
(0.035)
Fair/Poor Physical Health -0.130 **
(0.059)
Fair/Poor Mental Health -0.088
(0.103)




Quadratics and Interactions N Y Y
Demographics N N Y
Firm Characteristics N N Y
τ HMO 1.325 1.309 1.050
(0.278) (0.309) (0.287)
τ Non-HMO 0.868 0.887 2.039
(0.293) (0.361) (0.740)
Number of plans 2851 2851 2851
Number of employees 774 774 774
Note: Specifications 2 and 3 include quadratic terms for variables marked with * and pairwise
interactions between Mean OOP Amount, Premium, and Income. All regressions weighted to account
for non-random missing observations in HC-IC Linked File sample.
*** - Significantly different from zero at the 99% confidence level ** - 95% confidence level * - 90%
confidence level
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Table 4.8: Mean Derivatives from Nested Logit Regression of Plan Choice, Single Coverage
Only, Worst Plan Has Lowest Premium
(1) (2) (3)
Within Nest
Mean OOP Amount -0.033 ** -0.021 -0.016
(0.015) (0.016) (0.029)
2nd Moment, OOP Amount -0.000059 -0.00012 -0.00019
(0.000340) (0.00030) (0.00055)
Employee Premium* -0.020 *** -0.0055 -0.0014
(0.005) (0.0091) (0.0091)
FFS -0.054 -0.050 0.075
(0.082) (0.089) (0.103)
Enrollee Share* 0.640 **
(0.271)
Quadratics and Interactions N Y Y
Supplemental Coverage N N Y
Plan Characteristics N N Y
Nest - Picking HMO
After-Tax Family Income* 0.0018 *** 0.0023 *** 0.0012
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0018)
Any Chronic Conditions -0.075
(0.063)
Fair/Poor Physical Health -0.0087
(0.0795)






Quadratics and Interactions N Y Y
Demographics N N Y
Firm Characteristics N N Y
τ HMO 1.032 1.143 0.846
(0.477) (0.510) (0.627)
τ Non-HMO 0.74 0.77 0.863
(0.293) (0.307) (0.442)
Number of plans 1004 1004 1004
Number of employees 369 369 369
Note: Specifications 2 and 3 include quadratic terms for variables marked with * and pairwise
interactions between Mean OOP Amount, Premium, and Income. All regressions weighted to account
for non-random missing observations in HC-IC Linked File sample.
*** - Significantly different from zero at the 99% confidence level ** - 95% confidence level * - 90%
confidence level
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Table 4.9: Mean Derivatives from Nested Logit Regression of Plan Choice, Family Coverage
Only with No Working Spouse
(1) (2) (3)
Within Nest
Mean OOP Amount -0.021 ** -0.021 * -0.006
(0.010) (0.012) (0.011)
2nd Moment, OOP Amount 0.000050 0.000058 0.000028
(0.000149) (0.000205) (0.000116)
Employee Premium* -0.001 -0.0006 0.00125
(0.002) (0.0032) (0.00263)
FFS -0.006 -0.005 0.016
(0.078) (0.084) (0.057)
Enrollee Share* 0.806 **
(0.325)
Quadratics and Interactions N Y Y
Supplemental Coverage N N Y
Plan Characteristics N N Y
Nest - Picking HMO
After-Tax Family Income* 0.000038 0.000099 -0.00316 ***
(0.000460) (0.000785) (0.00093)
Number with Any Chronic Conditions 0.013
(0.023)
Number with Fair/Poor Physical Health -0.042
(0.033)
Number with Fair/Poor Mental Health -0.031
(0.042)
Number with Any Limit/ADL/IADL 0.021
(0.028)




Quadratics and Interactions N Y Y
Demographics N N Y
Firm Characteristics N N Y
τ HMO 1.122 1.171 1.314
(0.212) (0.216) (0.326)
τ Non-HMO 1.138 1.342 1.532
(0.302) (0.344) (0.758)
Number of plans 2105 2105 2105
Number of employees 648 648 648
Note: Specifications 2 and 3 include quadratic terms for variables marked with * and pairwise
interactions between Mean OOP Amount, Premium, and Income. All regressions weighted to account
for non-random missing observations in HC-IC Linked File sample.
*** - Significantly different from zero at the 99% confidence level ** - 95% confidence level * - 90%
confidence level
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Table 4.10: Mean Derivatives from Conditional Logit Regression of Plan Choice, Single
Coverage Only
(1) (2)
Mean OOP Amount -0.0070 -0.0089
(0.0098) (0.0130)
2nd Moment, OOP Amount 0.0000057 0.00000047
(0.0000837) (0.0002098)
Employee Premium -0.0092 ** -0.0100 **
(0.004) (0.0039)




HMO 0.200 *** 0.181 ***
(0.030) (0.052)
HMO Interactions N Y
Number of plans 4731 4731
Number of employees 1479 1479
Note: Specifications 2 and 3 include quadratic terms for variables marked
with * and pairwise interactions between Mean OOP Amount, Premium,
and Income. All regressions weighted to account for non-random missing
observations in HC-IC Linked File sample.
*** - Significantly different from zero at the 99% confidence level ** - 95%
confidence level * - 90% confidence level
CHAPTER V
Conclusion
This volume explores the extensive and intensive margins of health insurance
coverage, focusing on three different aspects of consumers’ interaction with the health
care system: the choice of employer-sponsored health plans, how health insurance
coverage generosity influences medical spending, and disparities in the uninsured rate
across racial and ethnic groups. Because all three chapters use data from national
surveys, the results should be more broadly applicable than studies that examine a
single firm or a small group of health insurance policyholders.
The results in the first chapter suggest that consumers do respond to the inherent
moral hazard incentive in the health insurance system: more generous coverage,
which lowers the out-of-pocket price for medical care, encourages more spending.
But inefficiency is not an automatic result. Managed care, an innovation of health
maintenance organizations that has extended into more traditional health plans,
breaks this relationship between generosity and spending to some extent. Moreover,
there is little evidence of adverse selection; if consumers with greater health care
needs are not opting for more expensive, more generous health plans, then the lack
of information sharing in today’s employer-sponsored health insurance system, and
perhaps tomorrow’s health insurance exchange, need not lead to spiraling premiums
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or inefficient provision of insurance coverage.
In the second chapter, I find that differences in citizenship, education, and labor
market outcomes do not fully account for the growth in the disparity in health insur-
ance coverage between Hispanics and non-Hispanic Whites. If universal coverage is
the societal goal, policymakers must consider both supply and demand factors that
lead to the inequality in coverage rates.
I conclude in the third chapter that, as expected, consumers desire higher levels of
coverage against health risks, but do not seem attracted to lower levels of variability
in their out-of-pocket spending. Health insurance, and its consequences for how
the insured person receives necessary or desired medical care, is complicated, and
consumers are notorious for their misunderstanding of future health care risks, so
perhaps it is not surprising that consumers do not select plans optimally.
Policymakers took an enormous step toward reforming the health insurance sys-
tem in March, 2010, especially in extending affordable coverage options to nearly all
uninsured American citizens. Further improvements will likely require consumers,
with the help of both government and private industry, to educate themselves. A
consumer with a better understanding of the elements of health insurance plans,
especially managed care and the coinsurance schedule, will likely select the health
plan that best protects her and her family from the financial risk of large medical
expenditure. Better informed consumers could result in the adverse selection we do
not currently observe in the employer system, though this may be countered by a
desire by healthier individuals to subsidize the less fortunate members of society, a
motive we observe in the progressivity of the tax and transfer system and the popu-
larity of charitable giving. Further, if employees understand the general equilibrium
effects of their demand for health insurance and health care — that their demand
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for more generous coverage results in lower wages for all, and that overspending on
medical care raises premiums for all — health insurance could become less a way to
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